Who knowing the Judgment of God, that they which commit such things are worthy of death, not only do the same, but have pleasure in them that do them.

The displeasure of God with all who are pleased with sin

I. Sinners do things which they know are displeasing to God. The heathen do things which God has forbidden by the law of nature; the Jews those which are forbidden by the God of revelation: both, therefore, do things which they know must be displeasing to Him. And this is true of all men now. They know that God forbids them to love themselves and the world supremely; but they do both. God forbids them to disobey His commands; but they do disobey them. God forbids them to disbelieve and reject the gospel; but they do disbelieve and reject it. And they will persist in displeasing Him, notwithstanding death appears to be their certain doom.

II. They take pleasure in seeing others take the same path to ruin. It will be easy to account for this if we consider--

1. That they love one another. They are all by nature possessed of the same selfish heart. And it is therefore reasonable to suppose that, notwithstanding the great diversity in their external conduct, they love one another because they are sinners, and not saints. Christ says repeatedly, “that sinners love those that love them.” And He tells His disciples that this selfish spirit is essential to their character. “If ye were of the world, the world would love his own.” Men of the world universally approve the spirit of the world, and are pleased to see one another act it out without the least reserve; though they know it is infinitely displeasing to God.

2. As sinners possess one and the same selfish and sinful heart, so they are heartily united in opposing one and the same holy and benevolent cause. The greatest nations have been, and still are, united in their views, and feelings, and conduct, towards the Church of Christ. As all sinners wish that God’s gracious designs may be defeated; so they have pleasure in seeing any of their fellow men doing what they think has a tendency to frustrate them.

3. Those who do things which they know are displeasing to God, take pleasure in seeing others do the same. Those who disbelieve the existence of God are pleased to hear others say that they believe there is no God. Those who disbelieve the inspiration of the Bible are pleased to hear others say that they believe it is a cunningly devised fable. Those who disbelieve the doctrines of the Trinity, of atonement, of total depravity, of regeneration, etc., are always pleased to hear others say that they disbelieve all these doctrines. Those who disbelieve in the Sabbath, who practise tavern haunting, vain and sinful amusements, like others to do the same. Those who are ambitious love to see others ambitious. Those who are worldly minded love to see others worldly minded. Those who despise all religion love to see others despise it.

III. Improvement.

1. If sinners love to do things which they know are displeasing to God, then they never refrain from doing anything merely because they know it will be displeasing to Him. They know what is pleasing to themselves, and they mean to do what is pleasing to themselves, though they know it will be displeasing to God. They are like disobedient children and servants, who will always do what is agreeable to their own corrupt heart, though they know it will be disagreeable to their parents or masters, unless they fear their displeasure. It is the fear and not the love of God that restrains sinners from doing any evil action or pursuing any evil course.

2. If sinners love to do things which they know are displeasing to God, then, though they do a great many things which He has required, yet they never do anything merely for the sake of obeying or pleasing Him. They labour to please themselves, and not Him.

3. If sinners love to do things that they know are displeasing to God, and take pleasure in seeing others act from the same principle, then no external means nor motives are sufficient to restrain them from sin, and induce them to love and please God. They sin with their eyes wide open. They know what would please God, but they do not desire to please Him.

4. If sinners not only do things which they know are displeasing to God, but take pleasure in seeing others do the same things, then they are guilty not only of their own sins, but of all the sins of others, which they see and approve. And the approvers are often more guilty and criminal than the actors. Parents who allow their children to profane the Sabbath, to game, to attend balls and haunt taverns, are more guilty than their children that do these things. Executive officers, who see and approve of those who break the laws of the land, are more guilty than the actual transgressors. The reason is, that in all these cases the approvers know more than the actors, and are under stronger obligations to condemn and restrain those who are under their care, than the transgressors are to refrain from their evil courses.

5. If men are guilty of all the sins which they know and approve of, then we may see what it is to be guilty of national sins. It is to approve of those sins, which the majority of a nation commit and approve of. And, in this view, it is easy to see that one nation may be guilty of the sins of another nation. (N. Emmons, D. D.)

The heinous guilt of taking pleasure in other men’s sins

From the beginning of Romains 1:18 to the end of Romains 1:31 we have an abridgment of the lives and practices of the whole heathen world. And yet, as comprehensive as this catalogue of sin is, it is but of sin under a limitation; sins of direct and personal commission. Is not this a sufficient comprehension? For is not a man’s person the compass of his actions? Or, can he operate further than he does exist? Yes; he may not only commit sins, but also take pleasure in the sins of others. Which implies, first, that thus to take pleasure in other men’s sins is a distinct sin from all the former; and, secondly, that it is much greater--the furthest that human pravity can reach. For surely, that sin that exceeds idolatry, monstrous unnatural lusts, etc., must needs be such a one as must nonplus the devil himself to proceed further.

I. What it is that brings a man to such a disposition of mind as to take pleasure in other men’s sins.

1. In order to show this I shall premise--

(1) That every man naturally has a distinguishing sense of what is fit, and what is not fit to be done--the candle of the Lord, which discovers to him both what he is to do and what to avoid.

(2) That there is consequently upon this an inward satisfaction, or dissatisfaction, after a good or an evil action. And this, no doubt, proceeds not only from the real unsuitableness of sin to the nature of man, but also from a foreboding fear, that evil will follow the doing of that which conscience disallows, which, no question, is the voice of God Himself, speaking in the hearts of men, and by secret intimations giving the sinner a foretaste of that direful cup, which he is like to drink more deeply hereafter.

(3) That this distinguishing sense of good and evil, and this satisfaction and dissatisfaction is a principle not easily extinguished. It is founded in nature, and the great important end that God designs it for shows the necessity of its being put beyond the danger of being torn up by ordinary violence.

(4) That that which weakens this principle is an inferior, sensitive principle, which receives its gratifications from objects clean contrary to the former, and which affect a man much more warmly and vividly than those which affect only his nobler part, his mind.

2. From these considerations we naturally infer--

(1) That no man is easily brought to take a full pleasure in his own sins. For though sin offers itself in never so alluring a dress at first, yet the remorse of the soul, upon the commission of it, infinitely overbalances those transient gratifications it affords the senses. The fine colours of the serpent by no means make amends for the smart and poison of his sting.

(2) That as no man is easily brought to take a full pleasure in his own sins, so much less easily can he be brought to take pleasure in those of others. The reason is because the chief motive that induces a man to sin--the gratification of his sensitive part--cannot be had from the sins of another. For certainly another man’s intemperance cannot affect my sensuality any more than the meat and drink that I take into my mouth can please his palate.

3. What, then, are the causes that corrupt the mind of man as to take pleasure in other men’s sins?

(1) A commission of the same sins. This is imported in the words, “They not only do the same things.” It is acquaintance that must give delight in actions, as well as in persons. And it is trial that must begin the acquaintance. None look with so much pleasure upon the works of art as artists. In like manner no sober man can look with complacency on drunkenness. No; he must first be a practitioner. It is possible, indeed, that a sober or a chaste person, through ill will, envy, or spiritual pride, may be glad to see the intemperance and debauchery of some about him, but he rejoices not in it, as in a delightful object, but as in a means of his neighbour’s ruin.

(2) A commission of them against the conviction of conscience. The persons charged in the text are such “as knew the judgment of God, that they who committed such things were worthy of death,” such as broke through all mounds of law, and laughed at the sword of vengeance, which Divine justice brandished in their faces. For God has set a flaming sword not only before paradise, but before hell; and conscience is the angel into whose hand this sword is put. But if now the sinner shall not only wrestle with this angel, but throw him too, his heart lies open, like a broad road, for all the sin in the world freely to pass through.

(3) Continuance in them. For God forbid that every single commission of a sin should so far deprave the soul and bring it to such a condition. David and Peter sinned against the dictates of their conscience; yet we do not find that either of them delighted in their own sins, and much less in other men’s. Before a man can come to be pleased with sin, because he sees his neighbour commit it, he must have had such a long acquaintance with it as to create a kind of friendship; and we know a man is naturally glad to see his old friend wheresoever he meets him. It is generally the property of an old sinner to find a delight in reviewing his own villainies in the practice of other men. An old wrestler loves to look on the lists, though feebleness will not let him offer at the prize. An old huntsman finds a music in the noise of hounds, though he cannot follow the chase. An old drunkard loves a tavern, though he cannot go to it, but as he is supported by another, just as some are observed to come from thence. And an old wanton will be doting upon women when he can scarce see them without spectacles. Their great concern is, that the vice may still go on.

(4) That meanness and poor spiritedness that naturally and inseparably accompanies all guilt. Whosoever is conscious of sin, feels, whether he will own it or not, shame and depression of spirit. And this is so irksome that he is restless to rid himself from it; for which he finds no way so effectual as to get company in the same sin. A vicious person, like the basest sort of beasts, never enjoys himself but in the herd. Company, he thinks, abates the torrent of a common odium by deriving it into many channels; and, therefore, if he cannot wholly avoid the eye of the observer, he hopes to distract it at least by a multiplicity of the object.

(5) A certain, peculiar, unaccountable malignity. This we see in those who secretly rejoice when they hear of the calamity of their neighbour, though no imaginable interest can be served thereby. And as this occurs in temporals, so there is no doubt but that with some it acts the same way also in spirituals. So he acted who made a poor captive renounce his religion, in order to the saving of his life; and when he had so done, presently ran him through, glorying that he had thereby destroyed his enemy, both body and soul.

II. The reasons a man’s being disposed to do so comes to be attended with such an extraordinary guilt.

1. That naturally there is no motive to tempt a man to it. The lesser the temptation the greater the sin. For in every sin, the freer the will the more sinful the act. If the object be extremely pleasing, though the will has still a power of refusing it, yet it is not without some difficulty. Now this pleasure springs from the gratification of some desire founded in nature. An irregular gratification it is often; yet still the foundation of it is, and must be, something natural. Thus drunkenness is an irregular satisfaction of the appetite of thirst; and covetousness a boundless, unreasonable pursuit of the principle of self-preservation. There is hardly any one vice but what is the abuse of one of those two grand natural principles; namely, that which inclines a man to preserve himself, or to please himself. But now, what is, or can be, gratified by another man’s pursuit of his own vice? All the pleasure that naturally can be received from a vicious action can immediately affect none but him who does it. And therefore the delight that a man takes for another’s sin can be nothing else but a fantastical, preternatural love of vice, as such, a delighting in sin for its own sake. “If a man plays the thief,” says Solomon, “and steals to satisfy his hunger,” though it cannot wholly excuse the fact, yet it sometimes extenuates the guilt. But when a man shall, with a sober, diabolical rancour, enjoy himself in the sight of his neighbour’s sin and shame, can he plead the instigation of any appetite in nature inclining him to this? No, for he may as well carry his eyes in another man’s head, and run races with another man’s feet, as directly and naturally taste the pleasures that spring from the gratification of another man’s appetites. Nor can that person, who accounts it his recreation to see a man wallowing in his filthy revels, allege for a reason of his so doing that it leaves the least relish upon the tip of his tongue. What can we then assign for the cause of this monstrous disposition? Why, that the devil and long custom of sinning have superinduced upon the soul new, unnatural, and absurd desires, that relish things not at all desirable. In fine, there is as much difference between the pleasure a man takes in his own sins, and that which he takes in other men’s, as there is between the wickedness of a man and the wickedness of a devil.

2. A second reason is, from the boundless nature of this way of sinning. For by this a man contracts a kind of a universal guilt, and, as it were, sins over the sins of others; so that while the act is theirs, the guilt of it is equally his. Personal powers and opportunities of sinning comparatively are not great; for at greatest, they must still be limited by the measure of a man’s acting, and the term of his duration. But now, for the way of sinning which we have been speaking of, it is neither confined by place nor weakened by age; but the bedrid and the lethargic may, upon this account, equal the activity of the strongest sinner. A man, by delight and fancy, may grasp in the sins of countries and ages, and by an inward liking of them communicate in their guilt.

3. It presupposes and includes in it the guilt of many preceding sins. For a man must have passed many periods of sin before he can arrive to it, and have served a long apprenticeship to the devil before he can come to such a perfection and maturity in vice as this imports. It is the wickedness of a whole life, discharging all its foulness into this one quality, as into a great sink. So that nothing is, or can be, so properly and significantly called the “very sinfulness of sin,” as this.

III. What kind of persons are to be reckoned under this character? In general whosoever draws others to sin. But to particularise--

1. Those who teach doctrines directly tending to a sinful course (Matthieu 5:19; cf. Matthieu 15:5). Now these are of two sorts.

(1) Such as represent actions that are sinful, as not so--e.g., Antinomians, who assert that believers cannot sin.

(2) Such as represent many sins much less than they are--e.g., those who assert that all sins committed by believers to be but infirmities.

2. Such as endeavour to allure men to sin, either by formal persuasions (Proverbes 7:13), or by administering objects and occasions fit to draw forth a man’s corrupt affections; such as are the inflaming of a choleric person into a fit of rage against his neighbour, the provoking of a lustful person by filthy discourse, books, and pictures.

3. Such as affect the company of vicious persons. For otherwise, what is there in such men, which they can pretend to be pleased with? For generally such sots have neither parts nor wits. It is clear, therefore, that where a man can like the conversation of debauched persons, amidst all the natural grounds of dislike, it can proceed from nothing but the inward affection he bears to their lewd humour. It is this he enjoys; and for the sake of this the rest he endures.

4. Such as encourage men in their sins. This may be done--

(1) By commendation. No man commends another any further than he likes him. He who writes an encomium Neronis is but a transcript of Nero. From whence we see the reason of some men’s giving such honourable names and appellations to the worst of men and actions, and base, reproachful titles to the best.

(2) By preferment. None certainly can love to see vice in power, but such as love to see it also in practice.

IV. The effects of this sin.

1. Upon particular persons.

(1) It quite alters and depraves the natural frame of a man’s heart.

(2) It peculiarly indisposes a man to repent and recover himself from it. For the first step to repentance is a man’s dislike of his sin; and how can we expect that a man should dislike that which has taken such possession of his affections, that he loves it, not only in his own practice, but also in other men’s?

(3) The longer a man lives the wickeder he grows, and his last days are certainly his worst. To delight in other men’s sins is most properly the vice of old age, and may be truly called the old age of vice. For, as first, old age necessarily implies a man’s having lived many years, and withal, this sort of viciousness supposes the precedent commission of many sins, so it has this further property that, as when a man comes once to be old, he grows every day older and older; so when a man comes to such a degree of wickedness, as to delight in the wickedness of others, it is more than ten thousand to one if he ever returns to a better mind. Tiberius is a notable instance, who was bad enough in his youth, but monstrously so in his old age; and the reason of this was because he took a particular pleasure in seeing other men do vile things. And, therefore, let not men flatter themselves that though they find it difficult to combat an ill practice, yet that old age shall do that for them which they in their youth could never find in their heart to do for themselves, for a habit may continue when it is no longer able to act. The longer a blot continues the deeper it sinks. And it will be found a work of no small difficulty to dispossess and throw out a vice from that heart where long possession begins to plead prescription.

(4) Many perish eternally who never arrived at such a pitch of wickedness as to take any pleasure in, or indeed to be at all concerned about, the sins of other men. But they perish in the pursuit of their own lusts, and often not without a considerable mixture of dislike of themselves for what they do.

2. Upon communities. Some men’s taking pleasure in other men’s sins will cause many men to sin to do them a pleasure, for--

(1) It is seldom or never that any man comes to such a degree of impiety as to take pleasure in other men’s sins, but he also shows the world, by his actions and behaviour, that he does so.

(2) There are few men in the world so inconsiderable, but there are some who have an interest to serve by them.

(3) The natural course that one man takes to serve his interest by another is by applying himself to him in such a way as may most gratify and delight him. (R. South, D. D.).

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