Commentary Critical and Explanatory
Genesis 2:17
But of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, thou shalt not eat of it: for in the day that thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die.
The tree of the knowledge of good and evil, thou shalt not eat. The inspired historian (Genesis 2:15) resumes the thread of his narrative, which was broken by the insertion (Genesis 2:8-14) of the topographical description of Eden. Kurtz and others indeed think that this tree possessed the inherent property of imparting a knowledge of the physical evil that was in the place of his abode, and that thereby it stood in direct opposition to the tree of life; so that, by pointing to the two trees in the midst of the garden, the Creator virtually addressed the first pair in the same terms that were afterward used to the Israelites, "See, I have set before thee life and death" (Deuteronomy 30:15). But Kurtz expresses at the same time his concurrence in the common view, that this "tree of the knowledge of good and evil" was designed to be a test of man's obedience. The purpose was to test man's fidelity to God; and it is obvious that, in the state of probation in which Adam was placed at so early a stage of his existence, a positive command like this, not to eat of a particular tree, was the simplest and easiest trial to which his fidelity could have been exposed. He lived in the midst of inexhaustible abundance; because the liberal terms on which it was offered to him were, "of every tree of the garden thou mayest freely eat." The eye and the palate were alike gratified.
Every source of enjoyment was freely open to him, and his heart seemed to have nothing further to desire. One fruit of all the trees amid the infinite stores of that prolific garden was forbidden; and how easy, one should think, would it have been for Adam, in such circumstances, to have kept the injunction inviolate. Had he been placed in a hard and difficult condition, encircled by few enjoyments, or exposed to severe privations, he would still have been bound by the most sacred obligations to obey. But his actual situation was the happy reverse of this. His Creator had provided for him with divine liberality. He had bestowed upon him all that was either useful or necessary for his happiness; and the only limit set to his range of enjoyment was one thing, and that a trifling gratification at the best. But a positive command like this was not only the simplest and easiest, it was the only test to which Adam's fidelity could have been submitted. In his special circumstances, he could not be put on probation as to any of the branches of the moral law; for, since he was not yet living in society, the prohibition could not with any sense of propriety have been directed against killing, stealing, or any other violations of social duty; and being in an unfallen state, as little could the prohibition have been directed against the duties of the first table; against worshipping God by images, or taking His name in vain.
A positive command like this, not to eat of a particular tree, was a test of obedience which was in every respect the most suited to the existing condition of man, and the most highly expressive of the goodness of God. It concentrated in one single act the spirit and principle of all obedience, and it was this-not any natural property of the tree to impart heavenly wisdom, but the moral condition annexed to it, that constituted it a tree which gave the knowledge of good and evil. The equity, as well as kindness of the Creator, in making the test of man's obedience consist in compliance with a positive command like this, is manifest.
There are some, indeed, who profess, with an air of affected wisdom, to question the reasonableness of suspending the destiny of man on so trivial a circumstance; and there are others who have spoken with a sneer of profane ridicule and infidel contempt of the idea that God would punish, and with such awful severity, the venial offence, as they term it, of stealing an apple. The objection is as foolish as it is groundless: it is not only urged with an irreligious levity of tone and language that merits condemnation, but it proceeds on a total perversion of the circumstances of the case. It was not the stealing of some fruit-the injury done to a tree on which a high and particular value was set-that drew down the wrath of God upon the offenders; because how could the fruit of any single tree be of such special importance in the eyes of Him of whom it is said, "all the trees of the forest are his," and who could by a single word have filled each mountain and valley with myriads of the same species?
It was not the intrinsic value of that tree, but the principle involved in abstaining from its fruit, which God had strictly forbidden the first pair to eat. Some outward attractions that tree must doubtless have possessed. But it does not matter or alter the case whether it was a rare or a common species. The more worthless the kind of tree, the easier would it be to obey the injunction; and when all the circumstances of Adam's condition are taken into account-the inexhaustible plenty by which he was surrounded, the vast variety to satisfy his wishes, and the very small temptation which in these circumstances he had to violate his Creator's command-it is impossible to conceive that any easier test of his obedience could have been selected to determine whether the principle of true and devoted love to God was established in his heart.
For in the day thou eatest thereof, thou shalt surely die - Hebrew, 'dying thou shalt die,' which the Septuagint translates 'thou shalt die the death.' Now, since no lawgiver would annex a penalty to the breach of a command unless the party to whom it is addressed were acquainted with what they were to forfeit, the announcement to the first pair of the condition consequent on eating the fruit of the forbidden tree implies that they knew well what death was. Geological researches have fully established the fact that death took place in the pre-Adamite world.
But independently of this, and on the supposition that the first pair were total strangers to what had occurred before their time in other parts of the earth, the garden of Eden itself furnished them with ample means and opportunities of understanding the nature and effects of death. The decay and fall of plants and leaves, either through the processes of Nature or the animals that fed on these, would produce distraction in the vegetable kingdom; and since myriads of animalculae live on plants and leaves, so the dissolution of the latter would necessarily cause their living inhabitants to perish also. By these and other ways equally obvious the first pair must have familiarly understood the nature of the penalty denounced against the eating of the prohibited tree. If such an event had been entirely unknown in the world when the declaration of the Creator was made, they could have formed no conception of what it was to die; and hence, the interdict would have fallen upon their ears as an unmeaningful sound.
But if, on the other hand, death was an occurrence with which their observation, short and limited as it was, had made them familiar among the inferior creation, the threatened penalty of such a catastrophe would present the most powerful inducement to observe the command of God. But the words before us seem to imply that in the event of a careful and continued abstinence from the interdicted tree man would not be subjected to death; and hence, it has been the favourite opinion of divines, that steadfast obedience to the divine precept would have ensured him an earthly immortality, or that after a lengthened sojourn in this world-Sherlock supposes a period of one thousand years-he would have been transferred to a higher scene of existence. But the sacred narrative gives no hint of such a happy eventuality: it is entirely silent as to the alternative view of life, while it is known to be a settled principle in physiology, that every organized body is subject to the natural law of dissolution; and consequently man must, like other objects in the physical world, have been liable to mortality from the moment of his creation.
With these circumstances in view, the only conclusion that is apparently admissible is, that man, had he continued in a state of innocence, would, by the special grace of the Creator, have enjoyed a happy immunity from decay; and that the import of the declared penalty was this-`So long as thou continuest obedient and faithful, I shall give thee an exemption from death; but in the event of transgression, this privilege shall be withdrawn, and thou shalt be liable to die like the lower animals.' The first man was thus placed in a state of probation: and as, though he was already complete in all his intellectual and physical attributes, his moral character as a free agent was not yet developed, the course of probationary discipline commenced immediately or soon after his removal to the garden of Eden: for since he was not destined to continue always in that paradise, but to have dominion over the earth (Genesis 1:26-28), it was indispensably necessary for him that at the outset of life he should make the moral decision whether he would obey or disobey the will of God.
For as Kurtz justly remarks, 'Man could not, like a plant, have absolute perfection put upon him from without; by free determination and activity he was to rise to that stage for which God had destined and endowed him. Accordingly, man was immediately put into circumstances in which he was freely to decide either for or against the will of God, and thus to choose his own direction.' He was left to the uncontrolled, entire freedom of his own will, which was the source at once of his dignity and his peril. It would have altered the whole character of his choice had he been under any natural necessity to pursue a certain course; and although God foresaw the fatal result, His foreknowledge does not infringe on the liberty of human actions. This arrangement of Providence is commonly called 'the covenant of works.' The term 'covenant' does not, indeed, occur in the narrative, but it is used elsewhere in reference to this primitive state of man, because the prophet Hosea says (Hosea 6:7), "They like men (Hebrew, Adam) have transgressed the covenant;" and the apostle also alludes to its principle or conditions, 'Do and live, sin and die' (Romans 10:5; Galatians 3:12; cf. Isaiah 1:19-20). This theological phraseology is in harmony with the language of Scripture, which employs the word 'covenant' to denote sometimes an agreement between two parties who, being equal, can each stand on the terms of their compact, in which case it is expressed by the Greek term suntheekee (G4936); and at other times, when the party being greatly the superior proposes or prescribes conditions to which the other is required to submit, then it is represented by the Greek word diatheekee (G1242), an appointment, institution, or dispensation.
The Edenic dispensation had the true character of a covenant, because in every dispensation or promise God has made to the Church there was an outward sign annexed (cf. Genesis 17:7-10; Exodus 12:11; 1 Corinthians 11:20-28); and as in the subsequent dispensations theirs respective signs were pledges of the promises to which they were severally annexed - i:e., as far as material can signify or picture spiritual things-so the tree of life, which nourished Adam's physical life, typified that spiritual life which he, while obedient, possessed in the "Lord God." It has been a question much discussed, What character did Adam sustain in this primitive dispensation?-was it that of an individual, or did he appear the representative, the federal head of his posterity? Many consider that Adam acted only in a personal capacity; while others, looking upon him as in altogether special circumstances, and as connected with all mankind representatively and by covenant, since no other father has been or can be with his children, regard him as the federal or corporate head of the race-acting not for himself alone, but for all his posterity; and, accordingly, in the language of this school of divines, he is described as 'a public person.' This difference of view is necessary to be stated, since it leads to corresponding discrepancies of opinion as to the effects of the Fall.