Luke 6:31

And as ye would that men should do to you, do ye also to them likewise.

What would we that men should do unto us?

1. That they should deal with us honestly.

2. That they should treat us generously.

3. That they should deal with us faithfully; warning us of any danger into which we are liable to fall.

4. That they should be patient with us. (H. S. Brown.)

The royal law

I. THE LAW ITSELF--

1. Teaches us to take the initiative; to begin to do for others what we conceive they ought to do for us.

2. Teaches us that the standard we set up for others must be the measure of our own conduct.

3. Teaches us that the end of our duty is the good of humanity.

II. THE WORKING OF THE LAW.

1. In the home-life.

2. In our social relationships.

3. In relation to business in all shapes and forms.

4. In relation to party politics.

5. In relation to church life. (J. B. Walton, B. A.)

“Do as you would be done by”

Men who neglect Christianity nevertheless do acknowledge this precept; men of experience, practical, intelligent, when talked to upon the subject of religion will not scruple to say: “My religion is this--‘Do as you would be done by.’” And yet they fail to apply this to the claim of Jesus Christ upon them. All who have lived and died, all who are now living--all combined, have not the claim on my life that Jesus Christ has. I ask you how you dare to say that all your religion is “Do as you would be done by,” if you fail to apply it to Him who has done so much for you. Do it, and you must dedicate all you have and all you are to His glory. (Dr. Deems.)

Was the golden rule original?

The gold in the Golden Rule is not its newness but its goodness. (A. Macleod, D. D.)

The rule and the test of morality

The light and warmth of the sun no more clearly bespeak the hand that formed it, than the excellence of this rule of conduct declares it to be from God. Although no rule is perhaps so universally admired, yet none is more universally broken.

I. TO EXPLAIN THE RULE. In explaining the rule, let us examine the different parts of it. “All things whatsoever.” This clause declares its universal extent. We may do some things, perhaps many things, to others which we would wish them to do to us, and yet in many other things be wholly and habitually selfish. A man, for example, may give food to the hungry, but Habitually overreach and defraud. No matter who he is, whether friend or enemy, if he is a fellow-creature, one of your own species, a man, you must be governed by this rule in all that you do toward him. “Do ye even so.” In this clause we are directed not only to do the things themselves which we would that others should do to us, but also to the utmost exactness in doing so. What, then, are we to understand by the clause, “Whatsoever ye would that men should do to you”? It has commonly been supposed, by commentators, that a literal interpretation of this text is inconsistent with other plain scriptural duties, and that therefore the rule is to be explained by certain qualifications or restrictions not expressed in it; for our desires of good from others may be selfish and extravagant, and to make such desires the measure of what we are to do to others, would in many cases be doing what is not required, as well as what is forbidden. For example, a rich man may feel and say, “If I were in that poor man’s place and he in mine, I should wish him to give me his estate; and now, if I am to do as I would be done by, I am to show him the same kindness, and give him my estate.” This difficulty evidently arises from inadequate views of the text. The rule contains its own explanation and limitation. If I am to do to others as I would that they should do to me, then I am to love them as I love myself; not them more than myself, nor myself more than them. If, therefore, I were to give my estate, if I we’re rich, to a poor man, I should do that which in this respect would imply that I loved him more than myself, which would be a palpable violation of the rule. Besides, how can I, putting myself in the poor man’s place, wish another to give me his estate--wish that he should impoverish himself to enrich me, without violatingthe rule. In this very wish I am desiring my own happiness more than my neighbour’s, and thus I counteract the very spirit and letter of the rule itself. In deciding what we would that others should do to us--i.e., in forming our desires of good from others--we are to remember that we are to cherish the same desires to impart good to them. Thus one desire is to check and regulate and define the other. Thus the rule aims directly at the utter extinction of all selfish inordinate desires of good, and requires simply that what we would on disinterested principles desire from others, were we in their circumstances and they in ours, we are to do to them. Let us examine this a little further. We are to do to others what we would on truly benevolent principles desire from them. The existence of the happiness of one man, other things being equal, is of equal value with that of another. The simple fact that the happiness of one of the two is mine, gives it no additional value. It has precisely the same value as when it is the happiness of another. All the value which I can reasonably attach to my happiness, because it is mine, he can us reasonably attach to his, because it is his. All that I am to myself he is to himself, and all that I am as it respects him he is as it respects me. The reason why I should regard his happiness as much as my own, circumstances being tile same, is as plain and conclusive as that things of equal value ought to be equally loved or desired. If my right lays him under obligation to me, his right lays me under the same obligation to him. There is a great diversity in the character and stations of men. It is very desirable there should be, and as it is not in our power so it is not our duty, on principles of true benevolence, to wish to alter them. There is, therefore, a consequent variety of duties owed to men. But we can easily determine, by the rule before us, what these duties are. Thus a ruler is to treat his subjects as he would wish to be treated were he a subject. But he is not bound to yield that submission to his subjects which, as a ruler, he justly demands of them. This he could not do without sacrificing the public good to private interest--i.e., he could not do it on disinterested principles. For, if he were a subject, he could not on such principles wish for the submission and obedience of a ruler to himself. A judge is not required to acquit, though he might on selfish principles wish, were he the criminal, to be acquitted, because he could not on benevolent principles wish the laws of justice to be abandoned, and the guilty to go unpunished. Thus, too, a parent or head of a family is not required to neglect to promote the welfare of his own household, to promote the welfare of his neighbours, because on truly disinterested principles he could not wish his neighbour to do so by him. So, also, an individual is not required to sacrifice his own happiness to promote an equal degree of happiness in another individual, because it is as right that the former should enjoy it, if but one can enjoy it, as that the latter should; and therefore the former could not, on truly disinterested principles, desire that the latter should do so by him. On the same principle we are not required to put our property into common stock for the equal benefit of all. This would tend, as a general rule, to promote so many evils, that if we were poor we could not, on benevolent principles, desire it. The amount of this rule of our Lord is, that in determining what our duty is to others, and in performing it, our selfishness is to have no voice and no influence. It is as if our Lord had said: Regard your neighbour in his wants, his rights, his happiness, as another self. Ask, then, how, as a reasonable, disinterested man, you would be treated by him: and treat him exactly in that manner.

II. To ENFORCE THE DUTY.

1. God has commanded it.

2. The duty is obviously reasonable and right.

3. This rule has a most direct and effectual tendency to promote the happiness of men.

4. Obedience to this rule is the most ennobling character of man. The spirit inculcated is the very opposite of selfishness; and selfishness is the very substance of moral degradation. But behold the man who loves his neighbour as himself! Behold him raised, as it were to heaven, by the principles just described; behold his heart fixed on the good of his fellowmen, his friends, his enemies, his neighbour, and the stranger, as on his own happiness! What is there lovely, what of good report, what of moral beauty, that does not shine in such a character? Is it not real greatness to be like him?

5. We can neither be fit for, nor admitted into heaven without this character. It is impossible not to see in every page of the Scriptures the necessity of a fitness for heaven which consists in the subjugation of selfish to benevolent principles, and which are all summed up in one expressive term, “Holiness, without which no man shall see the Lord.”

Remarks:

1. We see that many things which are deemed consistent with this rule of Christ’s are direct violations of it. Why does the duelist consent that his antagonist should take his life if he can do it? That he may have an opportunity to take that of a fellow-creature. Is this being willing to give up his life to another from motives of disinterested love? Must one or the other die; and rather than that his neighbour should die, does he consent to die himself? Why, too, is the gambler, or the man who takes undue advantage of his neighbour in trade, willing that others should do to him as he does to them? For the same reason substantially, as it respects the morality of the act that governs the duelist. They are willing that others should treat them thus, that they may obtain, or at least have the opportunity of obtaining, their neighbours’ property without an equivalent. For, if they are really willing their neighbours should have their property without an equivalent, why not give it to them directly? My hearers, such is the deception which men practise on themselves, in these and a thousand other cases. They are not willing to do as they pretend; the proof is, that they do not do it. They are at most willing to run the hazard of being injured themselves, for the privilege of injuring their neighbour.

2. We remark that there is very little genuine morality in the world.

3. How it would commend the religion of the gospel to all, if there were more of the spirit of the text manifested by its professors.

4. I cannot close without remarking, how much we all need a Saviour! I say all; for, let it be noticed, that to condemn what is wrong in the professors of religion, does not justify what is wrong in those who are not. (N. W. Taylor, D. D.)

On the great Christian law of reciprocity between man and man

Let a man, in fact, give himself up to a strict and literal observation of the precept in this verse, and it will impress a twofold direction upon him. It will not only guide him to certain performances of good in behalf of others,’ but it will guide him to the regulation of his own desires of good from them. For his desires of good from others are here set up as the measure of his performances of good to others. The more selfish and unbounded his desires are, the larger are those performances with the obligation of which he is burdened. Whatsoever he would that others should do unto him, he is bound to do unto them; and therefore, the more he gives way to ungenerous and extravagant wishes of service from those who are around him, the heavier and more insupportable is the load of duty which he brings upon himself. The commandment is quite imperative, and there is no escaping from it; and if he, by the excess of his selfishness, should render it impracticable, then the whole punishment due to the guilt of casting aside the authority of this commandment, follows in that train of punishment which is annexed to selfishness. There is one way of being relieved from such a burden. There is one way of reducing this verse to a moderate and practicable requirement; and that is, just to give up selfishness- just to stifle all ungenerous desires- just to moderate every wish of service or liberality from others, down to the standard of what is right and equitable; and then there may be other verses in the Bible, by which we are called to be kind even to the evil and to the unthankful. But most assuredly this verse lays upon us none other thing than that we should do such services for others as are right and equitable. The operation is somewhat like that of a governor or fly in mechanism. This is a very happy contrivance, by which all that is defective or excessive in the motion, is confined within the limits of equability; and every tendency, in particular, to any mischievous acceleration is restrained. The impulse given by this verse to the conduct of man among his fellows, would seem, to a superficial observer, to carry him to all the excesses of a most ruinous and quixotic benevolence. But let him only look to the skilful adaptation of the fly. Just suppose the control of moderation and equity to be laid upon his own wishes, and there is not a single impulse given to his conduct beyond the rate of moderation and equity. You are not required here to do all things whatsoever in behalf of others, but to do all things whatsoever for them, that you would should be done unto yourself. This is the check by which the whole of the bidden movement is governed, and kept from running out into any hurtful excess. And such is the beautiful operation of that piece of moral mechanism that we are now employed in contemplating, that while it keeps down all the aspirations of selfishness, it does, in fact, restrain every extravagancy, and impresses on its obedient subjects no other movement than that of an even and inflexible justice. This rule of our Saviour’s, then, prescribes moderation to our desires of good from others, as well as generosity to our doings in behalf of others; and makes the first the measure of obligation to the second. There is nothing in the humble condition of life they occupy which precludes them from all that is great or graceful in human charity. There is a way in which they may equal, and even outpeer, the wealthiest of the land, in that very virtue of which wealth alone has been conceived to have the exclusive inheritance. There is a pervading character in humanity which the varieties of rank do not obliterate; and as, in virtue of the common corruption the poor man may be as effectually the rapacious despoiler of his brethren, as the man of opulence above him--so, there is a common excellence attainable by both; and through which the poor man may, to the full, be as splendid in generosity as the rich, and yield a far more important contribution to the peace and comfort of society. To make this plain--it is in virtue of a generous doing on the part of a rich man, when a sum of money is offered for the relief of want; and it is in virtue of a generous desire on the part of a poor man, when this money is refused; when, with the feeling that his necessities do not just warrant him to be yet a burden upon others, he declines to touch the offered liberality; when, with a delicate recoil from the unlooked-for proposal, he still resolves to put it for the present away, and to find, if possible, for himself a little longer; when, standing on the very margin of dependence, he would yet like to struggle with the difficulties of his situation, and to maintain this severe but honourable conflict, till hard necessity should force him to surrender. Let the money which he has thus so nobly shifted from himself take some new direction to another; and who, we ask, is the giver of it? The first and most obvious reply is, that it is he who owned it; but, it is still more emphatically true, that it is he who has declined it. It came originally out of the rich man’s abundance; but it was the noble-hearted generosity of the poor man that handed it onwards to its final destination. Thus it is, that when Christianity becomes universal, the doings of the one party, and the desires of the other, will meet and overpass. The poor will wish for no more than the rich will be delighted to bestow; and the rule of our text, which every real Christian at present finds so practicable, will, when carried over the face of society, bind all the members of it into one consenting brotherhood. The duty of doing good to others will then coalesce with that counterpart duty which regulates our desires of good from them; and the work of benevolence will, at length, be prosecuted without that alloy of rapacity on the one hand, and distrust on the other, which serve so much to fester and disturb the whole of this ministration. To complete this adjustment, it is in every way as necessary to lay all the incumbent moralities on those who ask, as on those who confer; and never till the whole text, which comprehends the wishes of man as well as his actions, wield its entire authority over the species, will the disgusts and the prejudices, which form such a barrier between the ranks of human life, be effectually done away. It is not by the abolition of rank, but by assigning to each rank its duties, that peace and friendship and order will at length be firmly established in our world. We should not have dwelt so long upon this lesson, were it not for the essential Christian principle that is involved in it. The morality of the gospel is not more strenuous on the side of the duty of giving of this world’s goods when it is needed, than it is against the desire of receiving when it is not needed. ( T. Chalmers, D. D.)

The golden rule taught by an Indian

Some time before the war between the English and the Indians in Pennsylvania broke out, an English gentleman, who lived on the borders of the province, was standing one evening at his door, when an Indian came and desired a little food. He answered, he had none for him. He then asked for a little beer, and received the same answer. Not yet discouraged, he begged for a little water; but the gentleman only answered, “ Get you gone for an Indian dog.” The Indian fixed his eye for a little time on the Englishman, and then went away. Some time after, this gentleman, who was fond of shooting, pursued his game till he was lost in the woods. After wandering a while, he saw an Indian hut, and went to it to inquire his way to some plantation. The Indian said, “It is a great way off, and the sun is near going down; you cannot reach it to-night, and if you stay in the woods the wolves will eat you up; but if you have a mind to lodge with me, you may.” The gentleman gladly accepted the invitation, and went in. The Indian boiled a little venison for him, gave him some rum and water, and then spread some deer skins for him to lie upon; having done this, himself and another Indian went and lay at the other side of the hut. He called the gentleman in the morning, telling him that the sun was up, and that he had a great way to go to the plantation, but that he would show him the way. Taking their guns, the two Indians went forward, and he followed. When they had gone several miles, the Indian told him he was within two miles of the plantation he wanted; then, stepping before him, he said, “Do you know me?” In great confusion, the gentleman replied, “I have seen you.” “Yes,” said the Indian, you have seen me at your own doer; and I will give you a piece of advice: when a poor Indian, who is hungry, and dry, and faint, again asks you for a little meat or drink, do not bid him ‘get him gone for an Indian dog.’ “So he turned and went away. Which of these two was to be commended, or which acted most agreeably to the Saviour’s golden rule in the text?