The Preacher's Homiletical Commentary
Acts 25:6-12
CRITICAL REMARKS
Acts 25:6. More than ten days.—According to the most reliable authorities this should be not more than eight or ten days.
Acts 25:7. The many and grievous complaints, or charges, against Paul, which his accusers could not prove, were no doubt the same which had been preferred against him by Tertullus (Acts 24:5).
Acts 25:8. Paul’s defence shows that the accusations now put forward were the srme old charges to which he had already answered, only perhaps in a different order—heresy, sacrilege, sedition.
Acts 25:9. Wilt thou go up to Jerusalem and there be judged?—The proposal of Festus not merely to shift the venue or place of trial from Cæsarea to Jerusalem, but to substitute an ecclesiastical for a civil court, with himself present merely as a spectator (which seems to be the import of before me), was perhaps dictated by two motives—a desire to please the Jews (see on Acts 24:27), and a wish to rid himself of a troublesome responsibility. It had also an appearance of being fair to Paul in that it offered him a trial before a court of his own nation, with the presence of the procurator to see that no injustice was done. Only as Paul had been handed over as a Roman citizen to a Roman tribunal, the proposed change could not take place without the prisoner’s consent.
Acts 25:10. I stand, or am standing, at Cæsar’s judgment seat.—Paul knew that his doom was sealed should his case be remitted back to Jerusalem, and hence claimed to be tried as a Roman citizen before a Roman court. It can hardly be that Paul intended to say, “I stand already in mind and purpose before the Emperor’s court, for God has shown me by a special revelation that I am to preach the gospel at Rome, and my trial there is accordingly part of the divinely ordered course of things which cannot be altered” (Wordsworth). As thou very well knowest.—This complete insight into the worthlessness of the charges brought against him, which Paul ascribes to Festus, may appear to conflict with Festus’s own statements in Acts 25:18; Acts 25:26 (Holtzmann); but both assertions may easily enough have been correct. Festus may not have perfectly comprehended the precise points in which Paul was alleged to have violated Jewish law; but he Lad discernment enough to perceive that sufficient to establish anything against his prisoner had not been advanced.
Acts 25:11. I refuse not to die.—I make no entreaty against dying, I beg not myself off by prayers. “Not mercy, but only justice, asks Paul of Cæsar” (Besser). “We make no request for favour; if any one can convict us of wrong, be it little or great, we refuse not the sharpest punishment” (Athenagoras in his Apology for the Christians, addressed to Marcus Aurelius). No man may deliver me unto them, or give me up to them as a favour.—“Not even Festus, if he will do what is right” (Besser). I appeal unto Cæsar.—“These important words were spoken by Paul,” says Stier, “being certainly impelled by the suggestion of the Holy Spirit” (compare Acts 23:11.) So did the Christians in Bithynia in Pliny’s time do. “Paul felt indeed what a curse his people had brought upon themselves by compelling him to appeal to Caesar” (Besser).
Acts 25:12. Conferred with the council.—I.e., with the Roman assessors who assisted him at the trial. The subject of consultation manifestly was as to whether the appeal should be admitted or refused. Appeals appear not to have been admitted in every case. Chap. Acts 28:18 shows that Festus was disposed to release Paul, and probably would have done so had not the Sanhedrists objected. Weizsäcker comments upon the fact that Paul was thrice in danger of his life (Acts 21:31; Acts 23:12; Acts 25:3), thrice accused by the Jews (Acts 23:28; Acts 24:1; Acts 25:2; Acts 15), and thrice rescued by the Romans (Acts 23:30; Acts 24:22; Acts 25:12), and finds in this word “thrice” a proof of manufactured history. This requires no refutation.
HOMILETICAL ANALYSIS.—Acts 25:6
Paul before Festus—an Appeal to the Emperor
I. The court constituted.
1. Some things the same on this as on the former occasion.
(1) The judgment hall—a room or chamber in Herod’s palace (see on Acts 24:24, “Homiletical Analysis”).
(2) The prosecutors—the Jews who had come down from Jerusalem, and who may have been as before “Ananias with certain of the elders” (Acts 24:1), including “the chief priests and the principal men of the Jews” (Acts 25:2).
(3) The prisoner—Paul, who had already so triumphantly vindicated his innocence, and been so wonderfully protected by God.
(4) The charges—many and grievous things which could not be established against him (Acts 25:7).
2. Some things different on this from what were on the former occasion.
(1) The judge.—Felix had given place to Porcius Festus, about whom little is known—though, like Felix, it would appear, he was not above pandering to the wishes of the Jews in the hope of currying favour with them (Acts 25:9).
(2) The mode of procedure. On this occasion Tertullus was conspicuous by his absence. The prosecutors believed themselves able to dispense with the services of a hired advocate. Roman flattery and eloquence had not done much for them at the previous trial; perhaps clamour and vehemence would serve them better at this. At least this was the method adopted. “The Jews who had come down from Jerusalem stood round about Festus, bringing against Paul many and grievous charges.”
(3) The order of the charges. Though in substance the same, the presentation of them appears to have been somewhat varied (see below).
II. The indictment preferred.
1. The old charges were revived. Sedition, schism, sacrilege; treason against the state, against the faith, against the temple; revolt against Cæsar, against Moses, against Jehovah; revolution—a serious civil crime; innovation—a heinous ecclesiastical offence; irreligion or impiety—a deadly sin. Had Paul been guilty of these he must have been a monster of wickedness indeed.
2. The new order in which the charges were presented. Schism, sacrilege, sedition. Not without craft had this alteration been made. At the first trial the high priest and the elders had hopes of enlisting the jealousy and power of Rome against Paul, and with this end in view they placed in the forefront of their indictment the charge of sedition. What more likely to gain the ear of a representative of Cæsar, than the allegation that the prisoner at the bar had been “a pestilent fellow and a mover of insurrections among all the Jews throughout the world” (Acts 24:5), saying “there is another king, one Jesus” (Acts 17:7)? That card, however, had been tried and failed. It was now, therefore, their aim, if possible, to withdraw the prisoner from beneath the shelter of the Roman Ægis, and accordingly they shove the charge of sedition into the background, and advance into the purview of the procurator those of schism and sacrilege. They hoped in this way to persuade the new governor that the case was one which fell more within their jurisdiction than his, that it belonged to an ecclesiastical and spiritual rather than to a secular tribunal. The distinction between things secular and sacred, courts spiritual and ecclesiastical, and courts civil and criminal, was a sound one, but in their mouths it was being used not to secure right and justice, but to perpetrate cruelty and wrong.
III. The defence offered.
1. On every count in the indictment, as before, Paul pleaded not guilty. “Neither against the law of the Jews, nor against the temple, nor against Cæsar” had he offended. He was no schismatic or heretic in the proper sense of that expression; what he preached was only a legitimate development and necessary fruit of the Hebrew faith. He had not violated the sanctity of the temple; the allegation that he had done so contradicted fact. He was no revolutionary against Cæsar’s throne; neither by word nor deed had he taught men to rise against the powers that be. From first to last Paul had been consistent in maintaining his innocence.
2. On every count in the indictment, as before, evidence in its support was wanting. Paul would be sure to call the attention of his judge to this, and Festus, it is clear, discerned that the charge of sedition was a bogus affair altogether (Acts 25:18), while about the heresy he was simply at sea—that belonged to another sphere than the one in which he moved (Acts 25:19). The sacrilege allegation he probably dropped out of view entirely, as an unfounded assertion, or as a matter too insignificant to be noticed. Nevertheless, baseless as the charges were, Festus wanted courage to sweep them aside, and liberate his prisoner. Precisely as Felix failed, so did he. Neither had the fortitude to follow conscience and do what was right.
IV. The proposition made.
1. A specious compromise.
(1) To drop the charges of sacrilege and sedition and restrict further investigations to the one point of divergence from the laws of the Jews. This would practically be a decision two-thirds in Paul’s favour.
(2) To proceed to Jerusalem, that the strictly religious question might be examined into by a court of his own people. This also, while it had the appearance of being fair to Paul, would be a virtual concession to what Festus understood to be the real wishes of the Jews.
(3) To have the trial conducted in the procurator’s presence as a guarantee that the prisoner would have even-handed justice.
2. The secret motive.
(1) The motive stated was to gain favour with the Jews. This was probably natural, considering that he was a new governor, and that they were a troublesome people, who had it in their power to impeach him, as they had impeached Felix his predecessor, before Cæsar—if not for real, for imaginary crimes, since, as he could see from Paul’s case, they were by no means fastidious as to the character of the weapons with which they struck a man down.
(2) The unrecorded motives probably were to shield Paul, if possible, and in any case to shift from himself all responsibility for his condemnation.
V. The appeal taken.
1. To whom? Cæsar, i.e., Nero. Paul demanded to be tried by the emperor himself. “Theoretically the emperor was but the imperator, or commander-in-chief of the armies of the state, appointed by the Senate, and acting under its direction. Consuls were still elected every year, and went through the shadowy functions of their office. Many of the provinces were directly under the control of the Senate, and were accordingly governed by proconsuls. But Augustus had contrived to concentrate in himself all the powers that in the days of the Republic had checked and balanced the exercise of individual authority. He was supreme pontiff, and as such regulated the religion of the state; permanent censor, and as such could give or recall the privileges of citizenship at His pleasure. The tribunicia potestas, which had originally been conferred on the tribunes of the plebs so that they might protect members of their order who appealed to them against the injustice of patrician magistrates, was attached to his office. As such he became the final court of appeal from all subordinate tribunals, and so by a subtle artifice, what had been intended as a safeguard to freedom, became the instrument of a centralised tyranny” (Plumptre).
2. For what reason? Because he was already standing before Cæsar’s judgment seat—i.e., was already pleading before a Roman tribunal, and no one, not even a procurator, had a right to withdraw him therefrom and hand him over to the Jews without his consent—which, of course, Paul was unwilling to give, for the following reasons.
(1) That as a panel at a Roman tribunal he was entitled to receive from that tribunal a verdict on his case.
(2) That he was perfectly prepared to accept that verdict, whatever it might be. Should he be found to have done wrong, and to have committed anything worthy of death, he refused not to die; but should, on the other hand, his innocence be established, he was entitled to be acquitted.
(3) That he was not amenable to any Jewish tribunal, since he had not violated any Jewish law, as Festus himself knew.
(4) That Paul also understood his doom would be sealed the moment he was handed over to the tender mercies of the Sanhedrim.
3. With what result? That his appeal was allowed. Having conferred privately with his own council of Roman assessors (see “Critical Remarks”), Festus, “with something like a sneer” in his words, intimated his acceptance of Paul’s decision. “He knew, it may be, better than the apostle to what kind of judge the latter was appealing, what long delays there would be before the cause was heard, how little chance there was of a righteous judgment at last” (Plumptre).
Learn.—
1. That false witnessing against good men and good causes is an old and common, as well as heinous sin.
2. That the desire of gaining popular favour often leads statesmen, judges, and private individuals to perpetrate acts of great injustice.
3. That Christians are not debarred by their religion from defending themselves against persecution and oppression by all lawful means.
4. That nothing inspires a man with courage in presence of his adversaries like a consciousness of innocence.
5. That God’s people are (or should be) ever ready to render due satisfaction for whatever evil deeds can be proved against them.
HINTS AND SUGGESTIONS
Acts 25:6. A Court Scene in the Olden Time.
I. Infuriate and reckless pursuers.—
1. A multitude against one.
2. Men of power against a weak prisoner.
3. Persons regardless of truth against an individual who tried to keep a clean conscience.
II. A friendless but unmoved defender.—Strong in—
1. The consciousness of his innocence.
2. The justness of his claim—to be judged where he was.
3. The superiority of his soul to death.
III. A discerning but unprincipled judge—
1. Faithless to conscience. Knowing his duty, but declining to act upon it.
2. Showing respect of persons. Preferring the favour of the powerful and rich wicked to the rights of the humble but poor good.
3. Trampling on the weak. Sending Paul to Rome instead of granting him liberty.
Acts 25:8. A Model Defence.
I. Short.—Consisting of one sentence.
II. Simple.—Containing no intricate reasoning or doubtful chicanery.
III. Direct.—Resting satisfied with a plain denial of the charges advanced.
IV. Exhaustive.—Leaving none of these untouched, but repudiating all alike.
V. Effective.—If it did not procure acquittal it at least showed the charges to be false.
Acts 25:8. Christian Fortitude.—As exemplified in Paul.
I. Unlike the effrontery of the hypocrite.—Paul grounds his defence on solid fact and absolute truth.
II. Different from the defiance of the wicked.—Paul declines not to be examined once and again, having nothing to be ashamed of or conceal.
III. Having no resemblance to the obstinacy of the litigious.—Paul submits to every just decision, being willing even to die if he had done anything for which capital punishment is the only expiation.
Acts 25:10. Cæsar’s Judgment Seat and Christ’s.—A contrast. In respect of—
I. The authorities by which they have been appointed.—Cæsar’s by the kings and emperors of earth. Christ’s by the King of kings, the Lord of eternity, and Sovereign of the universe.
II. The judges who have been entrusted with their procedure.—In the case of Cæsar’s mortal, fallible, and sinful men; in that of Christ’s, the Divine Son, who liveth evermore, whose eyes are as a flame of fire, in whom, are hid all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge, and with whom is no respect of persons.
III. The businesses which are transacted thereupon. In the case of Cæsar’s tribunal, the earthly and temporal affairs of men, so far as they affect men’s mundane interests; at Christ’s the concerns of the soul and the transactions of the life.
IV. The verdicts which are issued therefrom.—From Cæsar’s often such as are false and oppressive; from Christ’s always such as are just and true. The first may call for an appeal: the second are irreversible and final.
V. The parties who appear before them.—Some may never stand at Cæsar’s, but all must eventually stand at Christ’s, judgment-seat.
Acts 25:11. Paul’s Appeal to Cæsar.
I. Evidenced a conscience void of offence toward God and man.—Had the apostle not been conscious of innocence he would hardly have ventured on this step, which was not the last stroke for liberty on the part of a despairing criminal, but the sober act of a good man who knew himself to be wronged.
II. Signalised a humble submission to divinely ordained authority.—Had the apostle not regarded Cæsar’s tribunal as in some respects invested with divine authority, he would scarcely have proposed to lay his case before it.
III. Showed a laudable desire to avoid unnecessary martyrdom.—Had Paul deemed it sinful to keep himself alive as long as possible, or right to throw away his life without an effort to preserve it, it is doubtful if he would have resorted to this tedious method of obtaining justice.
IV. Proved an unwearied zeal for the extension of the kingdom of God.—Having already been assured by God that he would preach the gospel at Rome also, Paul probably saw in this appeal which he took a means of attaining to what was already a burning passion in his soul.—From Gerok in Lange.
Difficulties connected with Paul’s Appeal to Cæsar.
I. How does this harmonise with Christ’s doctrine of non-resistance (Matthew 5:39)? Answer: Paul, in appealing to Cæsar, does not propose retaliation, but only self-preservation, which is the first law of life, and is not forbidden to a Christian.
II. How does this accord with Paul’s exhortation to Christians not to go to law before the unrighteous but only before the saints (1 Corinthians 6:1)?—Answer: Paul does not propose to drag his accusers before the law, but only to vindicate his own character in the eyes of the law—which is always permissible to a Christian.
III. How does this square with Paul’s knowledge that Christ was with him and had promised to protect him?—How does his conduct compare with that of Ezra—e.g., who, in a time of difficulty and danger, refused to lean upon a secular arm (Ezra 8:22)? Answer: This may have been Christ’s way of protecting Paul.
IV. How does this comport with Paul s doctrine that the state has nothing whatever to do with judging spiritual matters (1 Corinthians 2:15)?—Answer: Paul does not propose to submit to Cæsar the question of his religious opinions, but only that of his civil Paul’s deportment.