Romans 3:25,26

“ Whom He had established beforehand as a means of propitiation through faith,by His blood, for the demonstration of His justice, because of the tolerance shown toward sins done aforetime, during the forbearance of God, for the demonstration of His justice at the present time; that He might be just, and justifying him who is of the faith in Jesus. ”

It is not without reason that these two verses have been called “the marrow of theology.” Calvin declares “that there is not probably in the whole Bible a passage which sets forth more profoundly the righteousness of God in Christ.” And yet it is so short that the statement seems scarcely to have begun when all is said, within so few lines are the most decisive thoughts concentrated! It is really, as Vitringa has said, “the brief summary of divine wisdom.”

It is God Himself who, according to this passage, is to be regarded as the author of the whole work of redemption. The salvation of the world is not therefore wrested from Him, as is sometimes represented by the mediation of Christ. The same thought is expressed elsewhere; for example, 2 Corinthians 5:18: “All is of God, who hath reconciled us to Himself by Jesus Christ;” and John 3:16: “God so loved the world, that He gave His only-begotten Son.” This point should never be forgotten in the idea which we form of expiation.

The verb προτιθέναι, to put before, may signify in the middle, either: to exhibit, present publicly (in view of oneself), or to set before oneself in the innermost shrine of the spirit; to decide, to design beforehand within oneself. For the preposition πρό may have the local meaning in front of, or the temporal meaning before. Both significations of the verb have been used here, and in favor of both numerous examples may be quoted in classic Greek. The second sense is obviously the prevailing one in the New Testament; comp. Romans 1:13; Ephesians 1:9, etc., as well as the common use of the word πρόθεσις to denote God's eternal plan (Romans 8:28; Ephesians 3:11); see also Acts 27:13. In favor of the first meaning, there may be quoted, indeed, the phrase ἄρτοι τῆς προθέσεως, the shewbread, in the LXX. If we use it here, it would make the apostle say: “whom God set forth publicly as a propitiatory victim.” This act of public showing forth would refer either to the exhibition of Jesus on the cross, or to the proclamation of His death by the apostolic preaching. The middle form (to set forth for oneself) would find its explanation in the clause following: “for the demonstration of His justice. ” This meaning is not impossible. It is adopted by the Vulgate, Luth., Beng., Thol., de Wette, Philip., Meyer, Hofm., Morison. But this idea of a public exhibition of the person of Jesus appears to us to have it something at once theatrical and superfluous. Independently of what we have just been saying of the ordinary meaning of the words προτιθέναι, πρόθεσις, in the New Testament, the context speaks strongly in favor of the other meaning. The fundamental idea of the passage is the contrast between the time of God's forbearance in regard to sin, and the decisive moment when at once He carried out the universal expiation. It is natural in this order of ideas to emphasize the fact that God had foreseen this final moment, and had provided Himself beforehand with the victim by means of which the expiation was to be accomplished. Thus the phrase: to set forth beforehand, already gives a hint of the contrast: at the present time, Romans 3:26. Placed as it is at the head of the whole passage, it brings out forcibly, at the same time, the incomparable gravity of the work about to be described. The middle of the verb refers to the inward resolution of God. In adopting this meaning, we find ourselves at one with the ancient Greek interpreters, Chrys., OEcum., Theoph.; see, among the moderns, Fritzsche. The word ἱλαστήριον, propitiatory, belongs to that host of Greek adjectives whose termination (ηριος) signifies what serves to. The meaning therefore is: “what serves to render propitious, favorable.” The verb ἱλάσκεσθαι corresponds in the LXX. to kipper, the Piel of kaphar, to cover. Applied to the notion of sin, this Piel has a double sense: either to pardon the subject is then the offended one himself, who, as it were, covers the sin that he may see it no more, for example, Psa 65:4 or to expiate the subject is then the victim which covers (effaces) the sin with its blood, that the judge may see it no more, for example, Exodus 29:36. In the New Testament this verb occurs twice, Luke 18:13, where the publican says to God: ἱλάσθητι, show Thyself propitious to me, which is equivalent to: forgive me; and Hebrews 2:17: εἰς τὸ ἱλάσκεσθαι τὰς ἁμαρτίας, to expiate the sins of the people. We find in these same two passages the two meanings of the term in the Old Testament. The etymology of this verb ἱλάσκεσθαι is the adjective ἱλαος, favorable, propitious (probably connected with ἔλεος, merciful). To explain the word ἱλαστήριον in our text, very many commentators, Orig., Theoph., Er., Luth., Calv., Grot., Vitringa, and among the moderns, Olsh., Thol., Philip., etc., have had recourse to the technical meaning which it has in the LXX., where it denotes the propitiatory, or lid of the ark of the covenant. With this meaning the substantive understood would be ἐπίθεμα, lid, which is sometimes joined to the adjective, for example, Exodus 25:17. As is well known, the high priest, on the day of atonement, sprinkled this lid with the blood of the victim (Lev 16:14 et seq.). On this account these commentators hold that it was here regarded by Paul as the type of Christ, whose shed blood covers the sin of the world. The term is found in this sense, Hebrews 9:5. We do not, however, think this interpretation admissible. 1. If the matter in question were a well-known definite object, the only one of its kind, the article τό could not be omitted. 2. The Epistle to the Romans is not a book which moves, like the Epistle to the Hebrews, in the sphere of Levitical symbolism; there is nothing here to indicate that the term is applied to an object belonging to the Israelitish cultus. 3. Gess justly observes that if this type had been familiar to St. Paul, it would have been found elsewhere in his letters; and if it were not so, the term would have been unintelligible to his readers. 4. In all respects the figure would be a strange one. What a comparison to make of Jesus Christ crucified with a lid sprinkled with blood! 5. Give to the verb προέθετο whichever of the two meanings you choose, the figure of the propitiatory remains unsuitable. In the sense of exhibiting publicly, there is a contradiction between this idea of publicity and the part assigned to the propitiatory in the Jewish cultus; for this object remained concealed in the sanctuary, the high priest alone could see it, and that only once a year, and through a cloud of smoke. And if the verb be explained in the sense which we have adopted, that of establishing beforehand, it is still more impossible to apply this idea of an eternal purpose, either to a material object like the propitiatory itself, or to its typical connection with Jesus Christ. We must therefore understand the word ἱλαστήριον in a very wide sense: a means of propitiation. After reading Morison, we cannot venture to define more strictly, and to translate: a victim of propitiation, as if there were to be understood the substantive θῦμα (victim). For this meaning of the term used here does not seem to be sufficiently proved by the passages alleged (see the examples quoted by Thol., de Wette, Meyer, with Morison's criticism). The English commentator himself takes the word ἱλαστήριον as a masculine adjective, agreeing with the relative ὅν : “Jesus Christ, whom God set forth as making propitiation. ” Such is the explanation of the Peshito, Thomas Aquinas, Er., Mel., etc. It is certainly allowable. But in this sense would not Paul rather have used the masculine substantive ἱλαστής ? The word ἱλαστήρια is indeed found, not ἱλαστήριοι (Hofm.). We therefore hold by the generally received interpretation, which makes the term ἱλαστήριον a neuter substantive (originally the neuter of the adjective; comp. σωτήριον, χαριστήριον, etc.). As to the idea of sacrifice, if it is not in the word itself, it follows from its connection with the following clause: by His blood (see below). For what is a means of propitiation by blood, if it is not a sacrifice? A question may here be raised: if it is God himself who, as we have just said, has established this means of pardon of His free grace, what purpose then was this means to serve? For it cannot obtain for us anything else than we possessed already, the Divine love. This objection rests on the false idea that expiation is intended to originate a sentiment which did not exist in God before. What it produces is such a change in the relation between God and the creature, that God can henceforth display toward sinful man one of the elements of His nature rather than another. The feeling of the divine mind shows itself in the foundation of the expiatory work as compassion. But the propitiation once effected, it can display itself in the new and higher form of intimate communion. As Gess says: “Divine love manifests itself in the gift of the Son, that it may be able afterward to diffuse itself in the heart by the gift of the spirit.” There are therefore 1. The love which precedes the propitiation, and which determines to effect it; and 2. Love such that it can display itself, once the propitiation is effected.

The clause διὰ [τῆς b πίστεως, by faith, is wanting in the Alex., which, however is not enough to render it suspicious. Five Mjj. (Alex. and Greco-Lat.) omit the article τῆς (the, before faith). It would be impossible to explain why this word had been rejected if it existed originally in the text. It has therefore been added to give the notion of faith a more definite sense: the well-known faith in Jesus. But it was not on this or that particular faith the apostle wished here to insist; it was on faith in its very idea, in opposition to works. On what does the clause depend: διὰ πίστεως, by faith? According to some ancients and Philippi: on προέθετο (He set forth, or established beforehand). But it is difficult to conceive what logical relation there can be between the ideas of setting forth or establishing, and a clause such as by faith. The only natural connection of this clause is with the word ἱλαστήριον (means of propitiation): “God has established Jesus beforehand as the means of propitiation through faith,” which signifies that the efficacy of this means was from the first bound by the divine decree to the condition of faith. God eternally determined within Himself the means of pardon, but as eternally He stipulated with Himself that the condition on which this means should become available for each individual should be faith, neither more nor less. This idea is important; the subjective condition of faith entered as an integral element into the very decree of amnesty (the πρόθεσις). This is what we shall find afterward expressed in the words οὓς προέγνω, whom He foreknew (as His own by faith), Romans 8:29. The clause following: in or by His blood, is connected by most commentators (Luth., Calv., Olsh., Thol., Morison) with the word faith: “by faith in His blood. ” Grammatically this connection is possible; comp. Ephesians 1:15. And it is the interpretation, perhaps, which has led to the article τῆς being added before πίστεως. But it should certainly be rejected. The idea requiring a determining clause is not faith, which is clear of itself, but the means of propitiation. In a passage entirely devoted to the expounding of the fact of expiation, Paul could not possibly fail to indicate the manner in which the means operated. We therefore find the notion of propitiation qualified by two parallel and mutually completing clauses: the first, by faith, indicating the subjective condition; and the second, by His blood, setting forth the historical and objective condition of the efficacy of the means. Propitiation does not take place except through faith on the part of the saved, and through blood on the part of the Saviour. The attempt of Meyer, Hofmann, etc., to make this clause dependent on προέθετο (“He set Him forth or established Him beforehand... through His blood ”) is unnatural. To present or establish a person through or in his blood, would not only be an obscure form of speech, but even offensively harsh. According to Leviticus 17:11, the soul of man, the principle of life, is in the blood. The blood flowing forth is the life exhaling. Now the wilful sinner has deserved death. Having used the gift of life to revolt against Him from whom he holds it, it is just that this gift should be withdrawn from him. Hence the sentence: “In the day thou sinnest, thou shalt die.” Every act of sin should thus, in strict justice, be followed by death, the violent and instant death of its author. The sinner, it is true, no longer understands this; for sin stupefies the conscience at the same time that it corrupts the heart and perverts the will. Such, then, is the law which must be set in the light of day before pardon is granted, and that it may be granted. Otherwise the sovereign majesty of God on the one side, and the criminal character of the sinner on the other, would remain shrouded in the conscience of the pardoned sinner; and such a pardon, instead of laying a foundation for his restoration, would consummate his degradation and entail his eternal ruin. Thus are justified the two qualifications of the means of propitiation indicated here by the apostle: in blood and by faith; in other terms 1. The judgment of God on sin by the shedding of blood; 2. The adherence of the guilty to this judgment by faith. The apostolic utterance may consequently be paraphrased thus: “Jesus Christ, whom God settled beforehand as the means of propitiation on the condition of faith, through the shedding of His blood.”

Blood does not certainly denote the holy consecration of life in general. It is purely arbitrary to seek any other meaning in the word than it naturally expresses, the fact of a violent and bloody death. This signification is specially obvious in a passage where the word is found in such direct connection with ἱλαστήριον (propitiation), in which there is concentrated the whole symbolism of the Jewish sacrifices.

The relation commonly maintained between propitiation (the act which renders God favorable) and blood is this: the blood of the Messiah, shed as an equivalent for that of sinners, is the indemnity offered to God's justice to purchase the pardon granted by love. But it must be observed that this relation is not stated by the apostle himself, and that the term ἱλάσκεσθαι, to render propitious, does not necessarily contain the idea of an indemnity paid in the form of a quantitative equivalent. The word denotes in general the act, whatever it be, in consequence of which God, who was displaying His wrath, is led to display His grace, and to pardon. This propitiatory act is, Luke 18:13-14, the cry of the penitent publican; Psalms 51:17, the sacrifice of a broken and contrite heart. In the supreme and final redemption which we have in Christ, the way of propitiation is more painful and decisive. The apostle has just told us in what it consists; he proceeds in the words which follow to explain to us its object: for the demonstration of His justice.

The term demonstration is remarkable. If the apostle had in view a payment offered to justice in compensation for the death which sinful men have merited, he would rather have said: “for the satisfaction of His justice.” The word manifestation seems to belong to a somewhat different order of ideas. But let us begin with fixing the meaning of the principal expression: the righteousness of God. Luther has connected it with justification. But in this case the contrast with the time of God's long-suffering, Romans 3:26, becomes unintelligible, and the two last terms of the same verse: “that He might be just and the justifier,” could not be distinguished from one another. So all interpreters agree to take the word as indicating a divine attribute which, long veiled, was put in the light of day by the cross. Which attribute is it? Justice sometimes denoting moral perfection in general, each commentator has taken the term used by Paul as expressing the special attribute which agreed best with his system in regard to the work of redemption. It has been taken to express (1) Goodness (Theodor., Abel., Grot., Seml., etc.); (2) Veracity or fidelity (Ambr., Beza, Turret.); (3) Holiness (Nitzsch, Neand., Hofm., Lipsius); (4) Righteousness as justifying and sanctifying (the Greek Fathers, Mel., Calv., Oltram.) this meaning is almost identical with Luther's; (5) Righteousness in so far as it carries the salvation of the elect to its goal; such is the meaning of Ritschl, which comes very near No. 3; (6) Retributive justice in God, considered here specially as the principle of the punishment of sin (de Wette, Mey., Philip.). The first five meanings all fall before one common objection; the Greek language, and Paul's vocabulary in particular, have special terms terms to express each of those particular attributes: χρηστότης, goodness; ἀλήθεια, veracity; πίστις, faithfulness; χάρις, grace; ἁγιωσύνη, holiness. Why not use one of these definite terms, instead of introducing into this so important didactic passage a term fitted to occasion the gravest misunderstandings, if it was really to be taken in a sense different from its usual and natural signification? Now this signification is certainly that of No. 6: justice, as the mode of action whereby God maintains the right of every being, and consequently order throughout the whole moral universe, blessing him who has respect to this order, visiting with punishment him who violates it. The essence of God is the absolute love of the good, His holiness (Isaiah 6:3: “Holy, holy, holy”...). Now, the good is order, the normal relation between all free beings, from God Himself to the last of them. The attribute of justice, eternally latent in holiness, passes into the active state with the appearance of the free creature. For in the fact of freedom there was included the possibility of disorder, and this possibility soon passed into reality. God's abhorrence of evil, His holiness, thus displays itself in the form of justice preserving order and maintaining right. Now, to maintain order without suppressing liberty, there is but one means, and that is punishment. Punishment is order in disorder. It is the revelation of disorder to the sinner's conscience by means of suffering. It is consequently, or at least may be, the point of departure for the reestablishment of order, of the normal relation of free beings. Thus is explained the notion of the justice of God, so often proclaimed in Scripture (John 17:25; 2 Thessalonians 1:5; 2 Timothy 4:8; Revelation 16:5; Revelation 19:2; Revelation 19:11, etc.); and especially Romans 2:5 et seq., where we see the δικαιοκρισία, the just judgment, distributing among men wrath and tribulation (Romans 3:8-9), glory and peace (Romans 3:7-10).

This meaning which we give with Scripture to the word justice, and which is in keeping with its generally received use, is also the only one, as we shall see, which suits the context of this passage, and especially the words which follow.

How was the cross the manifestation of the justice of God? In two ways so closely united, that either of them separated from the other would lose its value. 1. By the very fact of Christ's sufferings and bloody death. If Paul does not see in this punishment a quantitative equivalent of the treatment which every sinner had incurred, this is what clearly appears from such sayings as 2 Corinthians 5:21: “God made Him sin for us; ” Galatians 3:13: “Christ hath redeemed us from the curse of the law, being made a curse for us. ” Now, herein precisely consists the manifestation of the righteousness wrought out on the cross. God is here revealed as one against whom no creature can revolt without meriting death; and the sinner is here put in his place in the dust as a malefactor worthy of death. Such is the objective manifestation of righteousness. 2. This demonstration, however striking, would be incomplete without the subjective or moral manifestation which accompanies it. Every sinner might be called to die on a cross. But no sinner was in a condition to undergo this punishment as Jesus did, accepting it as deserved. This is what He alone could do in virtue of His holiness. The calm and mute resignation with which He allowed Himself to be led to the slaughter, manifested the idea which He Himself formed of the majesty of God and the judgment He was passing on the sin of the world; from His cross there rose the most perfect homage rendered to the righteousness of God. In this death the sin of mankind was therefore doubly judged, and the righteousness of God doubly manifested by the external fact of this painful and ignominious punishment, and by the inward act of Christ's conscience, which ratified this dealing of which sin was the object in His person.

But now it will be asked what rendered such a demonstration necessary: Because, says St. Paul, of the tolerance exercised in regard to sins done aforetime.

For four thousand years the spectacle presented by mankind to the whole moral universe (comp. 1 Corinthians 4:9) was, so to speak, a continual scandal. With the exception of some great examples of judgments, divine righteousness seemed to be asleep; one might even have asked if it existed. Men sinned here below, and yet they lived. They sinned on, and yet reached in safety a hoary old age!...Where were the wages of sin? It was this relative impunity which rendered a solemn manifestation of righteousness necessary. Many commentators have completely mistaken the meaning of this passage, by giving to the word πάρεσις, which we have translated tolerance, the sense of pardon (Orig., Luth., Calv., Calov.; see also the Geneva translation of 1557, and, following it, Osterv. etc.). This first mistake has led to another. There has been given to the preposition διά the meaning of by, which it cannot have when governing the accusative, or it has been translated in view of, which would have required the preposition εἰς. The first error lies in confounding the term πάρεσις (tolerance, impunity) with ἄφεσις (remission, pardon). The second of these substantives comes from the verb ἀφίεναι, to send away, dismiss, pardon (remittere); while the first used here comes from the verb παρίεναι, to let pass, neglect, not to occupy oneself with (praetermittere); nearly the same idea as that expressed by the word ὑπεριδεῖν, to close the eyes to, Acts 18:30. The signification of the verb παρίεναι appears clearly from the two following passages: Sir 23:2 : “Lest sins should remain unpunished (μὴ παριῶνται τὰ ά μαρτήματα);” and Xenophon, Hipparchic. 7.10: “Such sins must not be allowed to pass unpunished (τὰ οὗν τοιαῦτα ἁμαρτήματα οὐ χρὴ παρίεναι ἀκόλαστα).” It is worthy of remark also that in these two places sin is designated by the same word ἁμάρτημα as Paul employs in our passage: sin in the form of positive fault, transgression. The real sense of πάρεσις is therefore not doubtful. It has been given by Theodor., Grot., Beng.; it is now almost universally received (Thol., Olsh., Mey., Fritzs., Rück., de Wette, Philip. etc.). The διά can thus receive its true meaning (with the accusative): on account of; and the idea of the passage becomes clear: God judged it necessary, on account of the impunity so long enjoyed by those myriads of sinners who succeeded one another on the earth, at length to manifest His justice by a striking act; and He did so by realizing in the death of Jesus the punishment which each of those sinners would have deserved to undergo.

Ritschl, who, on account of his theory regarding the righteousness of God (see on Romans 1:18), could not accept this meaning, supposes another interpretation (II. p. 217 et seq.). Tolerance (πάρεσις) is not, according to him, contrasted with merited punishment, but with the pardon which God has finally granted. Romans 3:25 would thus signify that till the coming of Jesus Christ, God had only exercised patience without pardoning, but that in Christ the justice of God (His faithfulness to the salvation of His elect) had advanced so far as to give complete pardon. But where then, asks Gess, is this only, so necessary to indicate the advance from tolerance to pardon? The natural contrast to impunity is not pardon, but punishment; comp. Romans 2:4-5, and the parallel passage to ours, Acts 17:30-31: “ The times of ignorance God winked at, but now commandeth men to repent, because He hath appointed a day in which He will judge the world in righteousness. ” Finally, it is impossible on this interpretation to give a natural meaning to the words on account of. For pardon was not given because of the impunity exercised toward those sins. Paul would have required to say, either: because of those sins themselves, or: following up the long tolerance exercised toward them.

Several commentators (Calovius, for example) refer the expression: sins done aforetime, not to the sins of mankind who lived before Christ, but to those committed by every believer before his conversion. It is difficult in this sense to explain the words which follow: at this time, which form an antithesis to the former. We must apply them to the moment when each sinner in particular believes. But this meaning does not correspond to the gravity of the expression: at this time, in which the apostle evidently contrasts the period of completion with that of general impunity, and even with the eternal decree (the πρόθεσις).

It may be further asked if these sins done aforetime are those of all mankind anterior to Christ, or perhaps, as Philippi thinks, only those of the Jews. The argument which this commentator derives from the meaning of ἱλαστήριον, the lid of the ark, the propitiatory so called, has of course no weight with us. Might one be found in the remarkable parallel, Hebrews 9:15: “The transgressions that were under the first testament”? No, for this restricted application follows naturally from the particular aim of the Epistle to the Hebrews (comp. for example, Romans 2:16). It may even be said that the demonstration of which the apostle speaks was less necessary for Israel than for the rest of mankind. For the sacrifices instituted by God were already a homage rendered to his justice. But this homage was not sufficient; for there was wanting in it that which gives value to the sacrifice of Christ; the victim underwent death, but did not accept it. Hence it was that the death of the Messiah necessarily closed the long series of the Levitical sacrifices. No more can we receive the opinion of Beza, Cocceius, Morison, who think the sins that are past are those of the faithful of the Old Testament whom God pardoned from regard to the future sacrifice of Christ. The article τῶν (“ the sins”) does not admit of this restriction, which there is nothing else to indicate. And the sacrifice of Christ cannot be explained here by an end so special.

But if it is asked why Paul gives as the reason for this sacrifice only the past and not the future sins of mankind, as if the death of Christ did not apply equally to the latter, the answer is easy, from the apostle's stand-point: the righteousness of God once revealed in the sacrifice of the cross, this demonstration remains. Whatever happens, nothing can again efface it from the history of the world, nor from the conscience of mankind. Henceforth no illusion is possible: all sin must be pardoned or judged.

Regarded from the point of view here taken by the apostle, the death of Jesus is in the history of humanity, something like what would emerge in the life of a sinner had he a time of perfect lucidity when, his conscience being miraculously brought into one with the mind of God regarding sin, he should judge himself as God judges him. Such a moment would be to this man the starting-point of a total transformation. Thus the demonstration of righteousness given to the world by the cross of Christ at the close of the long economy of sin tolerated, founded the new epoch, and with the possibility of pardon established the principle of the radical renewal of humanity.