1 Peter 3:16

1 Peter 3:16. having a good conscience, or, having your conscience unimpaired. The term conscience seems to make a nearer approach in this passage than in the previous (see on chap, 1 Peter 2:19) to the modern philosophical definitions of it as the ‘principle of reflection in men by which they distinguish between, approve and disapprove, their own actions' (Bishop Butler, Sermon 1.), and as at once exponent of moral law, judge, and sentiment (comp. M'Cosh, Div. Govern. p. 291, etc.). Even here, however, nothing is said about its abstract nature, or its psychology. It is a purely practical statement of how the moral consciousness works. The moral quality of a man's actions is attested to him, according to the Old Testament, by the heart, specially as that is aided and enlightened by the revelation of God's law, or quickened by the application which the prophets (‘the conscience of Israel,' as they are called) make of the facts of redemption. In the New Testament it is by a light within the man (Matthew 6:33; Luke 11:34-36), or by this inner witness, termed conscience in the Epistles, by which is meant primarily a ‘consciousness which the man has of himself in his relation to God, manifesting itself in the form of a self-testimony, the result of the action of the Spirit in the heart' (Cremer). It may be weak (1 Corinthians 8:7; 1 Corinthians 8:12), evil (Hebrews 10:22), defiled (Titus 1:15), seared (1 Timothy 4:2). But on the other hand it may be pure (2 Timothy 1:3), void of offence (Acts 24:16), or good (here and at 1 Peter 3:21; as also Acts 23:1; 1 Timothy 1:5; 1 Timothy 1:19; Hebrews 13:18). In the last-named passage its goodness is expressed by an epithet meaning honourable or fair to see. Here it is described by an epithet which refers to intrinsic moral quality. As there is an awkwardness, however, in attributing moral qualities to the conscience itself (we can scarcely speak, e.g., of a holy conscience), in this connection the adjective may perhaps have the sense of unimpaired, uninjured (see Cremer's Biblicotheol. Lex. to the N. T.). The readiness to ‘give an answer' receives thus another important qualification. It is essential that it be given not only in meekness and fear, but in the calm, clear strength of a mind conscious of nothing in the walk to give the lie to the apology. In vindicating to others the hope that is in ourselves, we must be able to point to the witness of the life in confirmation of the words:

‘Our acts our angels are, or good or ill,

Our fatal shadows that walk by us still,'

Fletcher.

in order that in the matter wherein ye are spoken against they may be put to shame who abuse your good behaviour (or, manner of life) in Christ. The construction and the sense are similar to what we have had already in 1 Peter 2:12, which see. The words ‘as evil-doers,' which are inserted here by the A. V., and some weighty manuscripts and Versions, are omitted by the Revised Version and some of the best critics. There is a similar division of opinion among textual experts as to whether we should read in the first clause, ‘ye are spoken against' (which is preferred by the Revised Version), or ‘they speak evil of you,' as in the A. V. The verb, which the A. V. translates ‘falsely accuse,' occurs only twice again in the Received Text of the N. T., viz. in Matthew 5:44 (where, however, it is rejected by the best critics as insufficiently attested), and Luke 6:28, where it is rendered ‘despitefully use.' As in classical Greek it has the sense of insulting, acting insolently to one, abusively threatening one, it is best rendered here ‘abuse,' or (with R. V.) ‘revile,' and the reference will therefore be to coarse and insolent misrepresentation of the way in which Christians live in the face of heathenism, rather than to ‘accusations' in the stricter sense. ‘Thus, without stirring,' says Leigh ton, ‘the integrity of a Christian conquers: as a rock, unremoved, breaks the waters that are dashing against it.... And without this good conscience and conversation we cut ourselves short of other apologies for religion, whatever we may say for it. One unchristian action will disgrace it more than we can repair by the largest and best framed speeches on its behalf.'

We are now brought face to face with one of the unsolved, if not insoluble, problems of New Testament interpretation. The remarkable paragraph about a preaching to the spirits in prison has been regarded by many eminent theologians as the primary proof text for the article of faith which is embodied in the creeds in the terms He descended into hell, on which so many different meanings have been put. It is one of three Petrine passages (Acts 2:25-31; 1 Peter 4:6), which seem to many to be closely related. It is also one of a larger class, including Matthew 12:40; Luke 23:43; Romans 10:6-8; Ephesians 4:8-10; Psalms 16:9-11; Acts 13:34-37, etc., which have been supposed to bear more or less directly upon a dogma for which an important place is claimed both in the system of Christian doctrine and in preaching the dogma of a descent of Christ to Hell or Hades. It has been drawn into the service of a singular variety of theological ideas, such as those of a liberation and elevation of the saints of pre-Christian times, a purgatorial detention and purification, a penal endurance of the extremity of God's wrath by man's Surety, a judicial manifestation of the victorious Redeemer to the impenitent dead, renewed opportunities of repentance and a continuous ministry of grace in the other world. The interpretations put upon the passage have been too numerous to admit of detailed statement, not to speak of criticism, here. We shall notice only those of deepest interest. It should at once be allowed that no exposition has yet succeeded in removing all the difficulties. There are some writers (e.g. Steiger) who venture to speak of these difficulties as rather created by interpreters than inherent in the passage itself. But these are few indeed. Many of the greatest exegetes and theologians have held a very uncertain position on the subject, or have confessed themselves baffled by it. Luther, for example, felt it to be a ‘dark speech,' and inclined to very different views of its meaning at different periods of his career. It is at best a question of the balance of probabilities. We shall, therefore, first examine the various terms separately. When the usage and application of each of the disputed terms are carefully determined, it should be possible to decide on what side the balance of probabilities lies. The great problems are these: Does the section refer to a ministry of grace, a ministry of judgment, or a mere manifestation of Christ? Is the ministry, if such is referred to, one that took place prior to the Incarnation, between the Death and the Resurrection, or after the Resurrection? Are the men of Noah's generation introduced in their proper historical position, or only as examples of a general class? In considering these problems, two things are too often overlooked. It is forgotten how precarious it is to erect upon one or two of the obscurities of Scripture a great system of doctrine, which is not in evident harmony with the general view of grace which clearly pervades the Bible. It is forgotten, too, that the passage cannot fairly be dealt with as a doctrinal digression, but must be read in the light of the writer's immediate object. That object is the Christian duty of enduring wrong for righteousness' sake, and the advantage of suffering for well-doing rather than for ill-doing. It is with the view of confirming what he has said of this that Peter appeals to Christ's own example. The question consequently is, what exposition is best sustained by the detailed exegesis of the several terms, does most justice to the plainer elements in the paragraph, such as the historical reference to Noah and the building of the ark, etc., and is in clearest harmony with the writer's design, namely, to arm believers smarting under the sense of wrongful suffering with Christ-like endurance?