Romans 5:13-14

“ For until the law sin was in the world: but sin is not imputed if there is no law; and nevertheless death reigned from Adam to Moses, even over them that had not sinned after the resemblance of Adam's transgression, who is the figure of Him that was to come. ”

According to the first two interpretations of the preceding proposition, which lay down the sins committed by each individual as the sole or secondary cause of his death, the argument contained in Romans 5:13-14 would be this: “All die because they have all sinned; for even during the time which elapsed down to the giving of the law sin was in the world; now sin is undoubtedly not reckoned in the absence of law. Nevertheless, that did not prevent sin from reigning during all the interval between Adam and Moses, which proves certainly that it was nevertheless imputed in some measure. How could that be? Because of the law of nature written even in the heart of the Gentiles.” Such is De Wette's interpretation, also that of Lange and Reuss. In this sense the second proposition of Romans 5:13 must be taken as an objection made to Paul on which he raises himself. Then he would be made to answer in the sequel by confining himself to stating the very fact of the reign of death. But the explanation of death is the very point in question; how could the fact itself be given in proof? Then a simple δέ would not have sufficed to indicate such a shifting in the direction of the thought. The text rather produces the impression of a consecutive argument. Finally, at the close of such an argument, the apostle could not have left to be understood the solution which he himself gave of the problem, namely, the natural law written in the heart of the Gentiles. This idea, on which everything rested, was at once too essential and too unfamiliar to the minds of his readers to be passed over in silence as self-evident. It has been sought to meet these difficulties by giving to the word ἐλλογεῖν, to put to account, a purely subjective meaning, and so to make the proposition, Romans 5:13 b, a simple observation interjected by the way. Ambrose and Augustine, then Luther, Calvin, and Melanchthon, and in our days Rückert, Rothe, and J. Müller, do in fact apply the imputation expressed by ἐλλογεῖν not to the judgment of God, but to the reckoning which the sinner makes to himself of the trespass which he has committed: “Every one died for his own sin, for sin existed even before the law, though the sinners did not take account of it, nor esteem themselves guilty. But death, which nevertheless reigned, proved that God on His part imputed it to the sinner.” But this purely subjective signification of the term ἐλλογεῖν cannot be justified. It would require to be indicated in some way. How, besides, could Paul have affirmed in terms so general that the sinners between Adam and Moses did not impute their sins to themselves, after saying of the Gentiles, Romans 2:15, that “their thoughts mutually accuse or excuse one another,” and Romans 1:32, that these same Gentiles “knew the judgment of God, that those who do such things are worthy of death”? Finally, the idea that, notwithstanding this want of subjective imputation, the divine imputation continued ever in force, would have required to be more strongly emphasized in Romans 5:14. In general, all these modes of interpretation, according to which Paul is held to explain the death of individuals by their own sins, run counter to the object which he had before him in this whole passage, the parallel between the justification of all in one, and the condemnation of all in one.

Let us then resume our explanation of the end of Romans 5:12; and let us seek from this viewpoint to give account of Romans 5:13-14: “Death passed upon all, for that (in Adam) all sinned.” The course of the following argument at once becomes easy to understand: “ Sin was assuredly in the world at that time (and you might consequently say to me: it was for that reason men died); but I answer: sin is not imputed if there is no law (it could not therefore be the cause of the death with which every individual was visited); and yet death reigned even over those who had not like Adam violated a positive law. ” The conclusion is obvious: “Therefore all these individuals died, not for their own sin, but because of Adam's,” which had been affirmed in the close of Romans 5:12 and which was to be proved. We might in our own day argue in exactly the same manner to explain the death of the heathen or of infants: Since they are still without law, they die, not because they have sinned personally, but because they all sinned in Adam. It is clear also how the argument thus understood is in keeping with the object of this passage. All having been, as is proved by the death of all, condemned in Adam, all can likewise be really justified in Christ. Hofmann and Dietzsch, who have explained ἐφ᾿ ᾧ in the sense of: “on the ground of which (death) all have sinned,” are of course obliged to interpret Romans 5:13-14 differently from us, though to arrive at the same result. We think it useless to discuss their explanation, which falls to the ground of itself, with that which they give to the last words of Romans 5:12.

Having explained the argument as a whole, let us return to the details of the text itself. The for, at the beginning of Romans 5:13, bears not only on the proposition of which it forms part, but on the entire argument to the end of Romans 5:14.

The words ἄχρι νόμου, until the law, might signify, as the old commentators would have it: “as long as the law existed,” that is to say, from Moses to Jesus Christ. For ἄχρι may have the meaning of during. But Romans 5:14, which paraphrases the words thus: “from Adam to Moses,” excludes this meaning.

The absence of the article before νόμου, law, certainly does not prevent it here from denoting the Mosaic law; comp. Romans 5:14: until Moses. But it is not as Mosaic law, but as law strictly so called, that the Jewish law is here mentioned. And so the translation might well be: till a law, that is to say, a law of the same kind as the commandment which Adam violated. The absence of the article before ἁμαρτία, sin, has a similar effect; there was sin at that period among men. In the following proposition it is again sin as a category which is designated (being without article). If the substantive ἁμαρτία, sin, is repeated (instead of the pronoun), it is because, as Meyer says, we have here the statement of a general maxim.

The verb ἒλλογεῖν is not found elsewhere except in the Epistle to Philemon, Romans 5:18, where Paul asks this Christian to put to his account, his, Paul's, what Onesimus, whom he is recommending, may still owe to him. Between this term and λογίζειν, which he more frequently uses, the one shade of difference is that of the ἐν, in, which enters into the composition of ἐλλογεῖν : to inscribe in the account book. It is wholly arbitrary to apply this word to the subjective imputation of conscience. The parallel from the Epistle to Philemon shows clearly what its meaning is. But does the apostle then mean to teach the irresponsibility of sinners who, like the Gentiles, have not had a written law? No; for the whole book of Genesis, which describes the period between Adam and Moses, would protest against such an assertion. The matter in questior is an immediate and personal imputation, resting on a threatening like this: “In the day thou eatest thereof thou shalt die.” The infliction of the punishment of death in the sense of this divine saying necessarily supposes a positive law violated; it supposes in general a theocratic government set up. Only in such circumstances can the violator be brought to account to be immediately judged and subjected, either to capital punishment, or to the obligation of providing an expiatory act, such as sacrifice (taking the place of the punishment of death). Outside of such an organization there may be other great dispensations of a collective and disciplinary character, such as the deluge, the overthrow of Sodom and Gomorrah, or the abandonment of the Gentiles to their own corruption (chap. 1). These historical dispensations are vast pedagogical measures taken in respect of the whole human race; they have not the character of judicial and individual sentences, like those which rest on some article of a code violated by an individual with full knowledge of the law; comp. the contrast between the ἀπολοῦνται, shall perish, and the κριθήσονται, shall be judged, Romans 2:12.

The subjective negative μή before ὄντος νόμου represents the fact as it exists in the mind of the author of the maxim.