Acts 8:38

38, 39. When Philip ascertained that the eunuch believed in the Lord Jesus, and desired to obey him, there was no delay, but his desire to be immersed was immediately gratified. (38) "And he commanded the chariot to stand still, and they went down into the water, both Philip and the eunuch, and he immersed him. (39) And when they were come up out of the water, the Spirit of the Lord caught away Philip; and the eunuch saw him no more, for he went on his way rejoicing."

This is one of the passages which the conflict of contending parties has rendered familiar to every reader of the New Testament. The questions in controversy are: First, Whether Philip and the eunuch went into the water, or only to it; Second, Whether the facts in the case afford any evidence that the eunuch was immersed.

The determination of the first question depends upon the exact force of the antithetical expression, katebesan eis to udor, and anebesan ek tou udatos. If the latter means, "they went up out of the water," then the former necessarily means, "they went down into the water;" and vice versa. There are two methods of inquiry, therefore, by which to determine whether they went into the water: First, The direct method, which depends upon the meaning of the words supposed to declare this fact; Second, The indirect method, which determines whether they went into the water, by determining whether they went out of it.

In dealing with this question, Dr. Moses Stuart, one of the most learned and candid of the disputants on the pedobaptist side, does great injustice to his own reputation. He says: "That eis, with the verb katabaino, often means going down to a place, is quite certain; e. g., 'Jesus went down to Capernaum;' 'Jacob went down to Egypt;' 'They went down to Attalia;' 'They went down to Troas;' 'He went down to Antioch;' 'Going down to Cæsarea.'" How strange it is that the learned author did not perceive that in every one of these examples the meaning is necessarily into! If he had paused to ask himself whether Jesus went into Capernaum, and Jacob into Egypt, and so of the others, or merely went to the boundary line of those places, he would have spared his reputation by erasing this paragraph. He would also have saved himself the utterance of another unfortunate sentence on the same page: "I find but one passage in the New Testament where it seems to mean into when used with katabaino. This is in Romans 10:7 Romans 10:7>, Who shall go down, eis abusson, into the abyss?" Besides the examples mentioned above, he must have searched with very little industry not to have discovered the following: "Let him that is on the housetop not go down into, katabato eis, the house." "Now that he ascended, what is it but that he also first descended into, katebe eis, the lower parts of the earth?" "This man went down into, katebe eis, his house, justified rather than the other." "A certain man was going down, katabainen, from Jerusalem into, eis, Jericho." "The road that goes down, katabainousan, from Jerusalem into, eis, Gaza."

These are all the instances in the New Testament in which these two words occur together; and the reader can but see, that in every single instance the controverted expression means to go down into. By our first method of inquiry, therefore, it is settled that Philip and the eunuch went down into the water.

It is not logically necessary to pursue this discussion any further; but, let it might be imagined that the conclusion we have already reached should be modified by the force of the other member of the antithesis, we must give some attention to the meaning of anebesan ek tou udatos. And here I must take exception to another sweeping declaration of Dr. Stuart's. He says: "anabaino is never employed in the sense of emerging from a liquid substance. The preposition ek, here, would agree with this idea-although it, by no means, of necessity implies it; but anabaino forbids us to thus construe it." Why is this apparently broad assertion so cautiously limited to the single case of "emerging from a liquid substance?" Is it possible that Dr. Stuart knew that the expression meant to go up out of, but, thinking that it did not occur in any other passage in connection with a liquid, framed his proposition to suit such an accident? It is humiliating in the extreme to see so great a mind descend to such special pleading on so grave a subject. If anabaiein ek means to go up out of, nothing but the most determined obduracy can preclude the admission that it means the same when referring to liquids as to other substances. Now, it is a fact, and it must have been known to Dr. Stuart, if he examined into the ground of his own statements, that, in every single occurrence of these two words in connection, in the New Testament, they men to go up out of. Moreover, in one of these occurrences they are "employed in the sense of emerging from a liquid substance. In Revelations 13:1 Revelation 13:1>, John says: "I stood upon the sand of the sea, and saw a beast, ek tes thalasses anabainon, rising up out of the sea." Notwithstanding this broad assertion of Dr. Stuart's, therefore, the expression in question does, without a single exception, invariably mean to go up out of. Philip and the eunuch, then, went up out of the water; hence, they must first have gone down into it. By both methods of inquiry, the conclusion is established.

The most astonishing display of partisan blindness on this passage is yet to be noticed. It is an argument employed by Moses Stuart, in which he is followed by Dr. Alexander. He says: "If katebesan eis to udor is meant to designate the action of plunging, or being immersed into the water, as a part of the rite of baptism, then was Philip baptized as well as the eunuch: for the sacred writer says they both went into the water. Here, then, must have been a rebaptism of Philip; and, what is at least singular, he must have baptized himself as well as the eunuch." This argument proceeds upon the assumption that immersionists regard the act of going down into water as the act of immersion, than which there could not be a grosser perversion of their meaning. When a strong mind descends to arguments so weak and childish as this, we have the clearest evidence that the cause in which it is employed is felt to be weak and untenable.

We must now address ourselves to the inquiry, whether this passage affords any evidence in favor of immersion. This much-controverted question may be discussed either as a philological question, or as a question of fact. In the former method, the controversy turns upon the meaning of the Greek word baptizo. In the latter, upon the action performed by the apostles when they baptized men. Questions of fact are much more tangible than those in philology, especially when the philological inquiry runs into a foreign language. We prefer, therefore, to discuss this question as a simple matter of fact; and this method is the more appropriate in this work, which treats of acts performed by apostles. It can be most easily determined what act was performed when men were baptized, without any discussion as to the meaning of the word baptizo.

If the passage before us contains any evidence that the eunuch was immersed, outside of the meaning of the word, it must be circumstantial evidence, and not direct testimony. In ordinary jurisprudence, the former is often more conclusive than the latter; for living witnesses may be bribed, or voluntarily bear false testimony; but facts, however grossly they may be misinterpreted, can never give real utterance to falsehood. Circumstantial evidence is that derived from facts which transpired in such connection with the main fact assumed as to indicate its existence or character. There are two conditions necessary to its conclusiveness: First, That the facts which constitute the circumstances be fully authenticated; Second, That they shall be such as can not be accounted for without the admission of the main fact at issue. The first condition is always satisfied in scriptural inquiries, because the facts are asserted by infallible witnesses. Every thing depends, therefore, upon compliance with the second condition. This compliance may be so various in degree, as to admit of every possible degree of conclusiveness, from the slightest presumption up to absolute certainty. When the circumstances are as easily accounted for without the fact assumed as with it, they afford no evidence at all. When they can be better accounted for with the fact than without it, the evidence is probable. When they can not possibly be accounted for without the fact, and are fully accounted for by the fact, the evidence is irresistible.

When the facts constituting the circumstances are actions performed by men, this introduces an additional element into the argument. In this case, if the agent is a rational man, he must be supposed to act for a reason, and his actions, as circumstances, may be regarded with reference to the reasons for which they were performed. We further observe, that the question, What act was performed by the apostles under the name of baptism? has not reference to an indefinite number of actions, but is confined, by the nature of the controversy, to two. It was either immersion or affusion; the latter term embracing both the specific acts of sprinkling and pouring. This is admitted by all parties; for, although some contend that either act will serve the purpose of a valid baptism, no one, at the present day, contends that the apostles practiced both. Those who contend for affusion deny that the apostles or John the harbinger practiced immersion; while those who contend for immersion deny that they practiced affusion. It is as if A and B were brought into court for trial in reference to the murder of C. It is admitted by both the parties, and known to the counsel, the jurors, the judge, the sheriff, and the spectators, that the murder was committed by one of these two parties. Now, whatever evidence might be presented to exculpate A, would have precisely the same tendency to the conviction of B. And if the demonstration of A's innocence were complete, the jury would render a verdict against B, though not a witness had testified directly to his guilt. Just so in the present case. Whatever evidence can be fund against the affusion of the eunuch and others, is good to the same extent in favor of their immersion, and vice versa.

The circumstances by which this question is to be decided are divided into two distinct classes, which we may style, respectively, circumstances of fact, and circumstances of allusion. We will consider them in the order in which they are here named.Arise and be baptized," though it supplies the fact that previous to being baptized he must arise from his prostrate or recumbent position, furnishes no evidence bearing upon our question, because it is consistent with either immersion or affusion. If it were proved that C was murdered with a club, this in itself would be no evidence again A, or in favor of B, seeing that either of them could have used a club.

But there are other circumstances of fact which afford unmistakable evidence upon this question. The agent about to perform the act in dispute selected for the purpose a river, as the Jordan, or a place where there was "much water," as in "Ænon near to Salim." When the parties about to perform the act were in an ordinary dwelling, they went out of doors for the purpose, though it were the hour of midnight, as in the case of the Philippian jailer. When they came down to the water selected, both the administrator and the subject went down into it, as in the case of the eunuch, and the baptism was performed while they were in it. These are all unquestionable facts, for they are declared in unambiguous terms by infallible witnesses. They are also actions performed by rational men, and, therefore, each of them must have been performed for some reason. Moreover, the reason for each was furnished by the nature of the main act, for the purpose of accomplishing which each of these subordinate actions was performed. But the supposition of affusion furnishes no conceivable reason for any one of these actions. It can not, therefore, be the main act in question.

Again: If the main act could have been as well and as conveniently performed without these subordinate actions as with them, then all these agents acted without a reason. But certain affusion, even of the multitudes baptized by John, could have been performed as conveniently to himself and the people, at some well or fountain centrally located, as at the Jordan, or in Ænon. Paul could have sprinkled the jailer as conveniently in the house at midnight, as out of doors; and Philip could have sprinkled or poured water on the eunuch as well at the brink of the water, as by going down into it. Each of these subordinate actions, therefore, was an irrational one, if affusion was the main act performed.against such a line of action as we are considering, such as have sufficed, in every age and country, and among all ranks of society, to cause those who perform affusion to pursue a course the reverse of this in every particular. To save time and labor, and to avoid personal discomfort, instead of going to rivers and places of much water, they administer the rite at home or at church. Instead of going out of doors at night, if they happen to be out of doors at night, they prefer to go into the house. And, instead of going down into the water, they dip into it merely the tips of their fingers, or, avoiding all contact with the water themselves, they pour it from a vessel upon the subject. To suppose, in the face of all these reasons, which are controlling with rational men, that the apostles performed the various actions which we know they did, for the purpose of affusion, is to suppose them to act not only irrationally, but contrary to all the reasons which govern rational men. But they were rational men; therefore, he who reasons thus concerning them is convicted, beyond question, of drawing an irrational conclusion.

So far as the circumstances of fact are concerned, we might logically rest the case here; for, having sustained the negative proposition that affusion was not the act in question, we have no alternative but to conclude that it was immersion. But the same circumstantial evidence which brings us to so solid a conclusion by this indirect method, serves the purpose equally well when applied to the direct proof of immersion. The supposition of immersion furnishes the desired reason for each one of the subordinate actions we have been considering. It accounts for the selection of a river or a place of much water; for leaving the house at midnight, and for going down into the water. It is the only supposition which can account for them; and, therefore, their existence demands the existence of immersion. We must either deny these facts, which would be infidelity; deny that the apostles acted rationally, which would be the height of folly and impiety; or admit that immersion, and not affusion, was the apostolic practice.

The circumstances of allusion are equally conclusive with those already considered. Their force may be stated thus: When parties who are certainly acquainted with the facts in dispute let drop incidental remarks indicative of the nature of the facts, such remarks afford evidence, by indicating the knowledge possessed by the speaker. If, in the case of trial for murder above supposed, it were known that D was cognizant of all the facts, any incidental statement of his, inconsistent with the supposition that he knew A to be the murderer, would afford circumstantial evidence in favor of A, and against B. Now, Jesus and the apostles were cognizant of all the facts in reference to baptism, and they have made certain allusions to it, which, so far as the nature of the act is concerned, are incidental, but which indicate what they knew the act to be. If, upon a collation of these allusions, we find them inconsistent with the knowledge, on their part, that baptism was affusion, but just such as imply the knowledge that it was immersion, the evidence from this source will be conclusive.born of water and the Spirit, he can not enter into the kingdom of God." That the expression, "born of water," is an allusion to baptism, is admitted by all standard commentators and critics known to the writer, and is disputed by none but those who are incapable of being candid upon this subject. The term is used metaphorically, and, therefore, indicates some connection with water, which is analogous to a birth. But there is no conceivable analogy between a birth and an application of water by affusion; hence it is impossible that Jesus could have known the act alluded to to be affusion. The expression forces the mind to something like a birth, which can be found only in the act of drawing the body out of water, which takes place in immersion. This, alone, could have suggested the metaphor to the mind of Jesus, and to this our minds intuitively run when we hear the words pronounced. It is intuitively certain, therefore, that Jesus alluded to immersion, and not to sprinkling.

The next allusion to which we invite attention is that in which Jesus calls the unspeakable sufferings which were to terminate his life, "The baptism with which I am to be baptized." Here the term baptism is used metaphorically for his sufferings, which could not be unless there is, in literal baptism, something analogous to the overwhelming agonies of Gethsemane and Calvary. The soul revolts at the supposition that a mere sprinkling, or pouring of water on the face, could have supplied this analogy, and intuitively demands something like the sweep of water over the sinking body, which is witnessed in immersion. Immersion supplies the analogy, and it must be the meaning of the term baptism, if there is any meaning in the Savior's mournful words.

One allusion from the Apostle Paul, and one from Peter, will suffice for our present purpose. Paul exhorts the brethren to draw near to God, "having our hearts sprinkled from an evil conscience, and our bodies washed with pure water." Here is an allusion to the sprinkled blood of Christ, as cleansing the heart from an evil conscience, and to baptism as a washing of the body. But this language is inconsistent with the idea of sprinkling or pouring a little water on the face, which could, by no propriety of speech, be styled a washing of the body. Nothing but immersion will meet the demands of the expression, for the words describe what takes in immersion, and in no other ordinance of the New Testament. Peter's allusion is quite similar to this. He says: "Baptism doth also now save us, not the putting away of the filth of the flesh, but the seeking of a good conscience toward God." Now Peter could not have supplied the words, "Not the putting away of the filth of the flesh," unless there was something in baptism which might possibly be mistaken for this. But it would be impossible for any one to so mistake sprinkling, while immersion might be readily mistaken for a cleansing of the flesh. Peter, then, knew that immersion, and not affusion, was baptism, and so indicates by this language.

We now have before us, from Jesus and Paul and Peter, who certainly knew what baptism was, unmistakable allusions to it, which could not have been made if they knew it to be affusion, and which force us to the conclusion that they knew it to be immersion. It is difficult to conceive how circumstantial evidence could be more conclusive.

We might add to our list of circumstances of allusion the statement of Paul in Romans 6:4 Romans 6:4>, and Colossians 2:12 Colossians 2:12>, that in baptism we are buried and raised again. But I regard this as direct testimony to what is done in baptism, and not a mere allusion to it. If any man were to try to frame a statement of what takes place in the act of immersion, he could not do so in more unambiguous terms than to say, "We are buried and raised again." If he were to say, "We are immersed," it would not be so specific a description of the act, nor so little liable to dispute as to its real meaning.

The last clause of the passage under consideration demands some notice ere we introduce another section of the text. It is said that "when they came up out of the water, the Spirit of the Lord caught Philip away; and the eunuch saw him no more, for he went on his way rejoicing." No doubt the influence of the Spirit by which Philip was caught away was the same as that which had at first joined him to the chariot. It was that monition of the Spirit by which the movements of inspired men were frequently directed. We will notice frequent instances of the kind in the course of this work.evidence of pardon. The fallacy which they commit is to assume, without authority, that a real pardon from God is the only cause which can induce this feeling. Now, we know that joy must spring up in the heart, under the belief that pardon has been dispensed, however mistaken that belief may be. The convict awaiting execution would be just as happy if deceived by a counterfeit pardon, as if it were genuine. So with the penitent sinner. When his soul has been racked, for hours and days together, by the torture of an awakened conscience, it is likely, by the reaction of its own powers, or through exhaustion of the nervous system, to become calm. Now, if he has been taught that the supervening of this calm is an indication of pardon, immediately upon the consciousness of its presence there will spring up that joy which he alone feels who believes his sins are pardoned. Such individuals, however, generally have serious doubts, at times, whether they did not mistake the natural for the supernatural, and they seldom obtain more than a hope that their sins were forgiven. The rejoicing of the eunuch was based upon far different and more solid ground. Taught by Philip, according to the commission, and according to the preaching of Peter, who had been Philip's own teacher, that the penitent believer was to be immersed for the remission of sins; realizing in his own consciousness, that he was a penitent believer; and having been immersed, his conviction that his sins were pardoned was as solid as his confidence in the word of God and in his own consciousness. In neither of these could he well be mistaken, and, therefore, his joy was not alloyed by any harassing doubts.

We now part company with this noble man, whose ready faith and prompt obedience give evidence of such a character that we would love to travel with him further; but here the curtain of authentic history drops upon him, and we see him no longer. Happily, the echoes that come back to us, as he passes on, are notes of joy, and we may hope to meet him at the point where all our journeys meet, and rejoice with him forever.