John Owen’s Exposition (7 vols)
Hebrews 9:16-17
῞Οπου γὰρ διαθήκη, θάνατον ἀνάγκη θέρεσθαι τοῦ διαθεμένου· διαθήκη γὰρ ἐπὶ νεκροῖς βεβαία, ἐπεὶ μήποτε ἰσχύει ὅτε ζῇ ὁ διαθέμενος.
Θάνατον ἀνάγκη φέρεσθαι. Syr., מַוְתָא היּ מְחַיְּיָא “the death of him is declared,” showed, argued, or proved. “Mors intercedat necesse est;” “necesse est mortem intercedere.” Ar., “Necesse est mortem ferri;” which is not proper in the Latin tongue: however, there is an emphasis in
φέρεσθαι, more than is expressed by “intercedo.” Διαθεμένον. Syr., דְּהָו דְּעַבְדָהּ, “of him that made it; “of the testator.” ᾿Επὶ νεκροῖς. Syr., עַל מִיתָא הוּ, “in him that is dead;” “in mortuis,” “among them that are dead.” Βεβαία. Vulg., “confirmatum est;” and so the Syriac, “ratum est,” more proper. Μήποτε ιεσχύει. Syr., לַית בָּהּ חַשְׁחוּ, “there is no use, profit, or benefit in it.” Ar., “nunquam valet;” “quandoquidem nunquam valet;” “nondum valet;” “it is not yet of force.” [10]
[10] EXPOSITION. Scholefield characterizes this passage “as perhaps the most perplexing in the whole New Testament.” The dispute relates to the import of διαθήκη, whether the translation “covenant” should be retained, as the word is commonly rendered; or whether the translation “testament” is not more suitable to the idea conveyed, particularly by verses 16, 17. Most of the Greek fathers, most of the Reformed theologians, Grotius, Pierce, Doddridge, Michaelis,.Macknight, Scholefield, Tholuck, Dr Henderson, Turner, and Ebrard, pronounce in favor of “covenant.” On the other hand, Chrysostom, Luther, Calvin, Erasmus, Wolf, Campbell, Bengel, Schleusner, Wahl, Rosenmuller, Bretschneider, Kuinoel, Stuart, Robinson, Conybeare and Howson, decide in favor of “testament” as the proper translation. The central difficulty in the passage will probably be admitted to Ale in the meaning of διαθέμενος . Conybeare and Howson affirm that “the A.V. is unquestionably correct in translating διαθήκη “testament” in this passage. The attempts which have been made to avoid this meaning are irreconcilable with any natural explanation of ὁ διαθέμενος .” Macknight renders it “appointed sacrifice.” But this would involve a grammatical error: and to obviate this consideration, Scholefield proposes a rendering in an active sense, “mediating sacrifice;” but he candidly owns that there is no instance of the word being used elsewhere in this signification; and besides, there is great harshness in affixing to διαθέμενος a meaning so widely different from its congener, διαθήκη, occurring as they do in the same sentence. Whitby and Burton, accordingly, propose the phrase “covenanting party.” But from this translation results another difficulty; the death of a covenanting party dissolves rather than confirms a covenant. Ebrard's solution of this difficulty is ingenious: “The man who will enter into a covenant with God is a sinner, and as such incapable of entering into fellowship with the holy God, nay, even of appearing before God's presence, Deuteronomy 5:26. He must die on account of his guilt, if a substitutionary sacrifice be not offered for him. But he must also die to his former life, in order to begin a new life in covenant with God. In short, from a simple view of the symbolical import of the covenant burnt-offering, described in verses 18-22, the following may be stated as the result: When a sinful man will enter into covenant with the holy God, the man must first die, must first atone for his guilt by a death, (or he must produce a substitutionary burnt-offering.)” ED.
Hebrews 9:16. For where a testament [is,] there must also of necessity be brought in the death of the testator. For a testament [is] firm [or ratifed] after men are dead; otherwise it is of no force whilst the testator liveth.
There is not much more to be considered in these verses, but only how the observation contained in them doth promote and confirm the argument which the apostle insists upon. Now this is to prove the necessity and use of the death of Christ, from the nature, ends, and use of the covenant whereof he was the mediator; for it being a testament also, it was to be confirmed with the death of the testator. This is proved in these verses from the notion of a testament, and the only use of it amongst men. For the apostle in this epistle doth argue several times from such usages amongst men as, proceeding from the principles of reason and equity, were generally prevalent among them. So he doth in his discourse concerning the assurance given by the oath of God, Hebrews 6. And here he doth the same from what was commonly agreed upon, and suitable unto the reason of things, about the nature and use of a testament. The things here mentioned were known to all, approved by all, and were the principal means of the preservation of peace and property in human societies. For although testaments, as unto their especial regulation, owe their original unto the Roman civil law, yet as unto the substance of them, they were in use amongst all mankind from the foundation of the world. For a testament is the just determination of a man's will concerning what he will have done with his goods after his decease; or, it is the will of him that is dead. Take this power from men, and you root up the whole foundation of all industry and diligence in the world. For what man will labor to increase his substance, if when he dies he may not dispose of it unto those which by nature, affinity, or other obligations, he hath must respect unto? Wherefore the foundation of the apostle's arguing from this usage amongst men is firm and stable.
Of the like nature is his observation, that “a testament is of no force whilst the testator liveth.” The nature of the thing itself, expounded by constant practice, will admit no doubt of it. For by what way soever a man disposeth of his goods, so as that it shall take effect whilst he is alive, as by sale or gift, it is not a testament, nor hath any thing of the nature of a testament in it; for that is only the will of a man concerning his goods when he is dead.
These things being unquestionable, we are only to consider whence the apostle takes his argument to prove the necessity of the death of Christ, as he was the mediator of the new testament.
Now this is not merely from the signification of the word διαθήκη, which yet is of consideration also, as hath been declared, but whereas he treats principally of the two covenants, it is the affinity that is between a solemn covenant and a testament that he hath respect unto. For he speaks not of the death of Christ merely as it was death, which is all that is required unto a testament properly so called, without any consideration of what nature it is; but he speaks of it also as it was a sacrifice, by the effusion of his blood, which belongs unto a covenant, and is no way required unto a testament. Whereas, therefore, the word may signify either a covenant or a testament precisely so called, the apostle hath respect unto both the significations of it. And having in these verses mentioned his death as the death of a testator, which is proper unto a testament, in the 4th verse, and those that follow, he insists on his blood as a sacrifice, which is proper unto a covenant. But these things must be more fully explained, whereby the difficulty which appears in the whole context will be removed. Unto the confirmation or ratification of a testament, that it may be βεβαία, “sure, stable, and of force,” there must be death, “the death of the testator.” But there is no need that this should be by blood, the blood of the testator, or any other. Unto the consideration of a covenant, blood was required, the blood of the sacrifice, and death only consequentially, as that which would ensue thereon; but there was no need that it should be the blood or death of him that made the covenant. Wherefore the apostle, declaring the necessity of the death of Christ, both as to the nature of it, that it was really death; and as to the manner of it, that it was by the effusion of his blood; and that from the consideration of the two covenants, the old and the new testament, and what was required unto them; he evinceth it by that which was essential unto them both, in a covenant as such, and in a testament precisely so called. That which is most eminent and essential unto a testament, is, that it is confirmed and made irrevocable by the death of the testator; and that which is the excellency of a solemn covenant, whereby it is made firm and stable, is, that it was confirmed with the blood of sacrifices, as he proves in the instance of the covenant made at Sinai, verses 18-20. Wherefore, whatever is excellent in either of these was to be found in the mediator of the new testament. Take it as a testament, which, upon the bequeathment made therein of the goods of the testator unto the heirs of promise, of grace and glory, it hath the nature of, and he died as the testator; whereby the grant of the inheritance was made irrevocable unto them. Hereunto no more is required but his death, without the consideration of the nature of it, in the way of a sacrifice. Take it as a covenant, as, upon the consideration of the promises contained in it, and the prescription of obedience, it hath the nature of a covenant, though not of a covenant strictly so called, and so it was to be confirmed with the blood of the sacrifice of himself; which is the eminency of the solemn confirmation of this covenant. And as his death had an eminency above the death required unto a testament, in that it was by blood, and in the sacrifice of himself, which it is no way necessary that the death of a testator should be, yet it fully answered the death of a testator, in that he truly died; so had it an eminency above all the ways of the confirmation of the old covenant, or any other solemn covenant whatever, in that whereas such a covenant was to be confirmed with the blood of sacrifices, yet was it not required that it should be the blood of him that made the covenant, as here it was.
The consideration hereof solves all the appearing difficulties in the nature and manner of the apostle's argument. The word בְּרִית, whereunto respect is here had, is, as we have showed, of a large signification and various use. And frequently it is taken for a “free grant and disposition” of things by promise, which hath the nature of a testament. And in the old covenant there was a free grant and donation of the inheritance of the land of Canaan unto the people; which belongs unto the nature of a testament also. Moreover, both of them, a covenant and a testament, do agree in the general nature of their confirmation, the one by blood, the other by death. Hereon the apostle, in the use of the word διαθήκη, doth diversely argue both unto the nature, necessity, and use of the death of the mediator of the new testament. He was to die in the confirmation of it as it was a testament, he being the testator of it; and he was to offer himself as a sacrifice in his blood, for the establishment of it, as it had the nature of a covenant. Wherefore the apostle doth not argue, as some imagine, merely from the signification of the word, whereby, as they say, that in the original is not exactly rendered. And those who have from hence troubled themselves and others about the authority of this epistle, have nothing to thank for it but their own ignorance of the design of the apostle, and the nature of his argument. And it were well if we all were more sensible of our own ignorance, and more apt to acknowledge it, when we meet with difficulties in the Scripture, than for the most part we are. Alas! how short are our lines, when we come to fathom the depths of it! How inextricable difficulties do appear sometimes in passages of it, which when God is pleased to teach us, are all pleasant and easy!
These things being premised, to clear the scope and nature of the apostle's argument, we proceed unto a brief exposition of the words.
Hebrews 9:16. “For where a testament [is,] there must also of necessity be the death of the testator.”
There are two things in the words:
1. A supposition of a testament.
2. What is required thereunto.
1. In the first place there is,
(1.) The note of inference;
(2.) The supposition itself.
(1.) The first is the particle “for.” This doth not infer a reason to ensue of what he had before affirmed, which is the common use of that illative; but only the introduction of an illustration of it, from what is the usage of mankind in such cases, on supposition that this covenant is also a testament. For then there must be the death of the testator, as it is in all testaments amongst men.
(2.) The supposition itself is in these words, ῞Οπου διαθήκη. The verb substantive is wanting. “Where a testament is;” so it is by us supplied, it may be, not necessarily. For the expression, “Where a testament is,” may suppose that the death of the testator is required unto the making of a testament; which, as the apostle showeth in the next verse, it is not, but only unto its execution. ‘In the case of a testament, namely, that it may be executed,'is the meaning of the word “where;” that is, ‘wherever.' Amongst all sorts of men, living according unto the light of nature and the conduct of reason, the making of testaments is in use; for without it neither can private industry be encouraged nor public peace maintained. Wherefore, as was before observed the apostle argueth from the common usage of mankind, resolved into the principles of reason and equity.
2. What is required unto the validity of a testament; and that is, the death of the testator. And the way of the introduction of this death unto the validity of a testament is, by “being brought in,” φέρεσθαι; that it enter, namely, after the ratifying of the testament, to make it of force, or to give it operation. The testament is made by a living man; but whilst he lives it is dead, or of no use. That it may operate and be effectual, death must be brought into the account. This death must be the death of the testator, τοῦ διαθεμένου. ῾Ο διαθέμενος is he who disposeth of things; who hath right so to do, and actually doth it. This in a testament is the testator. And διαθήκη and διαθέμενος have in the Greek the same respect unto one another as “testamentum” and “testator” in the Latin.
Wherefore, if the new covenant hath the nature of a testament, it must have a testator, and that testator must die, before it can be of force and efficacy; which is what was to be proved.
This is further confirmed,
Hebrews 9:17. “For a testament [is] of force after men are dead: otherwise it is of no strength at all, while the testator liveth.”
It is not of the making and constitution of a testament, but of the force and execution of it, that he speaks. And in these words he gives a reason of the necessity of the death of the testator thereunto. And this is because the validity and efficacy of the testament depend solely thereon. And this reason he introduceth by the conjunction γάρ, “for.”
A testament ἐπὶ νεκροῖς βεβαία, “is of force,” say we; that is, firm, stable, not to be disannulled. For “if it be but a man's testament, yet if it be confirmed, no man disannulleth, or addeth thereunto,” Galatians 3:15.It is ratified, made unalterable, so as that it must be executed according unto the mind of the testator. And it is so ἐπὶ νεκροῖς, “among them that are dead,” “after men are dead;” that is, those who make the testament: for it is opposed unto ὅτε ζῆ ὁ διαθέμενος, “whilst the testator liveth;” for testaments are the wills of dead men. Living men have no heirs. And this sense is declared in these words, ἐπεὶ μὴποτε ἰσχύει , “quandoquidem,” “quoniam,” “seeing that;” “otherwise,” say we, without this accession unto the making of a testament, as yet it prevaileth not, it is not of force for the actual distribution of the inheritance or the goods of the testator.
Two things must yet further be declared:
1. What are the grounds or general reasons of this assertion.
2. Where lies the force of the argument from it:
1. The force of a testament depends on the death of the testator, or the death of the testator is required to make it effectual, for these two reasons:
(1.) Because a testament is no act or deed of a man whereby he presently, and in the making of it, conveys, gives, or grants, any part of his possession unto another, or others, so as that it should immediately thereon cease to be his own, and become the property of those others: all such instruments of contract, bargain, sale, or deeds of gift, are of another nature, they are not testaments. A testament is only the signification of the will of a man as unto what he will have done with his goods after his death. Wherefore unto the force and execution of it his death is necessary.
(2.) A testament, that is only so, is alterable at the pleasure of him that makes it whilst he is alive. Wherefore it can be of no force whilst he is so; for he may change it or disannul it when he pleaseth. The foundation, therefore, of the apostle's argument from this usage amongst men is firm and stable.
2. Whereas the apostle argueth from the proportion and similitude that is between this new testament or covenant and the testaments of men, we may consider what are the things wherein that similitude doth consist, and show also wherein there is a dissimilitude, whereunto his reasonings are not to be extended. For so it is in all comparisons; the comparates are not alike in all things, especially where things spiritual and temporal are compared together. So was it also in all the types of old. Every person or every thing that was a type of Christ, was not so in all things, in all that they were. And therefore it requires both wisdom and diligence to distinguish in what they were so, and in what they were not, that no false inferences or conclusions be made from them. So is it in all comparisons; and therefore, in the present instance, we must consider wherein the things compared do agree, and wherein they differ.
(1.) They agree principally in the death of the testator. This alone makes a testament among men effectual and irrevocable. So is it in this new testament. It was confirmed and ratified by the death of the testator, Jesus Christ; and otherwise could not have been of force. This is the fundamental agreement between them, which therefore alone the apostle expressly insisteth on, although there are other things which necessarily accompany it, as essential unto every testament; as,
(2.) In every testament amongst men there are goods disposed and bequeathed unto heirs or legatees, which were the property of the testator. Where a man hath nothing to give or bequeath, he can make no testament; for that is nothing but his will concerning the disposal of his own goods after his decease. So is it in this new testament. All the goods of grace and glory were the property, the inheritance of Christ, firmly instated in him alone; for he was “appointed heir of all things.” But in his death, as a testator, he made a bequeathment of them all unto the elect, appointing them to be heirs of God, co-heirs with himself. And this also is required unto the nature and essence of a testament.
(3.) In a testament there is always an absolute grant made of the goods bequeathed, without condition or limitation. So is it here also; the goods and inheritance of the kingdom of heaven are bequeathed absolutely unto all the elect, so as that no intervenience can defeat them of it. And what there is in the gospel, which is the instrument of this testament, that prescribes conditions unto them, that exacts terms of obedience from them, it belongs unto it as it is a covenant, and not as a testament. Yet, (4.) It is in the will and power of the testator, in and by his testament, to assign and determine both the time, season, and way, whereby those to whom he hath bequeathed his goods shall be admitted unto the actual possession of them. So it is in this case also. The Lord Christ, the great testator, hath determined the way whereby the elect shall come to be actually possessed of their legacies, namely, “by faith that is in him,” Acts 26:18. So also he hath reserved the time and season of their conversion in this world, and entrance into future glory, in his own hand and power.
And these things belong unto the illustration of the comparison insisted on, although it be only one thing that the apostle argues from it, touching the necessity of the death of the testator. But notwithstanding these instances of agreement between the new testament and the testaments of men, whereby it appears to have in it, in sundry respects, the nature of a testament, yet in many things there is also a disagreement between them, evidencing that it is also a covenant, and abideth so, notwithstanding what it hath of the nature of a testament, from the death of the testator; as,
(1.) A testator amongst men ceaseth to have any right in or use of the goods bequeathed by him, when once his testament is of force. And this is by reason of death, which destroys all title and use of them. But our testator divests himself neither of right nor possession, nor of the use of any of his goods. And this follows on a twofold difference, the one in the persons, the other in the goods or things bequeathed:
[1.] In the persons. For a testator amongst men dieth absolutely; he liveth not again in this world, but “lieth down, and riseth not, until the heavens be no more.” Hereon all right unto, and all use of the goods of this life, cease for ever. Our testator died actually and really, to confirm his testament: but, 1 st . He died not in his whole person; 2 dly . In that nature wherein he died he lived again, “and is alive for evermore.”
Hence all his goods are still in his own power.
[2.] In the things themselves. For the goods bequeathed in the testaments of men are of that nature as that the propriety of them cannot be vested in many, so as that every one should have a right unto and the enjoyment of all, but in one only. But the spiritual good things of the new testament are such, as that in all the riches and fullness of them they may be in the possession of the testator, and of those also unto whom they are bequeathed. Christ parts with no grace from himself, he diminisheth not his own riches, nor exhausts any thing from his own fullness, by his communication of it unto others. Hence also,
(2.) In the wills of men, if there be a bequeathment of goods made unto many, no one can enjoy the whole inheritance, but every one is to have his own share and portion only. But in and by the new testament, every one is made heir to the whole inheritance. All have the same, and every one hath the whole; for God himself thence becomes their portion, who is all unto all, and all unto every one.
(3.) In human testaments, the goods bequeathed are such only as either descended unto the testators from their progenitors, or were acquired during their lives by their own industry. By their death they obtained no new right or title unto any thing; only what they had before is now disposed of according unto their wills. But our testator, according unto an antecedent contract between God the Father and him, purchased the whole inheritance by his own blood, “obtaining for us eternal redemption.”
(4.) They differ principally in this, that a testament amongst men is no more but merely so; it is not moreover a solemn covenant, that needs a confirmation suited thereunto. The bare signification of the will of the testator, witnessed unto, is sufficient unto its constitution and confirmation. But in this mystery the testament is not merely so, but a covenant also. Hence it was not sufficient, unto its force and establishment, that the testator should die only, but it was also required that he should offer himself in sacrifice by the shedding of his blood, unto its confirmation.
These things I have observed, because, as we shall see, the apostle in the progress of his discourse doth not confine himself unto this notion of a testament, but treats of it principally as it had the nature of a covenant. And we may here observe,
Obs. 1. It is a great and gracious condescension in the Holy Spirit, to give encouragement and confirmation unto our faith by a representation of the truth and reality of spiritual things in those which are temporal and agreeing with them in their general nature, whereby they are presented unto the common understanding of men. This way of proceeding the apostle calls a speaking κατ ᾿ ἄνθρωπον, Galatians 3:15, “after the manner of men.” Of the same kind were all the parables used by our Savior; for it is all one whether these representations be taken from things real or from those which, according unto the same rule of reason and right, are framed on purpose for that end.
Obs. 2. There is an irrevocable grant of the whole inheritance of grace and glory made unto the elect in the new covenant. Without this, it could not in any sense have the nature of a testament, nor that name given unto it. For a testament is such a free grant, and nothing else. And our best plea for them, for an interest in them, for a participation of them, before God, is from the free grant and donation of them in the testament of Jesus Christ.
Obs. 3. As the grant of these things is free and absolute, so the enjoyment of them is secured from all interveniencies by the death of the testator.