1 Corinthians 11:5

But precisely because the woman is in a position contrasted with that of the man, in so far as she has here below a visible head, she would dishonour this head by affecting a costume which would be a symbol of independence. And since the woman does not naturally belong to public life, if it happen that in the spiritual domain she has to exercise a function which brings her into prominence, she ought to strive the more to put herself out of view by covering herself with the veil, which declares the dependence in which she remains relatively to her husband. As Heinrici says, it can only be to the shame of her husband if a wife present herself in a dress which belongs to the man. By uncovering her head (in the literal sense) she dishonours her head (in the figurative sense).

Here a difficulty arises. The apostle, by laying down for the woman the condition of wearing the veil, seems decidedly to authorize the act to which this condition applies, that is to say, he permits the woman to pray and to prophesy in public. Now in chap. 1 Corinthians 14:34 he says, absolutely and without restriction: “Let your women keep silence in the Churches.” This apparent contradiction has led Hofmann, Meyer, Beet, and others to the idea, that, in our chapter, Paul had in view only gatherings for family worship (Hofmann) or private meetings (Meyer), composed exclusively of women (Beet). But it is impossible to hold that the apostle would have imposed the obligation of the veil on a mother praying while surrounded by her husband and children. Neither is it possible to see how the idea of Meyer and of Beet could be reconciled with 1 Corinthians 11:10 of our chapter (because of the angels). Besides, 1 Corinthians 11:16 naturally implies that Paul is thinking of public worship (the Churches of God). Finally, in 1 Corinthians 14:34-35 he is not distinguishing between different kinds of assemblies; but he is contrasting assemblies in general with the time when husband and wife find themselves alone together at home: “Let the women keep silence in the Churches...” (1 Corinthians 14:34), “let them ask their husbands at home” (1 Corinthians 14:35).

Heinrici proposes to restrict the prohibition laid on women, in chap. 14, to the tokens of admiration which they liked to give to those who spoke in tongues, or also to the curious questions which they put to the prophets, thus of course disturbing the decorum of the assemblies. Some writers in England have even supposed that in chap. 14. Paul simply means to forbid women to indulge in the whisperings and private conversations which would break the stillness of worship. But it is impossible so to restrict the meaning of the word λαλεῖν, to speak, in chap. 14, applied as it is in that chapter to all the forms of public speaking. Besides, the prohibition, if it had one of these meanings, should have been addressed to men as much as to women. What the passage in chap. 14 forbids to women, is not ill-speaking or ill-timed speaking, it is speaking; and what Paul contrasts with the term speaking, is keeping silence or asking at home.

It might be supposed that the apostle meant to let the speaking of women in the form of prophesying or praying pass for the moment only, contemplating returning to it afterwards to forbid it altogether, when he should have laid down the principles necessary to justify this complete prohibition. So it was that he proceeded in chap. 6, in regard to lawsuits between Christians, beginning by laying down a simple restriction in 1 Corinthians 11:4, to condemn them afterwards altogether in 1 Corinthians 11:7. We have also observed the use of a similar method in the discussion regarding the participation of the Corinthians in idolatrous feasts; the passage, 1 Corinthians 8:10, seemed first to authorize it; then, afterwards, when the time has come, he forbids it absolutely (1 Corinthians 10:21-22), because he then judges that the minds of his readers are better prepared to accept such a decision. But this solution is unsatisfactory, because it remains true that one does not lay down a condition to the doing of a thing which he intends afterwards to forbid absolutely.

It has also been thought that the term λαλεῖν, speaking, should be taken in chap. 14 solely in the sense of teaching. Thus the woman might prophesy or pray in an unknown tongue; but she must never indulge in teaching. But it is impossible to accept so limited a meaning of the word λαλεῖν in a chapter where it is used all through to denote both prophetical speaking and speaking in tongues. This solution is not, perhaps, radically false, but it is impossible to deduce it from the word speaking in chap. 14 in contrast to the terms prophesying and praying in chap. 11

I rather think, therefore, that while rejecting, as a rule, the speaking of women in Churches, Paul yet meant to leave them a certain degree of liberty for the exceptional case in which, in consequence of a sudden revelation (prophesying), or under the influence of a strong inspiration of prayer and thanksgiving (speaking in tongues), the woman should feel herself constrained to give utterance to this extraordinary impulse of the Spirit. Only at the time when she thus went out of her natural position of reserve and dependence, he insisted the more that she should not forget, nor the Church with her, the abnormal character of the action; and this was the end which the veil was intended to serve. Moreover, Paul does not seem to think that such cases could be frequent. For in chap. 14 prophetesses are not once mentioned along with prophets, and yet the name προφῆτις was familiar in the Old Testament, and is not wanting in the New (Luke 2:36; Rev 2:20). Probably in making the concession which we find in this passage, the apostle was thinking only of married women. The question could hardly have been even raised as to young women. Reuss says: “In Greece a woman of character did not appear in public without a veil.” How much more must it have been so with unmarried persons! And if Paul had extended to the latter the permission implied in his words, he would still less have suppressed in their case the condition of the veil imposed on the former.

In the last words of 1 Corinthians 11:5, Paul likens the woman who appears in public with her head uncovered to one who has her head shaven. This was never found among the Greeks, except in the case of women who were slaves; among the Jews, only in the case of the woman accused of adultery by her husband (Num 5:18). A similar usage seems to have prevailed among other nations besides. The subject of the proposition, according to most, is understood: every woman that speaketh with her head uncovered (see Meyer). But is it not simpler to make ἓν καὶ τὸ αὐτό, one and the same thing, the subject of ἐστί : “One and the same [condition] is the woman's who is shaven [as hers who is not veiled].” The verb ξυρέω, or ξυράω, or ξύρω, signifies to shave to the skin.