Expositor's Greek Testament (Nicoll)
Ephesians 1:11
ἐν ᾧ καὶ : in whom also we. The ͅκαί does not qualify the subjects (for there is no emphatic ἡμεῖς, nor is there any such contrast between ἡμεῖς and ὑμεῖς here as appears in Ephesians 1:12-13), but refers to what is expressed by the verb and presents that as something additional to what has been expressed by the preceding verb. The “we,” therefore, designates Christians inclusively, and the καί gives the sentence this force “not only was it the purpose of God to make known the secret of His grace to us Christians, but this purpose was also fulfilled in us in point of fact and we were made His own not only chosen for His portion but actually made that”. The AV “in whom also we” seems to follow the erroneous rendering of the Vulg., in quo etiam nos. Equally at fault are those (including even Wetstein and Harless) who limit the “we” to Jewish Christians here. ἐκληρώθημεν : were made a heritage. The reading ἐκλήθημεν, found in a few uncials and favoured by Griesb., Lachm., Rück., may be a gloss from Romans 8:13, or possibly a simple case of mistaken transcription due to the faulty eyes of some scribe. The verb ἐκληρώθημεν is of disputed meaning here. This is its only occurrence in the NT. The compound form προσκληροῦν also occurs in the NT, but only once (Acts 17:4). In classical Greek κληροῦν means to cast the lot, to choose by lot, and to allot. Both in the classics and in the NT κλῆρος denotes a lot, and then a portion allotted. The cognate κληρονομεῖν means to get by lot, to obtain an allotted portion, and so to inherit; and κληρονομία, in the LXX often representing נַחֲלָה, signifies a property inherited, or a possession. In the OT it is used technically of the portion assigned by lot to each tribe in the promised land, and of the Holy Land itself as Israel's possession given by God (Deuteronomy 4:38; Deuteronomy 15:4). In the NT it gets the higher sense of the blessedness of the Messianic kingdom, the Christian's destined possession in the consummation of the Kingdom of God. The affinities of κληροῦν show that it may have the definite sense of heritage. It is alleged indeed by some (e.g., Abb.) that the only idea expressed in κληροῦν is that of assigning a lot or portion, and that the notion of an inheritance does not belong to it. But the portions of land assigned by lot to the tribes of Israel on their entrance into Canaan were secured inalienably, and the lots belonging to each family were so secured to the family from father to son that it was impious to let them go into the hands of strangers (cf. the case of Naboth, 1 Kings 21:3). Thus the idea of lot or portion passed over into that of inheritance. Thus, too, in the OT the blessings of the people of God, recognised to be possessed by God's free gift and not by the people's merit, came to be described in terms of a heritage, and God Himself, the Giver of all, was looked to as the supreme portion of His people, the possession that made their inheritance (Psalms 16:5-11). But in the OT there was also the counter idea that Israel was the portion or inheritance of the Lord, chosen by Himself to be His peculiar possession. At times these two ideas meet in one statement (Jeremiah 10:16). The question, therefore, is which of these two conceptions is embodied in the ἐκληρώθημεν here? Or may it be that the word has a sense somewhat different from either? Some take this latter view, understanding the word to mean appointed by lot, or elected by lot, sorte vocati sumus as the Vulg. makes it. So Syr., Goth., Chrys., Erasm., Estius, etc. So also the Genevan Version gives “we are chosen,” and the Rhemish “we are called by lot”. The point thus would be again the sovereignty of the Divine choice, the Christians in view being described as appointed to their Christian position as if by lot. But when our appointment or election is spoken of it is nowhere else said to be by lot, but by the purpose or counsel of God. Retaining, therefore, the general conception of an inheritance, some take the passive ἐκληρώθημεν for the middle, and render it simply “we have obtained an inheritance” (AV., Conyb.). The passive, however, must be accepted as a real passive, and the choice comes to be between these two interpretations: (a) we were made partakers of the inheritance, in hereditatem adsciti, enfeoffed in it (Eadie), and (b) we were made a heritage (RV), God's λαὸς ἔγ κληρος, taken by Him as His own peculiar portion. The former is the view of Harl., Mey., Haupt, etc., and so far also of Tyndale and Cranmer, who translate “we are made heirs”. It deals with the pass. κληροῦσθαι on the analogy of such passives as πιστεύομαι, φθονοῦμαι, διακονοῦμαι; it has the advantage of being in accordance with the idea regularly conveyed by the cognate terms κληρονομία, κληρονομεῖν; and it points to a third gift of God of the same order with the previous two forgiveness, wisdom, inheritance. The other interpretation, however “made a heritage,” “taken for God's inheritance” is to be preferred (with Grot., Olsh., De Wette, Stier., Alf., etc.) as being on the whole more consistent with usage; more in harmony with the import of the other passives in the paragraph; sustained, perhaps, by the use of προσκληρουν in Acts 17:4, where the idea is rather that of being allotted to Paul as disciples than that of joining their lot (AV and RV = “consorted with”) with Paul; and, in particular, as suggested by the εἰς τὸ εἶναι that follows εἰς τὸ ἔχειν rather than εἰς τὸ εἶναι being what would naturally follow the statement of an inheritance which we received. προορισθέντες κατὰ πρόθεσιν : having been foreordained according to the purpose. The fact that we were made the heritage of God is thus declared to have been no incidental thing, not an event belonging only to time or one having its explanation in ourselves, but a change in our life founded on and resulting from the eternal foreordaining purpose of God Himself. The purpose of God is expressed here by the term πρόθεσις, the radical idea in which is that of the setting of a thing before one. It occurs six times in the Pauline Epistles, and is not confined to one class of these, but appears alike in the Primary Epistles, the Epistles of the Captivity, and the Pastoral Epistles (Romans 8:28; Romans 9:11; Ephesians 1:11; Ephesians 3:11; 2 Timothy 1:9; 2 Timothy 3:10). Outside these Epistles it occurs only twice in the NT, both times in Acts (Acts 11:23; Acts 27:13) and of human purpose. τοῦ τὰ πάντα ἐνεργοῦντος : of Him who worketh all things. The πάντα has the absolute sense, and is not to be restricted to the “all things” that belong to the Divine grace and redemption. The foreordination of men to a special relation to God is connected with the foreordination of things universally. The God of the chosen is the God of the universe; the purpose which is the ground of our being made God's heritage is the purpose that embraces the whole plan of the world; and our position as the κλῆρος and possession of God has behind it both the sovereignty and the efficiency of the Will that energises or is operative in all things. κατὰ τὴν βουλὴν τοῦ θελήματος αὐτοῦ : after the counsel of his will. The distinction between βουλή and θέλημα. is still much debated, scholars continuing to take precisely opposite views of it. On the one hand, there are those who hold that θέλειν and its cognates express the will as proceeding from inclination, and that βούλεσθαι and its cognates express the will as proceeding from deliberation (Grimm, Wilke, Light., etc.). On the other hand, there are those who contend that θέλειν is the form that conveys the idea of deliberation and βούλεσθαι that which carries with it the idea of inclination. In many passages it is difficult, if not impossible, to substantiate any real distinction, the terms being often used indiscriminately. But in connections like the present it is natural to look for a distinction, and in such cases the idea of intelligence and deliberation seems to attach to the βουλή. This appears to be supported by the usage which prevails in point of fact in the majority of NT passages, and in particular by such occurrences as Matthew 1:19. Here, therefore, the will of God which acts in His foreordaining purpose or decree, in being declared to have its βουλή or “counsel,” is set forth as acting not arbitrarily, but intelligently and by deliberation, not without reason, but for reasons, hidden it may be from us, yet proper to the Highest Mind and Most Perfect Moral Nature. “They err,” says Hooker, with reference to this passage, “who think that of God's will there is no reason except His will” (Ecc. Pol., i., 2). It is also implied in this statement that the Divine foreordination, whether of things universally or of men's lots in particular, is neither a thing of necessity on the one hand nor of caprice on the other, but a thing of freedom and of thought; and further, that the reasons for that foreordination do not lie in the objects themselves, but are intrinsic to the Divine Mind and the free determination of the Divine Will.