Romans 9:11

Nay more, the preference given to Jacob was expressed even before the birth of the twins, before they had done any act whatever; so true is it, that it was not founded on any particular merit which Jacob might possess. The two subjective negations μήπω and μηδέ are used here because they contain a reflection of the author on the fact; as is expressed in the translation. No doubt it might have been said in answer to the apostle, that God foresaw the good works of Jacob and the evil acts of Esau, and that His predilection for the former was founded on this prevision. The view might even have been supported by a word used by the apostle, that of foreknowledge, Romans 8:29. But supposing the apostle had wished to discuss the question thoroughly, he might have replied in turn that the divine prevision, on which election rests, relates not to any work whatever as being able to establish some merit in favor of the elect, but on his faith, which cannot be a merit, since faith consists precisely in renouncing all merit, in the humble acceptance of the free gift. Faith foreseen is therefore a wholly different thing from works foreseen. The latter would really establish a right: the former contains only a moral condition, that, namely, which follows from the fact that possession in the case of a free being supposes acceptance. Work foreseen would impose obligation on God and take away from the freedom of His grace; faith foreseen only serves to direct its exercise. To accept and to merit are two different things. But the apostle does not enter on this discussion, and simply states the fact that it was no merit on Jacob's part which constrained God to organize His plan as He did. This plan certainly was not arbitrarily conceived, but it contains nothing which gives it the character of an obligation or debt.

Before citing the oracle which he intends to quote here (Romans 9:12), the apostle explains the object of God's way of acting, announced in the oracle. What God meant by choosing the youngest of the two sons and setting aside the eldest was, that His liberty of organizing His plans in virtue of His free choice between individuals might remain perfectly intact.

We know already what the πρόθεσις is, the purpose formed beforehand (see on Romans 8:27). This purpose to be realized needs human instruments; and it is to the choice of these individuals that the word ἐκλογή, election, refers. The expression: the purpose of God according to election (not as in the T. R.: the purpose according to the election of God), denotes therefore a plan of conduct in the preparation of salvation, which God draws out in virtue of a choice which He has made between certain individuals, in order to secure the man who best suits his purpose. Such a plan is the opposite of one founded on the right or merit of one or other of those individuals. God's free will indeed would be at an end if any man whatever might say to Him: “I have a right to be chosen, and used by Thee rather than that other.” Suppose Saul had been chosen king in consequence of some merit of his own, when the time came for substituting David for him, God would have had His hands bound. In like manner, if in virtue of his right of seniority Esau must necessarily have become the heir of the promise, a man who suited His purposes less than another would have been imposed on God. The plan and choice of God must not therefore be tied up by any human merit, that the will of the only wise and good may be exercised without hindrance. This is the principle of His government which God wished to guard by choosing, in the case of which Paul speaks, the younger instead of the elder. It was easy for the Jews, who pretended to have a right to the divine election, to apply this principle to themselves.

The word μένῃ, may stand, may be understood in the logical sense: “may stand well established in the conscience;” but is there not something more in Paul's thought? Does he not mean: “may stand in reality ”? It is not only in the thought of man, but really that the liberty of God would be compromised if any human merit regulated His choice. God, who had determined to use Jacob and put aside Esau, might have caused Jacob to be born first. If He has not done so, it is precisely that His right of free choice may stand not only established, but intact.

Tholuck rightly observes that the apostle, by using the present μένῃ, may stand, instead of the aor. μείνῃ, might stand, extends this consequence of the fact to all times: it applies therefore also to the Jews of Paul's day.

The two regimens: “ not of works, but ”...might be made to depend on a participle understood: οὖσα, being, which would be a qualification of the verb μένῃ, may stand. But it is more natural to take this verb in an absolute sense, and to connect the two clauses with the subject of the sentence: the purpose according to election. Paul adds: “purpose not of works, but”...; that is to say, the choice on which the plan rests was not made in accordance with a merit of works, but solely according to the will of the caller. Chap. Romans 8:29 has shown us that though this choice is unmerited, yet neither is it arbitrary.