Romans 9:20

Most commentators do not hold that in the following answer Paul comes seriously to discuss the objection. Abrumpit quaestionem, says Melanchthon. Holsten observes that Paul raises the question, not to resolve it, which would be impossible, but to crush it. We acknowledge that in Romans 9:19-20 Paul pleads solely man's incompetency to discuss the dealings of God. But we shall see that he does not stop there, and that he enters more profoundly into the marrow of the question than is generally thought. It would be surprising, indeed, if a conclusion not-to-be received should be found to be the last word of Paul's logic. It would have been better for him in that case not to have made his interlocutor bring him to such a strait.

The particle μενοῦνγε, translated by much rather, is omitted by the Greco-Latins; wrongly, without doubt. It falls into three words: μέν, certainly; οὖν, therefore, and γέ, at least; that is to say, what follows remains in any case true, though all the rest should be false. Hence: much more certainly still; comp. Philippians 3:8 (much more). It therefore signifies here: “I do not examine the intrinsic truth of what thou allegest; but, however that may be, what is more certain is, that thou art not in a position to dispute with God.” The address: O man! reminds the adversary of the reason of his incompetency; it is his absolute inferiority in relation to the Creator. The exclamation ὦ ἄνθρωπε, O man, is placed by the Byzs. at the beginning of the sentence, but by the Alexs. after μενοῦνγε; the former is undoubtedly preferable. For the address: O man! justifies the use of this particle; and the two terms man and God placed, the one at the beginning of the sentence, the other at the end, form a better antithesis. The term ἀνταποκρίνεσθαι does not mean simply: to reply; but, as is proved by the only parallel in the N. T. (Luke 14:6): to reply to a reply, to make rejoinder, as it were. God, indeed, had already answered once in the previous sayings. This word implies the spirit of the contest.

The comparison of the relation between God and man to that between the vessel and the potter seems logically defective. Man free and responsible cannot be a mere instrument in the hands of God. Moreover, endowed as he is with sensibility to pleasure and pain, he cannot be manipulated like worthless matter. And certainly, if the question addressed by the vessel to the potter: “Why hast thou made me thus?” signified: “Why hast thou created me good clay or bad clay?” and in the application to man's relation to God: “Why hast thou created me with the disposition to good or to evil?” the comparison would have no meaning. For the potter does not commit the absurdity of holding the clay responsible for its superior or inferior quality. But the question is not in the least about the production of the clay, and consequently about its qualities, but solely about the use which is made of it by the potter. He does not create the clay; he takes it as he finds it, and adapts it as best he can to the different uses he proposes to himself. And besides, it is not the yet shapeless clay which asks: “Why hast thou made me thus (with or without such or such qualities)?” it is the fully manufactured vessel (τὸ πλάσμα) which thus interrogates him who has given it its present form (τῷ πλάσαντι). Consequently, in the application made of this to the relation between man and God, this same question does not signify: “Why hast Thou created me good or evil?” in that case the question could not be summarily set aside by Paul but: “Why, in the development of Thy work here below, hast Thou assigned me an honorable use (by favoring me with Thy grace, like Moses) or a vile use (by hardening me like Pharaoh)? Why does such a man serve the end of Thy glory by his salvation; such another the end of Thy glory by his dishonor?” This is the question in regard to which Paul reminds his Israelitish disputant of man's incompetency as before God. As it belongs only to the potter, in virtue of the knowledge he has of his art, to determine the use which he shall make of the different parts of the mass in his hands to extract from each the best result possible, so it belongs to God alone to assign to the different portions of humanity, to the Jews no less than to the rest of men, the use which suits Him best, with a view to His final aim. The question whether, in determining the use of one and another, He will act without rhyme or reason, or whether, on the contrary, He will adapt the use made of each to His moral predispositions, finds no place in the mind of any one who understands that God's perfections always act in harmony, and that consequently His power is ever the servant of His goodness, justice, and wisdom. As that which justifies the power of the potter over the lump of clay is not only the superiority of his strength, but that of his understanding; so, with stronger reason, what explains the sovereignty of God and His right over mankind is not only His almightiness, but His supreme understanding, and His infinite moral perfection. And what follows, Romans 9:22-24, proves that such is the view of the apostle. For to what purpose are the expressions θέλων, willing (Romans 9:22), and ἵνα, that (Romans 9:23), if not to bring out, as we shall see, God's perfect wisdom in the choice of His ends and the employment of His means? It is obvious, therefore, that the use God makes of man at a given moment (a Pharaoh, for example, as a vessel of dishonor), far from excluding his moral liberty, supposes and involves it. For the honor or dishonor to which God turns him in the execution of His work is not independent, as appears from this example, of the attitude taken by man in relation to God. The work of the skilful potter is not the emblem of an arbitrary use of strength; but, on the contrary, of a deliberate and intelligent employment of the matter at his disposal. Such is the apostle's complete view. But it is quite true, as Lange says: “When man goes the length of making to himself a god whom he affects to bind by his own rights, God then puts on His majesty, and appears in all His reality as a free God, before whom man is a mere nothing, like the clay in the hand of the potter. Such was Paul's attitude when acting as God's advocate, in his suit with Jewish Pharisaism. This is the reason why he expresses only one side of the truth. The following passage, ver. Romans 9:30 to Romans 10:21, will show that he is very far from mistaking or forgetting the other.

The ἤ, or, of Romans 9:21, means: “Or, if it were otherwise, it must be admitted the potter has not?”...Comp. Matthew 20:15. The genitive τοῦ πηλοῦ, of the lump of clay, is dependent not on ὁ κεραμεύς, the potter, but on ἐξουσίαν, power: the power which he has to use the clay. The subject, the potter, is placed between the two words, the better, as it were, to command them.

What does the lump represent? Some think that it is the people of Israel, and that God is described as having the right to make them either His elect people, or a rejected nation. This meaning breaks down on Romans 9:23-24, where we see that the vessels unto honor are elected from among the Gentiles as well as from among the Jews. The lump therefore represents the whole of humanity, not humanity as God creates it, but in the state in which He finds it every moment when He puts it to the service of His kingdom. This state includes for each individual the whole series of free determinations which have gone to make him what he is. Let not Israel therefore say to God: Thou hast no right to make of me anything else than a vessel of honor; and Thou hast no right to make of that other body, the Gentiles, anything else than a base vessel. It belongs to God Himself to decide, according to His wisdom, the part which He will assign to every human being. Comp. 2 Timothy 2:20-21, where the words: “If a man therefore purge himself from these, he shall be a vessel unto honor,” show clearly the truth of the standpoint which we have just expounded.

The forms ὃ μέν, ὃ δέ, might be explained as a remnant of the most ancient form of the Greek article; but it is perhaps more correct to admit an ellipsis: ὃ μὲν ποιεῖ εἰς τιμὴν, εἰς τιμὴν ποιῆσαι, etc.

Let us add, that the figure here developed by Paul is familiar to the writers of the O. T. (Isaiah 29:16; Isaiah 45:9-10; Jeremiah 18:6, etc.), and thus had the force of a quotation. Application of the figure, Romans 9:22-24.