John 8:6

Ver. 6. In what did the snare consist? Some, Augustine, Erasmus, Luther and Calvin think that they desired to lead Jesus to pronounce a sentence whose severity would place it in contradiction to His ordinary compassion. Others, Euthymius, Bengel, Tholuck, Hengstenberg, Weiss and Keil suppose that the adversaries expected a decision in the line of clemency, which would have put Jesus in contradiction to the Mosaic statute. But, in both of these cases, there would have been no snare properly so called, no danger existing for Jesus except in case of an affirmative answer in the first explanation and of a negative answer in the second. Hug and Meyer suppose the snare more skillfully laid, that is to say, threatening Jesus on both sides. If He replies negatively, He contradicts Moses; if He replies in conformity with Moses, He enters into conflict with the Roman law which did not punish adultery with death. This appears to me to approach the truth. Only the Roman law has nothing to do here; for the Romans did not impose on the provinces their own legislation, and the conflict resultant from a simple contradiction between the two codes would have had nothing striking enough in the eyes of the people to seriously injure Jesus.

The solution seems to me to be simple: If Jesus answered: Moses is right; stone her! they would have gone to Pilate and accused Jesus of infringing upon the rights of the Roman authority, which had reserved to itself the jus gladii here, as in all conquered countries. If He answered: Do not stone her! they would have decried Him before the people and would even have accused Him before the Sanhedrim as a false Messiah; for the Messiah must maintain or restore the sovereignty of the law. It is exactly the same combination as when the question was proposed to Him of paying tribute to Caesar (Luke 20 and parallels). Luthardt and Reuss also adopt this explanation. Weiss objects, it is true, that they could not reasonably expect from Jesus that He would give the order to stone her; and that, in any case, He could still reserve the confirmation of the penalty for the Roman authority. But in the case of a sentence of condemnation it would have been in vain for Jesus to place all the limitations upon this answer that were possible no account would have been taken of this before the Roman governor. He had been accused indeed of forbidding to pay tribute to Caesar, though He had answered in precisely the opposite way.

The act of Jesus in the face of the question which is proposed to Him is not simply, as it is frequently understood from certain examples derived either from the Greek authors or from the Rabbis, a way of isolating Himself and expressing His indifference with regard to the subject proposed. In the first place, it could not be an indifferent question for Jesus in such a situation. Then, notwithstanding all that Weiss says, it seems to me that Hengstenberg is in the true line of thought when he sees in this act, thus understood, a sort of trick imcompatible with the moral dignity of Jesus. If He gave Himself the appearance of doing a thing, it was because He was really doing it. He wrote, and that which He wrote must quite naturally, as it seems to me, be the words which He utters at this same moment (John 8:7). He writes the first part of it while He is stooping down the first time (John 8:6), and the second part when, after having raised Himself, He resumes the same attitude (John 8:8). Thereby Jesus takes the position of a divine judge both of the woman who is brought to Him and of the very persons themselves who present her to Him. A sentence is not only pronounced: it is written. This act has a meaning analogous to that of the saying of Jeremiah (John 17:13): “Those who turn aside from Me shall be written in the earth.”