Godet's Commentary on Selected Books
Romans 11:33
“ O the depth of the riches both of the wisdom and knowledge of God! How unsearchable are His judgments, and His ways past finding out! ”
Like a traveller who has reached the summit of an Alpine ascent, the apostle turns and contemplates. Depths are at his feet; but waves of light illumine them, and there spreads all around an immense horizon which his eye commands. The plan of God in the government of mankind spreads out before him, and he expresses the feelings of admiration and gratitude with which the prospect fills his heart.
The word βάθος, depth, applies precisely to that abyss which he has just been exploring. The genitive πλούτου, of riches, by which the word depth is qualified, is regarded by most commentators as a first complement, co-ordinate with the two following: of wisdom and of knowledge. In this case it must be held that the abstract term riches applies to a special divine attribute which can be no other than divine mercy; comp. Romans 10:12; Ephesians 2:4, etc. The two καί, and...and, which follow, would furnish an instance of a construction like that of Luke 5:17. And one might make these three complements, riches, wisdom, knowledge, parallel to the three questions which follow, Romans 11:34-35, as in fact the first refers rather to knowledge, the second to wisdom, and the third to grace. But if this latter relation really existed in the apostle's mind, why should the questions be arranged in an opposite order to that of the three terms corresponding to them in our verse? Then is not the notion of mercy too diverse in kind from those of wisdom and knowledge to allow of the first being thus co-ordinated with the other two? Finally, would not the abstract term riches have required to be determined by a complement such as ἐλέους or χάριτος (mercy, grace)? The apostle is not afraid of such accumulations of genitives (Romans 2:5 and Ephesians 1:19). It rather seems to me, therefore, that the second of these two abstract terms (depth and riches) ought to be regarded as a complement of the other: a depth of riches, for: an infinitely rich depth, that is to say, one which, instead of being an immense void, presents itself as embracing contents of inexhaustible fulness. Calvin has well caught this meaning: “This is why,” says he, “I doubt not that the apostle exalts the deep riches of wisdom and knowledge which are in God.”
This depth is rich, not in darkness, but in light; it is a depth both of wisdom and knowledge.
The two καί, both...and..., have the disjunctive sense; they distinguish the two following substantives very precisely, however closely allied their meaning may be. The second, γνῶσις, knowledge, refers especially in the context to divine foreknowledge, and in general to the complete view which God has of all the free determinations of men, whether as individuals or as nations. The former, σοφία, wisdom, denotes the admirable skill with which God weaves into His plan the free actions of man, and transforms them into so many means for the accomplishment of the excellent end which He set originally before Him. We cannot reflect, however little, without seeing that the very marked difference which Paul here establishes between these two divine perfections, is by no means indifferent; it is nothing less than the safeguard of human liberty. If the omniscience of God, especially His foreknowledge, were counfounded with His wisdom, everything in the universe would be directly the work of God, and the creatures would be nothing more than blind instruments in His hands.
Paul sees these two attributes of God shine forth in two orders of things which, combined, constitute the whole government of the world: judgments, κρίματα, and ways or paths, ὁδοί. Here the general sense of decree is sometimes given to the former of these terms. But the word in every case implies the idea of a judicial decree; and what Paul has just been referring to, those severe dispensations whereby God has successively chastised the ingratitude of the Gentiles (chap. 1) and the haughty presumption of the Jews (chap. 10), shows clearly that we are to keep to its strict sense.
Ways, ὁδοί, do not really denote different things from judgments; but the term presents them in a different and more favorable light, as so many advances toward the final aim. The term judgments expresses, if one may so speak, the because of the things, as the word ways points to their in order that. We may thus understand the twofold relation of the events of history to knowledge on the one hand, and wisdom on the other. From the knowledge which God possesses, there follow from the free decisions of man the judgments which He decrees, and these judgments become the ways which His wisdom employs for the realization of His plan (Isaiah 40:14: κρίματα, ὁδοί).
These two orders of things are characterized by the most extraordinary epithets which the most pliant of languages can furnish: ἀνεξερεύνητος, what cannot be searched to the bottom; ἀνεξιχνίαστος, the traces of which cannot be followed to the end. The former of these epithets applies to the supreme principle which the mind seeks to approach, but which it does not reach; the latter to an abundance of ramifications and of details in execution which the understanding cannot follow to the end. These epithets are often quoted with the view of demonstrating the incomprehensibility to man of the divine decrees, and in particular of that of predestination (Aug.). But it must not be forgotten that St. Paul's exclamation is called forth, not by the obscurity of God's plans, but, on the contrary, by their dazzling clearness. If they are incomprehensible and unfathomable, it is to man's natural understanding, and until they have been revealed; but, says the apostle, 1 Corinthians 2:10. “God hath revealed them unto us by His Spirit; for the Spirit searcheth (ἐρευνᾷ) all things, even the deep things (τὰ βάθη) of God.” It is therefore in view of the unveiled mystery that the exclamation is raised, as is done by Paul here: “O the depth of the riches!” A fact which does not prevent the mind which understands them in part from having always to discover in them new laws or applications.