Proverbs 18:13

MAIN HOMILETICS OF Proverbs 18:13

ANSWERING BEFORE HEARING

I. A man who gives judgment in a matter before he has heard all the facts of the case wrongs himself. If he were to give his opinion upon a building as soon as the builders had dug out the foundation, or were to criticise a picture when the artist had only sketched its outline upon his canvas, he would be deemed a fool, and what he said would have no weight whatever. Men would justly say that the house or the picture had as yet no existence, and therefore could not be judged. And a man who has only heard a part of “a matter” is in no better position to judge in it, and commits as great a folly if he attempts to do so. He does violence to his own understanding—to those mental faculties which enable him to place things side by side and to compare them, and to sift and weigh evidence before he arrives at a conclusion. Unless he does this, the opinion that he forms to-day will be altered to-morrow, and his mind will never be firmly made up on any subject. As a necessary consequence, nobody will give much heed to his judgment—no thoughtful person will attach much weight to his words—and he will thus deprive himself of that consideration and respect which he might otherwise have enjoyed.

II. Such a man often deeply wrongs others. A half-told story often makes the state of matters appear so different from the truth that it is a gross injustice to condemn or justify any person when that is all that is known. A man who does it proclaims that he values very lightly the reputation of those concerned, and is often a robber of what is more to a man than his purse, viz. his good name.

OUTLINES AND SUGGESTIVE COMMENTS

Secularly, this is beyond a doubt; judicially, here is a great outrage; socially, a something very impolite; but religiously, a thing altogether a “shame.” Men born yesterday might certainly afford to listen. Life is a wide thing; and might, at least, be acted through, before in the darker points we insist upon a judgment … Folly, and therefore, mischief; shame, and therefore, ill desert. These elements often appear together.—Miller.

According to Mr. Stuart Mill, it might be plausibly maintained that in almost every one of the leading controversies, past or present, in social philosophy, both sides were right in what they affirmed, though wrong in what they denied; and that if either could have been made to take the other’s views in addition to his own, little more would have been needed to make its doctrine correct.… Nicodemus did well to start the seasonable query, “Doth our law judge any man before it hear him, and know what he doth?” Festus did well to protest that it was not the manner of the Romans to deliver any man to die before that he which was accused had the accusers face to face, and had licence to answer for himself concerning the charge laid against him. And in the same spirit and by the same rule, otherwise applied, had Felix done well to defer hearing Paul’s defence until Paul’s accusers were present.… Aristides, they tell us, would lend but one ear to anyone who accused an absent “party,” and used to hold his hand on the other, intimating that he reserved one ear for the absentee accused.… Cicero, “the greatest orator, save one, of antiquity,” has left it on record, as we are pertinently reminded on the Essays on Liberty, that he always studied his adversaries’ case with as great intensity as his own, if not still greater. And what Cicero practised as the means of forensic success, requires, as the essayist urges, to be imitated by all who study any subject in order to arrive at the truth. For he who knows only his own side of the case is convicted of knowing little of that; his reasons may be good and no one may have been able to refute them, but if he is equally unable to refute the reasons on the opposite side, if he does not so much as know what they are, what rational ground has he for preferring either opinion?—Jacox.

We ought to be the more cautious in forming and pronouncing opinions, because we are so little disposed to admit conviction if we fall into mistakes, or to retract them upon conviction. It is commonly supposed that ministers cannot repent, although they do not claim, like the Pope, the gift of infallibility; and there is too much reason for the supposition, provided it be not restricted to that order of men; for the same pride that makes one set of men stubborn in their wrong opinions is to be found in other men, although it is not perhaps so much strengthened by particular circumstances, nor so visible in their conduct, because they meet not with the same temptations to discover it. How many do we find who will not change their sentiments about religion, or about persons and things, upon the clearest evidence, and give way to anger upon the least contradiction to their favourite notions, as if their dearest interests were attacked! Saints themselves are not entirely delivered from this selfish disposition, as we see in the behaviour of David to Mephibosheth, after he had pronounced a rash sentence in his case.—Lawson.

The sources of the evil are various. There is—

1. Natural or acquired eagerness of spirit, and impatience of protracted inquiry. Such minds cannot bear anything that requires close and long-sustained attention. They become uneasy, fretted, and fidgetty; and are ever anxious to catch at any occasion for cutting the matter short and being done with it.

2. The sympathy of passion with one or other of the parties. One of them happens to be their friend; and whether it be he or his adversary that makes the statement, partiality for him stirs their resentment at the injury done to him; the blood warms, and, passion thus striking in, they hastily interrupt the narration—will hear no more of it—and at once proceed to load the enemy of their friend with abuse and imprecation. They know their friend, and to them it is enough that he has been a sufferer; they take it for granted that he must be in the right.

3. Indolence—indisposition to be troubled. This is a temper the very opposite of the first, but producing a similar effect. The former jumped to a conclusion from over-eagerness; this comes soon to a close from sheer sluggishness of mind. It is to a man of this stagnant and lazy temperament an exertion quite unbearable to keep his mind so long on the stretch as to listen even to a statement, and still more to an argument or pleading, that cannot be finished in a breath and done with. His attention soon flags; he gets sick of it; he seems as if he were listening when he is not, and with a yawn of exhaustion and misery he pronounces his verdict, and at times with great decision, for no other purpose than to get quit of the trouble. He can stand it no longer.

4. Self-conceit—the affectation of extraordinary acuteness. This would be an amusing character, were it not, at the same time, so provoking. The self-conceited man assumes a very sagacious and penetrating look—sits down with apparent determination to hear out the cause on both sides, and to “judge righteous judgment.” But it is hardly well begun, when the self-conceited man sees to the end of it.… It is surprising with what agility this spirit of self-conceit gets over difficulties. It sees none—no, never.

“Where others toil with philosophic force,
Its nimble nonsense takes a shorter course;
Flings at your head conviction in the lump,
And gains remote conclusions at a jump.”—

Wardlaw.