Daniel 3:30

Then the king promoted Shadrach ... - Margin, “made to prosper.” The Chaldee means no more than “made to prosper.” Whether he restored them to their former places, or to higher honors, does not appear. There would be, however, nothing inconsistent with his usual course in supposing that he raised them to more exalted stations.

In the province of Babylon - See the notes at Daniel 2:49. The Greek and the Arabic add here, “And he counted them worthy to preside over all the Jews that were in his kingdom.” But nothing of this is found in the Chaldee, and it is not known by whom this addition was made.

In the Vulgate and the Greek versions, and in some of the critical editions of the Hebrew Scriptures (Walton, Hahn, etc.), the three first verses of the following chapter are subjoined to this. It is well known that the divisions of the chapters are of no authority, but it is clear that these verses belong more appropriately to the following chapter than to this, as the reason there assigned by the monarch for the proclamation is what occurred to himself Daniel 3:2, rather than what he had witnessed in others. The division, therefore, which is made in our common version of the Bible, and in the Syriac and the Arabic, is the correct one.

Practical Remarks

I. The instance recorded in this chapter Daniel 3:1 is not improbably the first case which ever occurred in the world of an attempt to produce “conformity” in idolatrous worship by penal statute. It has, however, been abundantly imitated since, alike in the pagan and in the nominally Christian world. There are no portions of history more interesting than those which describe the progress of religious liberty; the various steps which have been taken to reach the result which has now been arrived at, and to settle the principles which are now regarded as the true ones. Between the views which were formerly entertained, and which are still entertained in many countries, and those which constitute the Protestant notions on the subject, there is a greater difference than there is, in regard to civil rights, between the views which prevail under an Oriental despotism, and the most enlarged and enlightened notions of civil freedom. The views which have prevailed on the subject are the following:

1. The “general” doctrine among the pagan has been, that there were many gods in heaven and earth, and that all were entitled to reverence. One nation was supposed to have as good a right to worship its own gods as another, and it was regarded as at least an act of courtesy to show respect to the gods that any nation adored, in the same way as respect would be shown to the sovereigns who presided over them. Hence, the gods of all nations could be consistently introduced into the Pantheon at Rome; hence, there were few attempts to “proselyte” among the pagan; and hence, it was not common to “persecute” those who worshipped other gods. Persecution of idolaters “by” those who were idolaters was, therefore, rarely known among the pagan, and “toleration” was not contrary to the views which prevailed, provided the gods of the country were recognized. In ancient Chaldea, Assyria, Greece, and Rome, in the earliest ages, persecution was rare, and the toleration of other forms of religion was usual.

2. The views which have prevailed leading to persecution, and which are a violation, as we suppose, of all just notions of liberty on the subject of religion, are the following:

(a) Those among the pagan which, as in the case of Nebuchadnezzar, require “all” to worship a particular god that should be set up. In such a case, it is clear that while all who were “idolaters,” and who supposed that “all” the gods worshipped by others should be respected, could render homage; it is also clear that those who regarded “all” idols as false gods, and believed that “none” of them ought to be worshipped, could “not” comply with the command. Such was the case with the Jews who were in Babylon Daniel 3:8, for supposing that there was but one God, it was plain that they could not render homage to any other. While, therefore, every idolater could render homage to “any” idol, the Hebrew could render homage to “none.”

(b) The views among the pagan “prohibiting” the exercise of a certain kind of religion. According to the prevailing views, no mode of religion could be tolerated which would maintain that “all” the gods that were worshipped were false. Religion was supposed to be identified with the best interests of the state, and was recognized by the laws, and protected by the laws. To deny the claim, therefore, of any and of all the gods that were worshipped; to maintain that all were false alike; to call on men to forsake their idols, and to embrace a new religion - all this was regarded as an attack on the state. This was the attitude which Christianity assumed toward the religions of the Roman empire, and it was this which led to the fiery persecutions which prevailed there. While Rome could consistently tolerate any form of idolatry that would recognize the religion established by the state, it could not tolerate a system which maintained that “all” idolatry was wrong. It would allow another god to be placed in the Pantheon, but it could not recognize a system which woud remove every god from that temple. Christianity, then, made war on the system of idolatry that prevailed in the Roman empire in two respects: in proclaiming a “purer” religion, denouncing all the corruptions which idolatry had engendered, and which it countenanced; and in denying altogether that the gods which were worshipped were true gods - thus arraying itself against the laws, the priesthood, the venerable institutions, and all the passions and prejudices of the people. These views may be thus summed up:

(aa) all the gods worshipped by others were to be recognized;

(bb) new ones might be introduced by authority of the state;

(cc) the gods which the state approved and acknowledged were to be honored by all;

(dd) if any persons denied their existence, and their claims to homage, they were to be treated as enemies of the state.

It was on this last principle that persecutions ever arose under the pagan forms of religion. Infidels, indeed, have been accustomed to charge Christianity with all the persecutions on account of religion, and to speak in high terms of “the mild tolerance of the ancient pagans;” of “the universal toleration of polytheism;” of “the Roman princes beholding without concern a thousand forms of religion subsisting in peace under their gentle sway.” - Gibbon. But it should be remembered that pagan nations required of every citizen conformity to their national idolatries. When this was refused, persecution arose as a matter of course. Stilpo was banished from Athens for affirming that the statue of Minerva in the citadel was no divinity, but only the work of the chisel of Phidias. Protagoras received a similar punishment for this sentence: “Whether there be gods or not, I have nothing to offer.” Prodicus, and his pupil Socrates, suffered death for opinions at variance with the established idolatry of Athens. Alcibiades and Aeschylus narrowly escaped a like end for a similar cause. Cicero lays it down as a principle of legislation entirely conformable to the laws of the Roman state, that “no man shall have separate gods for himself; and no man shall worship by himself new or foreign gods, unless they have been publicly acknowledged by the laws of the state.” - “De Legibus,” ii. 8. Julius Paulus, the Roman civilian, gives the following as a leading feature of the Roman law: “Those who introduced new religions, or such as were unknown in their tendency and nature, by which the minds of men might be agitated, were degraded, if they belonged to the higher ranks, and if they were in a lower state, were punished with death.” See M‘Ilvaine’s “Lectures on the Evidences of Christianity,” pp. 427-429.

(c) The attempts made to produce conformity in countries where the “Christian” system has prevailed. In such countries, as among the pagan, it has been supposed that religion is an important auxiliary to the purposes of the state, and that it is proper that the state should not only “protect” it, but “regulate” it. It has claimed the right, therefore, to prescribe the form of religion which shall prevail; to require conformity to that, and to punish all who did not conform to the established mode of worship. This attempt to produce conformity has led to most of the persecutions of modern times.

3. The principles which have been settled by the discussions and agitations of past times, and which are recognized in all countries where there are any just views of religious liberty, and which are destined yet to be universally recognized, are the following:

(a) There is to be, on the subject of religion, perfect liberty to worship God in the manner that shall be most in accordance with the views of the individual himself, provided in doing it he does not interfere with the rights or disturb the worship of others. It is not merely that men are to be “tolerated” in the exercise of their religion - for the word “tolerate” would seem to imply that the state had some right of control in the matter - but the true word to express the idea is “liberty.”

(b) The state is to “protect” all in the enjoyment of these equal rights. Its “authority” does not go beyond this; its “duty” demands this. These two principles comprise all that is required on the subject of religious liberty. They have been in our world, however, principles of slow growth. They were unknown in Greece - for Socrates died because they were not understood; they were unknown in Rome - for the state claimed the power to determine what gods should be admitted into the Pantheon; they were unknown even in Judea - for a national or state religion was established there; they were unknown in Babylon - for the monarch there claimed the right of enforcing conformity to the national religion; they were unknown in Europe in the middle ages - for all the horrors of the Inquisition grew out of the fact that they were not understood; they are unknown in Turkey, and China, and Persia - for the state regards religion as under its control. The doctrine of entire freedom in religion, of perfect liberty to worship God according to our own views of right, is “the last point which society is to reach in this direction.” It is impossible to conceive that there is to be anything “beyond” this which mankind are to desire in the progress toward the perfection of the social organization; and when this shall be everywhere reached, the affairs of the world will be placed on a permanent footing.

II. In the spirit evinced by the three young men, and the answer which they gave, when accused of not worshipping the image, and when threatened with a horrid death, we have a beautiful illustration of the nature and value of “the religion of principle,” Daniel 3:12. To enable us to see the force of this example, and to appreciate its value, we are to remember that these were yet comparatively young men; that they were captives in a distant land; that they had no powerful friends at court; that they had had, compared with what we now have, few advantages of instruction; that they were threatened with a most horrid death; and that they had nothing of a worldly nature to hope for by refusing compliance with the king’s commands. This instance is of value to us, because it is not only important “to have religion,” but “to have the best kind of religion;” and it is doubtless in order that we “may” have this, that such examples are set before us in the Scriptures. In regard to this kind of religion, there are three inquiries which would present themselves: On what is it founded? what will it lead us to do? and what is its value?

(1) It is founded mainly on two things - an intelligent view of duty, and fixed principle.

(a) An intelligent view of duty; an acquaintance with what is right, and what is wrong. These young men had made up their minds intelligently, that it was right to worship God, and that it was wrong to render homage to an idol. This was not “obstinacy.” Obstinacy exists where a man has made up his mind, and resolves to act, without any good reason, or without an intelligent view of what is right or wrong, and where he adheres to his purpose not because it is right, but from the influence of mere “will.” The religion of principle is always found where there is an intelligent view of what is right, and a man can give a “reason” for what he does.

(b) This religion is founded on a determination to “do” what is right, and “not” to do what is wrong. The question is not what is expedient, or popular, or honorable, or lucrative, or pleasant, but what is right.

(2) What will such a religion lead us to do? This question may be answered by a reference to the case before us, and it will be found that it will lead us to do three things:

(a) To do our “duty” without being solicitous or anxious about the results, Daniel 3:16.

(b) To put confidence in God, feeling that if he pleases he “can” protect us from danger, Daniel 3:17.

(c) To do our duty, “whatever may be the consequences - whether he protects us or not,” Daniel 3:18,

(3) What is the “value” of this kind of religion?

(a) It is the only kind in which there is any fixed and certain standard. If a man regulates his opinions and conduct from expediency, or from respect to the opinions of others, or from feeling, or from popular impulses, there is no standard; there is nothing settled or definite. Now one thing is popular, now another; today the feelings may prompt to one thing, tomorrow to another; at one time expediency will suggest one course, at another a different course.

(b) It is the only kind of religion on which reliance can be placed. In endeavoring to spread the gospel; to meet the evils which are in the world; to promote the cause of temperance, chastity, liberty, truth, and peace, the only thing on which permanent reliance can be placed is the religion of principle. And

(c) It is the only religion which is “certainly” genuine. A man may see much poetic beauty in religion; he may have much of the religion of sentiment; he may admire God in the grandeur of his works; he may have warm feelings; easily enkindled on the subject of religion, and may even weep at the foot of the cross in view of the wrongs and woes that the Saviour endured; he may be impressed with the forms, and pomp, and splendor of gorgeous worship, and still have no genuine repentance for his sins, no saving faith in the Redeemer.

III. We have in this chapter Daniel 3:19 an affecting case of an attempt to “punish” men for holding certain opinions, and for acting in conformity with them. When we read of an instance of persecutions like this, it occurs to us to ask the following questions: What is persecution? why has it been permitted by God? and what effects have followed from it?

(1) What is persecution? It is pain inflicted, or some loss, or disadvantage in person, family, or office, on account of holding certain opinions. It has had “two” objects: one to “punish” men for holding certain opinions, as if the persecutor had a right to regard this as an offence against the state; and the other a professed view to reclaim those who are made to suffer, and to save their souls. In regard to the “pain” or “suffering” involved in persecution, it is not material what “kind” of pain is inflicted in order to constitute persecution. “Any” bodily suffering; any deprivation of comfort; any exclusion from office; any holding up of one to public reproach; or any form of ridicule, constitutes the essence of persecution. It may be added, that not a few of the inventions most distinguished for inflicting pain, and known as refinements of cruelty, have been originated in times of persecution, and would probably have been unknown if it had not been for the purpose of restraining men from the free exercise of religious opinions. The Inquisition has been most eminent in this; and within the walls of that dreaded institution it is probable that human ingenuity has been exhausted in devising the most refined modes of inflicting torture on the human frame.

(2) Why has this been permitted? Among the reasons why it has been permitted may be the following:

(a) To show the power and reality of religion. It seemed desirable to subject it to “all kinds” of trial, in order to show that its existence could not be accounted for except on the supposition that it is from God. If men had never been called on to “suffer” on account of religion, it would have been easy for the enemies of religion to allege that there was little evidence that it was genuine, or was of value, for it had never been tried. Compare Job 1:9. As it is, it has been subjected to “every form” of trial which wicked men could devise, and has shown itself to be adapted to meet them all. The work of the martyrs has been well done; and religion in the times of martyrdom has shown itself to be all that it is desirable it should be.

(b) In order to promote its spread in the world. “The blood of the martyrs” has been “the seed of the church;” and it is probable that religion in past times has owed much of its purity, and of its diffusion, to the fact that it has been persecuted.

(c) To fit the sufferers for an exalted place in heaven. They who have suffered persecution needed trials as well as others, for “all” Christians need them - and “theirs” came in this form. Some of the most lovely traits of Christian character have been brought out in connection with persecution, and some of the most triumphant exhibitions of preparation for heaven have been made at the stake.

(3) What have been the effects of persecution?

(a) It has been the “settled” point that the Christian religion cannot be destroyed by persecution. There is no power to be brought against it more mighty than, for example, was that of the Roman empire; and it is impossible to conceive that there should be greater refinements of cruelty than have been employed.

(b) The effect has been to diffuse the religion which has been persecuted. The manner in which the sufferings inflicted have been endured has shown that there is reality and power in it. It is also a law of human nature to “sympathize” with the wronged and the oppressed, and we insensibly learn to transfer the sympathy which we have for these “persons” to their “opinions.” When we see one who is “wronged,” we soon find our hearts beating in unison with his, and soon find ourselves taking sides with him in everything.

IV. We have in this chapter Daniel 3:24 an instructive illustration of the “protection” which God affords his people in times of trial. These men were thrown into the furnace on account of their obedience to God, and their refusal to do what they knew he would not approve. The result showed, by a most manifest miracle, that they were right in the course which they took, and their conduct was the occasion of furnishing a most striking proof of the wisdom of trusting in God in the faithful performance of duty, irrespective of consequences. Similar illustrations were furnished in the case of Daniel in the lions’ den Daniel 6:16, and of Peter Acts 12:1. But a question of much interest arises here, which is, What kind of protection may “we” look for now?

(1) There are numerous “promises” made to the righteous of every age and country. They are not promises indeed of “miraculous” interference, but they are promises of “an” interposition of some kind in their behalf, which will show that “it is not vain thing to serve God.” Among them are those recorded in the following places: Isaiah 54:7; Matthew 5:4; Job 5:19,

(2) In regard to the “kind” of interposition that we may look for now, or the “nature” of the favors implied in these promises, it may be observed:

(a) That we are not to look for any “miraculous” interpositions in our favor.

(b) We are not to expect that there will he on earth an “exact adjustment” of the Divine dealings according to the deserts of all persons, or according to the principles of a “completed” moral government, when there will be a perfect system of rewards and punishments.

(c) We are not to expect that there will be such manifest and open rewards of obedience, and such direct and constant benefits resulting from religion in this world, as to lead men “merely” from these to serve and worship God. If religion were “always” attended with prosperity; if the righteous were never persecuted, were never poor, or were never bereaved, multitudes would be induced to become religious, as many followed the Saviour, not because they saw the miracles, but because they did eat of the loaves and fishes, and were filled: John 6:26. While, therefore, in the Divine administration here it is proper that there should be so many and so marked interpositions in favor of the good as to show that God is the friend of his people, it is “not” proper that there should be so many that men would be induced to engage in his service for the love of the reward rather than for the sake of the service itself; because they are to be happy, rather than because they love virtue. It may be expected, therefore, that while the general course of the Divine administration will be in favor of virtue, there may be much intermingled with this that will appear to be of a contrary kind; much that will be fitted to “test” the faith of the people of God, and to show that they love his service for its own sake.

V. We have, in Daniel 3:28, a striking instance of the effect which an adherence to principle will produce on the minds of worldly and wicked men. Such men have no “love” for religion, but they can see that a certain course accords with the views which are professedly held, and that it indicates high integrity. They can see that firmness and consistency are worthy of commendation and reward. They can see, as Nebuchadnezzar did in this case, that such a course will secure the Divine favor, and they will be disposed to honor it on that account. For a time, a tortuous course may seem to prosper, but in the end, solid fame, high rewards, honorable offices, and a grateful remembrance after death, follow in the path of strict integrity and unbending virtue.