THE GOLDEN RULE

‘All things whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so to them.’

Matthew 7:12

In this part of the Sermon on the Mount our Lord begins to draw His discourse to a conclusion. The lessons He here enforces on our notice are broad, general, and full of the deepest wisdom. Let us mark them in succession.

I. A general principle.—He lays down a general principle for our guidance in all doubtful questions between man and man. We are ‘to do to others as we would have others do to us.’ We are not to deal with others as others deal with us: this is mere selfishness and heathenism. We are to deal with others as we would like others to deal with us: this is real Christianity. This is a golden rule indeed!

II. Settling debateable points.—It does not merely forbid all petty malice and revenge, all cheating and overreaching: it does much more. It settles a hundred difficult points, which in a world like this are continually arising between man and man; it prevents the necessity of laying down endless little rules for our conduct in specific cases; it sweeps the whole debateable ground with one mighty principle; it shows us a balance and measure, by which every one may see at once what is his duty.—Is there a thing we would not like our neighbour to do to us? Then let us always remember that this is the thing we ought not to do to him. Is there a thing we would like him to do to us! Then this is the very thing we ought to do to him.—How many intricate questions would be decided at once if this rule were honestly used!

III. Its general excellence.—Consider the excellence of this rule, and the grounds on which it claims the respect and homage of mankind. These are—

(a) Its reasonableness, as founded on the original equality of all men one with another.

(b) Its capability of easy and immediate application.

(c) Its kindness and beneficence in relation to ourselves.

Prebendary Daniel Moore.

Illustration

‘A judge, administering’ the laws of his country, knows very well that if he were in the situation of the prisoner there is nothing which he would, desire so much as an acquittal. Must he, therefore, pronounce nothing but pardons? A bold beggar comes to a rich man for alms. Imagine a reversal of their positions, and the rule of doing as you would be done by would require that the rich man should give up the half of his property. These and similar cases, arising out of the necessary dependences and relationships of social life, sufficiently evidence that the rule of our text is to be received with a certain understood limitation, and imply that it is not what we do, or might wish others to do to us, that is to be the gauge of our conduct to them, but only what, according to the principles of equity and fairness and right, we ought to wish.’

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