Albert Barnes' Bible Commentary
Daniel 6:14
Then the king, when he heard these words, was sore displeased with himself - That is, for having consented to such a decree without deliberation, or with so much haste - or for having consented to it at all. It is remarkable that it is not said that he was displeased with them for having proposed it; but it is clear that he saw that the guilt was his own for having given his assent to it, and that he had acted foolishly. There is no evidence as yet that he saw that the decree had been proposed for the purpose of securing the degradation and ruin of Daniel - though he ultimately perceived it Daniel 6:24; or if he did perceive it, there was no way of preventing the consequences from coming on Daniel - and that was the point that now engrossed his attention. He was doubtless displeased with himself,
(1) because he saw that he had done wrong in confirming such a decree, which interfered with what had been tolerated - the free exercise of religion by his subjects;
(2) because he now saw that it was foolish, and unworthy of a king, thus to assent to a law for which there was no good reason, and the consequences of which he had not foreseen; and
(3) because he now saw that he had involved the first officer of the realm, and a man of unsullied character, in ruin, unless some way could be devised by which the consequences of the statute could be averted.
It is no uncommon thing for men to be displeased with themselves when they experience the unexpected consequences of their follies and their sins. An instance strongly resembling that here stated, in its main features, occurred at a later period in the history of Persia - an instance showing how the innocent may be involved in a general law, and how much perplexity and regret may be caused by the enactment of such a law. It occurred in Persia, in the persecution of Christians, 344 a.d. “An edict appeared, which commanded that all Christians should be thrown into chains and executed. Many belonging to every rank died as martyrs. Among these was an eunuch of the palace, named Azades, a man greatly prized by the king. So much was the latter affected by his death, that he commanded the punishment of death should be inflicted from thenceforth only on the leaders of the Christian sect; that is, only on persons of the clerical order.” - Neander’s Church History, Torrey’s Translation, vol. iii. p. 146.
And set his heart on Daniel to deliver him - In what way he sought to deliver him is not said. It would seem probable from the representation in the following verse, that it was by an inquiry whether the statute might not properly be changed or cancelled, or whether the penalty might not be commuted - for it is said that his counselors urged as a reason for the strict infliction of the punishment the absolute unchangeableness of the statute. Perhaps he inquired whether a precedent might not be found for the abrogation of a law enacted by a king by the same authority that enacted it; or whether it did not come within the king’s prerogative to change it; or whether the punishment might not be commuted without injury; or whether the evidence of the guilt was perfectly clear; or whether he might not be pardoned without anything being done to maintain the honor of the law. This is one of the most remarkable instances on record of the case of a monarch seeking to deliver a subject from punishment when the monarch had absolute power, and is a striking illustration of the difficulties which often arise in the administration of justice, where the law is absolute, and where justice seems to demand the infliction of the penalty, and yet where there are strong reasons why the penalty should not be inflicted; that is, why an offender should be pardoned. And yet there is no improbability in this statement about the perplexity of the king, for
(1) there were strong reasons, easily conceivable, why the penalty should not be inflicted in this case, because
(a) the law had been evidently devised by the crafty enemies of Daniel to secure just such a result;
(b) Daniel had been guilty of no crime - no moral wrong, but had done only what should commend him more to favor and confidence;
(c) his character was every way upright and pure;
(d) the very worship which he had been detected in had been up to that period allowed, and there was no reason why it should now be punished, and
(e) the infliction of the penalty, though strictly according to the letter of the law, would be manifestly a violation of justice and equity; or, in other words, it was every way. desirable that it should not be inflicted.
(2) Yet there was great difficulty in pardoning him who had offended, for
(a) the law was absolute in the case;
(b) the evidence was clear that Daniel had done what the law forbade;
(c) the law of the realm prohibited any change;
(d) the character and government of the king were involved in the matter. If he interposed and saved Daniel, and thus suffered the law to be violated with impunity, the result would be that there would be a want of stability in his administration, and any other subject could hope that he might violate the law with the same impunity. justice, and the honor of the government, therefore, seemed to demand that the law should be enforced, and the penalty inflicted.
(3) It may be added, that cases of this kind are frequently occurring in the administration of law - cases where there is a conflict between justice and mercy, and where one must be sacrificed to the other. There are numerous instances in which there can be no doubt that the law has been violated, and yet in which strong reasons exist why the offender should be pardoned. Yet there are great difficulties in the whole subject of pardon, and there are more embarrassments in regard to this than anything else pertaining to the administration of the laws. If an offence is never pardoned, then the government is stern and inexorable, and its administration violates some of the finest and most tender feelings of our nature for there are cases when all the benevolent feelings of our nature demand that there should be the remission of a penalty - cases, modified by youth, or age, or sex, or temptation, or previous character, or former service rendered to one’s country. And yet pardon in any instance always does just so much to weaken the strong arm of the law. It is a proclamation that in some cases crime may be committed with impunity. If often exercised, law loses its force, and men are little deterred from crime by fear of it. If it were always exercised, and a proclamation were sent forth that anyone who committed an offence might be pardoned, the authority of government would be at an end. Those, therefore, who are entrusted with the administration of the laws, are often substantially in the same perplexity in which Darius was in respect to Daniel - all whose feelings incline them to mercy, and who yet see no way in which it can be exercised consistently with the administration of justice and the prevention of crime.
And he labored - He sought to devise some way in which it might be done.
Till the going down of the sun - Houbigant understands this, “Until the sun arose;” but the common rendering is probably the correct one. Why that hour is mentioned is not known. It would seem from the following verse that the king was pressed by his counselors to carry the decree into execution, and it is probable that the king saw that the case was a perfectly clear one, and that nothing could be hoped for from delay. The law was clear, and it was equally clear that it had been violated. There was no way, then, but to suffer it to take its course.