Romans 9:14-16

“ What shall we say then? Is there not unrighteousness with God? Let it not be! For He saith to Moses, I will have mercy on whom I have mercy, and I will have compassion on whom I have compassion. So then it is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that showeth mercy. ”

Several commentators, and Mangold among the last, have taken Romans 9:15-18 not as the answer to the objection raised in Romans 9:14, but as the continuation and justification of the objection itself. But nothing is needed to refute this opinion beyond the exclamation: μὴ γένοιτο, let it not be, which cannot be a simple parenthesis; besides, the form of the question with the negation μή, in Romans 9:14, already assumes a negative answer, the development of which is necessarily expected in what follows.

The answer is taken solely from Scripture, which is an authority for Paul's opponent in the discussion as well as for himself. This opponent is a Jew, who thinks that the sovereign liberty which the apostle ascribes to God, and by which he seeks to justify the rejection of Israel, wrongs the divine character. It must, indeed, be borne in mind that the Jewish conscience, being developed under the law, was accustomed to consider God's dealings with man as entirely dependent on human merit or demerit. Man's doings regulated those of God.

Vv. 15. Scripture itself, that foundation of all Israel's theocratic claims, demonstrates divine liberty as it is taught by Paul. This liberty therefore cannot involve any injustice. And first, a quotation proving the absence, in the case of man, of all right to God's favors. It is taken from Exodus 33:19, where God, when condescending to grant the bold request of Moses that he might behold His glory with his bodily eyes, gives him to understand that nothing in him, notwithstanding all he has been able to do up till now in God's service, merited such a favor. If God grants it to him, it is not because he is that Moses who asks it, or because there is any right in the matter; it is pure grace on God's part. The passage is cited according to the LXX. The only difference between it and the Hebrew is, that here in each proposition the first verb is in the past (present), the second in the future; while in the Greek the first is in the future, the second in the present. It matters little for the sense. The two verbs in the present (or past) express the internal feeling, the source, and the verbs in the future the external manifestations, the successive effects. But the emphasis is neither on the first nor on the second verbs; it is on the pronoun ὃν ἄν, him, whosoever he may be. It is the idea of God's free choice which reappears. The condescension of God to Moses is certainly not an arbitrary act; God knows why He grants it. But neither is it a right on the part of Moses, as if he would have been entitled to complain in case of refusal. The difference of meaning between the two verbs ἐλεεῖν and οἰκτείρειν is nearly the same as that between the two substantives λύπη and ὀδύνη, Romans 9:2. The first expresses the compassion of the heart, the second the manifestations of that feeling (cries or groans).

Vv. 16 enunciates the general principle to be derived from this divine utterance in the particular case of Moses. When God gives, it is not because a human will (he that willeth) or a human work (he that runneth) lays Him under obligation, and forces Him to give, in order not to be unjust by refusing. It is in Himself the initiative and the efficacy are (Him that calleth), whence the gift flows. He gives not as a thing due, but as a fruit of His love; which does not imply that therein He acts arbitrarily. Such a supposition is excluded, precisely because the giver in question is God, who is wisdom itself, and who thinks nothing good except what is good. The principle here laid down included God's right to call the Gentiles to salvation when He should be pleased to grant them this favor. The words: “of him that willeth, of him that runneth,” have often been strangely understood. There have been found in them allusions to the wish of Isaac to make Esau the heir of the promise, and to Esau's running to bring the venison necessary for the feast of benediction. But Isaac and Esau are no longer in question, and we must remain by the example of Moses. It was neither the wish expressed in his prayer, nor the faithful care which he had taken of Israel in the wilderness, which could merit the favor he asked; and as no man will ever surpass him in respect either of pious willing or holy working, it follows that the rule applied to him is universal. So it will always be. Israel, in particular, should understand thereby that it is neither their fixed theocratic necessities, nor the multitude of their ceremonial or moral works, which can convert salvation into a debt contracted toward them by God, and take away from Him the right of rejecting them if He comes to think it good to do so for reasons which He alone appreciates.

But if the words of God to Moses prove that God does not owe His favors to any one whomsoever, must it also be held that He is free to reject whom He will? Yes. Scripture ascribes to Him even this right. Such is the truth following from another saying of God, in reference to the adversary of Moses, Pharaoh.