1 Peter 2:13

1 Peter 2:13. Submit yourselves. The verb has this middle sense here rather than the purely passive force of ‘be subjected,' or (as the R.V. puts it) ‘be subject.'

to every human institution. The noun is variously rendered in our A. V. creation (Mark 10:16; Mark 13:19; Romans 1:20; Romans 8:22; 2 Peter 3:4; Revelation 3:14), creature (Mark 16:15; Romans 1:25; Romans 8:19-21; Romans 8:39; 2 Corinthians 5:17; Galatians 6:15; Colossians 1:15; Colossians 1:23; Hebrews 4:13), building (Hebrews 9:11), and ordinance (only here). In the New Testament it appears to denote the act of creation (Romans 1:20), anything created, the creature (Romans 1:25; Romans 8:39; Hebrews 4:13, etc.), the complex of created things, the creation (Mark 10:6; Mark 10:13; Mark 10:19; 2 Peter 3:4, etc.), mankind as a whole (Mark 16:15, etc.), nature as distinguished from man (Romans 8:19-21); while it is also used metaphorically of the ‘new creature.' Hence some (e.g. de Wette, Erasmus, etc.) take the sense here to be = to every human creature; which manifestly would mean too much. In classical Greek the term, however, means the act of setting up, founding, or instituting something, and here, therefore, it is generally taken to mean something that is established, an institution or ordinance. It is not to be limited, however, to magistracy only, or to persons in authority, or to magisterial laws (Luther), but is to be taken in the absolute sense, embracing under it all the different forms, kingship, magistracy, and the rest, which follow. It is described as ‘human,' not exactly in the sense of being founded on the necessities of human society (Lillie), or as dealing only with things pertaining to man in contrast with other institutions which deal with things ‘pertaining to God;' but either (as most interpret it) in the sense of being established by man, or (with Hofmann, and now Huther, etc.) in the sense of applying to man, ordering man's social and political life and relations. The latter view is favoured both by the fact that the cognate verb (the proper force of which reappears in this exceptional use of the noun) seems never to be used in the New Testament of merely human agency, and by the consideration that subjection to every ordinance which man himself may set up seems too wide a charge.

for the Lord's sake. The spirit which should animate us in practising such submission is thus solemnly added. And that is the spirit which recognises something Divine in human institutions (as Wiesinger perhaps rather vaguely puts it), or better, the spirit of consideration for Christ, who would be dishonoured by the opposite (Hofmann), or more simply, the thought that Christ wills it so. This pregnant statement of motive, therefore, elevates incalculably the duty itself. It implies that our submission will come short of its standard if the duty is viewed as a merely secular thing, or if the Divine purpose in civil institutions and Christ's interest in them are not acknowledged. It shows, too, that the very thing which might seem to weaken the sense of ordinary civil and political obligation, namely the peculiar duty of loyalty to Christ as Head, makes such obligation a more sacred and binding one to the Christian.

whether to the king as sovereign. Peter passes now from institutions in the abstract to their concrete representation in persons. The subjection which is inculcated to the former is inculcated to the latter, and in both cases with equal lack of qualification. He does not pause to pronounce on different kinds of government, constitutional, despotic, or other, or to adjust his statement of the duty in relation to the different characters of administrations and administrators. He takes the things and the persons as they then were, and, on high spiritual grounds, recommends an inoffensive and respectful attitude towards them. While he speaks of them with the same breadth of spirit as Paul (e.g. in Romans 13:1-7), his standpoint is not quite the same. He does not deal with them here as Paul does there, in respect of what they are as powers ‘ordained of God,' but simply in respect of this duty of submission. Hence he can speak absolutely. For the duty of submission must stand even when positive obedience cannot be rendered, and when (as in his own case, Acts 3:19; Acts 5:28-32; Acts 5:40-42) the mistake or abuse of ‘the powers that be' forces us to say, ‘We must obey God rather than men.' Peter's statement is something essentially different from any so-called doctrine of ‘Divine right' or ‘passive obedience.' Writing as he is to Roman provinces, he signalizes first of all the Roman Emperor. To him submission is due on the broad ground of his sovereignty; for no comparison is meant here between him and other rulers, such as the ‘supreme' of the A. V. may suggest He is designated by a title (occurring also in Matthew 10:18; Matthew 14:9; John 19:15; 1 Timothy 2:2, etc.) which would be appropriate enough on the lips of non-Romans, as the Greek language had no term exactly equivalent to the Latin word for Emperor, or in subject territories, but not in Rome itself. Horace (Carm. iv. 14) might name the Emperor Augustus lord of the world, but not ‘king'! The title, though it continued to be applied to priests in the religious phraseology of Rome, ceased to be given to the head of the Roman state from the time of Tarquin's expulsion (Cic. Rep, 2, 20, 53), and the odium which clung to it all through the Republic followed it into the imperial times. Speaking of the so-called ‘ royal laws' of the later empire, Gibbon (Decline and Fall, ch. xliv.) says ‘the word (lex regia) was still more recent than the thing. The slaves of Commodus or Caracalla would have started at the name of royalty.'