Romans 7:13

Here was the place strictly speaking for the but (δέ), answering to the μέν, assuredly, of Romans 7:12. But Paul interrupts himself; he feels the need of yet again stating the problem in all its difficulty. This is what he does in the question beginning Romans 7:13. The difference between the reading of the majority of the Mjj., ἐγένετο (aorist), and that of the T. R., γέγονε (perfect), is this: The first expresses the act by which this whole internal history was brought about; the second, the permanent state which resulted from that act. The first is therefore rather connected with what precedes, the second with what follows. From the internal point of view both may consequently be defended; but the authorities are rather in favor of the first.

The problem being thus put afresh in all its rigor, the second part of Romans 7:13 gives its solution precisely as the μέν of Romans 7:12 leads us to expect, and as we have stated it at the beginning of that verse.

The second part of the verse has been construed in many ways. And first, what is the verb of the subject ἡ ἁμαρτία, sin, which begins the sentence? Either it is derived from the preceding sentence, by understanding ἐγένετο θάνατος : “But sin (not the law) became my death,” or “turned me to death.” But is not this ellipsis somewhat serious? Or the verb is found in the following participle κατεργαζομένη, by making it a finite verb: “But sin, that it may appear sin, works my death (Calvin: operatur mihi mortem) by that which is good.” To this meaning there has been objected the form of the participle. But if the apostle means to denote rather a quality than an act of the subject, the participle may be suitable: “Sin (is) working death,” that is to say, is capable of working, or wicked enough to work it. But this return to the present tense would be singular after the past ἐγένετο; then it would require rather the present φαινῇ, may appear, than the aorist φανῇ, might appear. Paul is not speaking of what is, he is reflecting on what has taken place. The first of the two constructions would therefore be preferable; but there is still room for hesitation between two alternatives: (a) Either the participle κατεργαζομένη is taken as in explanatory apposition to the principal subject ἡ ἁμαρτία, sin, by making the three words ἵνα φανῇ ἁμαρτία a short parenthetical proposition: “But sin, that it might appear sin, turned me to death, working my death by what was good.” The participle κατεργαζομένη would have the force of the Latin gerund. Only the general sense suffers from an awkward tautology: to turn to death by working death! (b) Or the participle κατεργαζομένη is joined to the proposition ἵνα φανῇ ἁμαρτία : “But sin (turned me to death), that it might appear sin by working my death by that which is good.” This second sense is evidently preferable. As to making the second ἁμαρτία the subject of this dependent proposition: “But sin turned me to death that sin might appear (to all eyes) working my death by what is good,” it cannot be thought of; this construction would require the article ἡ before the second ἁμαρτία. We should therefore range ourselves without hesitation on the side of construction No. 1 b, were it not for two grave difficulties, the one arising from the thought itself, the other from the connection between the two ἵνα, in order that, which follow one another in this verse. Could Paul say: Sin turned me to death, that it might appear sin slaying me by a good thing? The idea is rather this: Sin caused my death by a good thing, that it might appear so much the more sin. Then what relation are we to establish in this sense between the two thats? Are they parallel as two distinct and simultaneous ends: Sin turned me to death, 1st, that it might appear sin; 2d, that it might become exceeding sinful? But the fact of becoming is not parallel to that of appearing; the latter is rather the result of the former. Or should we give to γένηται, become, a purely logical sense, as is done by many commentators: that it might appear exceedingly sinful in the view of my conscience? But this verb would only serve in this sense to repeat the idea of the verb φανῇ, might appear; and then why change the term? Or should we see in the second that a more remote end in relation to which the first that would only be the means? But appearing is not the means of becoming; on the contrary, appearing is the result of becoming. It is clear that none of those constructions is wholly satisfactory.

It seems to me that to obtain a result in harmony both with the requirements of language and of logic, it is enough to modify construction No. 1, and combine it so modified with No. 2. We need to understand not ἐγένετο -ΣΨΜΒ >, παγε 2 U 9, - vΣΨΜΒ >άνατος, but merely the verb ἐγένετο, then to make of this finite verb the point of support for the participle κατεργαζομένη : “But sin, that it might appear sin, turned to [became] working (ἐγένετο κατεργαζομένη) my death by what was good.” We have thus a simple ellipsis, a meaning exact, clear, and in keeping with the context; we keep up the past tense (ἐγένετο), which suits the aorist φανῇ; we get an analytic form (ἐγένετο κατεργαζομένη) which, while leaving the fact in the past, serves to bring out (by the present participle) the permanent attribute, and not merely the initial act, as the aorist κατειργάσατο (Romans 7:8) would have done. Finally, in this way we get without difficulty at the explanation of the two thats. The verb ἐγένετο κατεργαζομένη, became working, becomes the point of support for the second that, which gives a clear meaning: sin wrought death by goodness, that it might become as sinful as possible. God willed that sin, by killing by means of that which was ordained to give life, should commit a true masterpiece of perversity. Hence the second that: it applies to the fact in itself (γένηται, might become). And why did God will that it should be so? This is what we are told in the outset by the first that: that sin might appear fully what it is, sin (ἵνα φανῇ ἁμαρτία). These three words form a parenthetical proposition put at the beginning to indicate from the first the final aim of this whole unexpected dispensation. It was necessary that to manifest completely its evil nature (the first that), sin should inflict death on me, not by something evil (which would throw part of the odium of this murder on the means employed), but by something good (the commandment), that the crime might be completely the work of sin (the second that).

Thus we have three ideas (1) sin slays by that which is good; (2) that thereby it may accomplish an act worthy of its nature; (3) and that thereby (final end) this nature may be manifested clearly. It is obvious from this progression that we must beware of taking γένηται, might become, in the logical sense, and of identifying as far as the sense goes the two thats, as Meyer does.

On Romans 7:7-13.

The commentators who apply the moral experiences described by the apostle in this passage (p. 270) to mankind in general, apply the words I was alive (Romans 7:9) to the period of paradise; those which follow: when the commandment came, to the prohibition to eat of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, and the rest of the passage, extending to the end of the chapter, to the fall and its consequences. By the question: What shall we say then (Romans 7:7)? Paul would thus invite his readers to a general contemplation of the history of our race from the beginning, to justify what he has been expounding in regard to emancipation from the law (Romans 7:1-6). But this interpretation is excluded first by the words ἁμαρτία νεκρά, sin is dead (Romans 7:8). In paradise, according to St. Paul, sin was not dead; it did not exist (ch. Romans 5:12). Then neither would the term ἀνέζησεν, as understood, be suitable to designate the first appearance of sin. Finally, the commandment expressly quoted (Romans 7:7) belongs to the code of Sinai, and thus brings us face to face with the Jewish law.

Those who, from Chrysostom to our day (p. 271), apply this passage to the Jewish people, find in the words I was alive an indication of the patriarchal period when the promise was the bond between God and man, and in the coming of the commandment, the epoch of Moses, when the law broke this relation, and produced the great national revolts. This interpretation connects itself more easily with the context than the preceding. But neither is it tenable. When we think of the shameful sins of the patriarchal period, can we apply to that time the descriptions of sin being dead, and I was alive? Then is it historically demonstrable that through the giving of the law, the state of the nation was made sensibly worse, and that its relation to Jehovah was broken? Do not the words of Paul apply to an inward event (covetousness, revelation of sin), rather than to a great national experience? Finally, what subtleties are we led into by this explanation, when we attempt to apply it in a consequent way to the end of the section! When we come to the passage 14-25, we must then, with Reiche, apply the first of the two I's which are in conflict, to the ideal Jew, the Jew such as he ought to be, and the other, to the real Jew, such as he shows himself in practice! We do not deny that the human conscience in general, and the Jewish conscience in particular, may recognize their experiences in those which are here described. But that is natural; is not Paul a man and a Jew? The truth is, the whole is narrated about himself, but with the conviction that his experience will infallibly be that of every Israelite, and of every man who will seriously use the moral or Mosaic law as a means of sanctification.

The point in question now is to trace this experience to its profound cause. Such is the study to which the following section (Romans 7:14-25) is devoted (for, Romans 7:14).